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Abstract 
 
By using a poststructuralist feminist perspective and by analysing empirical cases from a 
Western ‗war on terror‘ culture, this thesis argues that representations of female agency in 
political violence are told as stories of heroines, monsters and victims through a Myth of 
Motherhood. I conceptualise the Myth of Motherhood as a meta-discourse constituted by 
different discourses within each type of story. In all stories, a tension between identities of 
life-giving and life-taking is present which means that motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ albeit not 
necessarily highly visible. Thus, these stories are versions, perversions and inversions of 
motherhood. In heroine stories, this takes place as the subject‘s heroism is communicated 
through motherhood/lack of motherhood. In monster stories, the Myth of Motherhood is 
communicated as ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised and defined as that which the monster is 
not. In victim stories, female subjects are denied agency which means that a life-taking 
identity is removed whereas a life-giving identity is promoted communicating the Myth of 
Motherhood. I argue that motherhood is not simply a discourse denying women agency in 
political violence, but motherhood is also instrumental as to how agency in political violence 
is enabled. As such motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ in representations of female agency in 
political violence and needs to be analysed in order to understand how representations of 
female agency in political violence are gendered. This is why it is useful to think about 
motherhood as a myth.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For researchers of world politics, war presents political puzzles. 
(Moore 2006: 187) 
ETA bombs ‗planted by a woman‘. (Unattributed, Metro, 11/08/2009) 
My interest for this study was initially sparked by the media coverage of the British naval 
officer Faye Turney when she, together with fifteen other marines and sailors, was held 
hostage in Iran for two weeks in 2007. Being a woman and a mother, Turney was singled out 
and treated very differently to that of the other naval officers, who were all male. The focus 
on Turney‘s gendered identity as female rather than as a soldier annoyed me. Something was 
clearly going on in these representations as femininity and masculinity was depicted and 
portrayed in particular ways, inscribed with meaning and value. In addition, this research 
project was also inspired by a general interest in the way in which female perpetrators of 
political violence, in particular ‗terrorists‘ or other unlawful combatants, were represented in 
various media outlets. I had noticed the emphasis on the perpetrator‘s gender/ sex, but also 
that acts in which the perpetrator of political violence was female tended to be presented as 
extra shocking or extra ‗bad‘ resulting in rather disproportional coverage. As the second quote 
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above shows, acts by female perpetrators also seemed to be taken as less ‗real‘ or 
communicating a sense of surprise. Above, the information about a terrorist activity 
performed by a female ETA member is put within quotation marks indicating the uncertainty 
of this information. 
Intrigued by a political puzzle of gender, agency and war, I decided to analyse representations 
of female agency in political violence in greater detail. More specifically, I wanted to 
investigate the communicative process of representations in order to explore understandings 
and ideas about gender, agency and political violence within a specific cultural setting.  
In this introductory chapter, I first show how the political puzzle that sparked my interest for 
this project is not only understudied in the academic field of International Relations (IR), but 
also within feminist scholarship. Then, I explain the aims of the project, I introduce the 
empirical cases selected for analysis and, last, I give a brief outline of how the thesis is 
structured.  
 
 
2. WHY STUDY FEMALE AGENCY IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE? 
For most of its history, the academic discipline of IR failed to notice the relevance of gender 
in international politics. In the late 1980s, feminist interventions such as Jean Bethke 
Elshtain‘s Women and War (1995), Cynthia Enloe‘s Bananas, Beaches and Bases (2000) and 
J. Ann Tickner‘s Gender in International Relations (1992) not only made ‗feminist sense of 
international politics‘ (Enloe 2000) but also coincided with, and contributed to, the so-called 
fourth debate in IR theory regarding epistemology, ontology and methodology. In the debate 
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between positivism and postpositivism; between explaining and understanding; and between 
problem-solving and critical theories of IR (Steans 2006: 22; Kurki and Wight 2007: 20), this 
research project, as most feminist contributions, is situated within the latter categories.
1
 Thus, 
while it offers specific contributions to feminist IR and feminist security studies, it also 
contributes to critical IR theory, broadly defined, in a general sense due to its interpretative 
epistemology and methodological engagement with visual and cultural realms. As such, the 
appeal of this research project reaches further than just feminist IR.  
Today, it has become commonplace to look for representations of gender in popular cultural 
artefacts such as advertisements, novels, films or television programmes (Shepherd 2009: 
245) and female heroism, for example as ‗tough girls‘, ‗action chicks‘ (Inness 1999; 2004) 
and ‗violent femmes‘ (White 2007) has been explored within cultural studies. Yet, in 
International Relations (IR) analyses of female agency in political violence are still limited. 
One of the first insights in feminist IR was that within traditional stories about war and peace, 
men and masculinities are linked to war, whereas women and femininity are associated with 
peace (Elshtain 1995). As a result, female agency in war is commonly associated with work 
for peace or agency is denied as women are portrayed as victims of war only. Valuable 
contributions that counter notions of women‘s ‗natural‘ peacefulness have so far focused on 
women‘s participation in nationalist or ethnic warfare (Alison 2004; Bracewell 1996), in civil 
wars (Coulter 2008) and as female suicide bombers/‗terrorists‘ (Eager 2008; Brunner 2005). 
Some have noted that women have been described as either taking more pleasure in the 
bloodshed than male combatants (Bourke 1999: 312), or as more aggressive in comparison to 
male soldiers (Eager 2008; Coulter 2008; Alison 2004). Others have shown how female 
perpetrators of political violence are often seen to be motivated by personal connections and 
                                                             
1
 For contributions engaging with the ‗communication‘ between feminism and traditional IR, see Tickner (1997), 
Steans (2003), Ackerley et al. (2006), Zalewski (2007). 
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grievances rather than by their political ambitions (Nacos 2005; Brunner 2005; West 2004). 
These contributions, however, offer analyses of agency in political violence defined as 
political subjectivity rather than subject positions, which is what this research project 
explores. Furthermore, within a ‗war on terror‘ context, feminist contributions have shown 
how gendered systems of meaning and representation have enabled, justified or promoted the 
wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq (for example Shepherd 2006; Hunt and Rygiel 2006; 
Ferguson 2005; Young 2003). However, I argue it is equally important to explore how stories 
of war, rescue and heroism are used to police gender norms at home. Caron Gentry argues 
that: 
The manufacturing of women‘s political activism as part of their 
biological function as mothers tells the reader more about the story-
teller (the one who manufactures the narrative about women‘s 
proscribed violence) and less about women‘s agency. (Gentry 2009: 
247) 
In IR, motherhood has perhaps most clearly been theorized from a feminist standpoint 
perspective. Sara Ruddick‘s Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (1989) in which 
motherhood and mothering is theorised as an alternative to the way in which global politics is 
conducted is a prime example. More recently, contributions to the study of female agency in 
political violence have also engaged with motherhood. In particular, Sjoberg and Gentry‘s 
Mothers, Monsters, Whores (2007) and Caron Gentry‘s ‗Twisted Maternalism‘ (2009) are 
worth mentioning here. Both explore the way in which women‘s violence is explained 
through discourses of motherhood. For Sjoberg and Gentry, motherhood is one (out of three) 
type of narrative in which women‘s violence is made sense of and Caron Gentry shows how a 
discourse of motherhood is used to deny women agency in political violence. While this 
research project offers an elaboration of Sjoberg and Gentry‘s three-part framework and 
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builds on their contribution to the field, it goes beyond explaining how women‘s agency in 
political violence is denied through discourses of motherhood and argues that motherhood is 
also fundamental in order to understand how female agency in political violence is enabled. In 
part, this is made possible with the use of a much broader definition of agency in political 
violence.  
As I note below, this research project differs from the existing literature on female agency in 
political violence in several ways. First, as mentioned above, while most contributions tend to 
focus on a definition of agency linked to political subjectivity, how individuals act, I follow 
Judith Butler‘s understanding of agency and analyse how agency is represented through 
discourses which produce subjects, not individuals. I do not analyse political subjectivity, but 
the subject position of ‗female‘ in discourses of political violence and the representations of 
agency held by that subject. Second, in contrast to most of the literature on female agency in 
political violence, I use a broader definition of political violence which encompasses both 
legitimate and illegitimate agency:
2
 I define agency in political violence as the ‗capacity to 
kill‘. The reason for this theoretical move is not only that it is a capacity to kill that unites 
female subjects with agency, whether they are soldiers of a state army or ‗terrorists‘, but it is 
also the only way in which it is possible to capture the idea of women killing. I argue it is the 
idea of women killing, the capacity to kill, not whether or not they actually take life and in 
what role they take life, that is most provoking, shocking and, in the end, at odds and clashing 
with the Myth of Motherhood which captures the capacity to give life. Hence, I use a broader 
definition of agency in political violence to facilitate making the Myth of Motherhood 
visible/conscious. Third, in line with a poststructuralist account of female agency in political 
violence, I argue that it is only by looking to the story-teller(s) that we can understand how 
                                                             
2 This is not my valued judgement on whether agency is legitimate or not, but a distinction present within this 
specific cultural context. 
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gender norms have been reinforced in the cultural context of the ‗war on terror‘ and 
subsequently think differently about gender, agency and political violence. By this I mean we 
need to focus on representations of female agency in political violence because such 
representations inform us not only how female agency in political violence is understood but 
also what such understandings might mean for everyday life in our societies. Fourth, related 
to the focus on representations is the point that while most of the existing literature on female 
agency in political violence in IR tend to focus on narratives or ‗framing patterns‘ (Nacos 
2005), I do not distinguish between different forms of representations. Inspired by, and 
indebted to, contributions such as Der Derian and Shapiro (1989), Bleiker (2001; 2009), 
Campbell (2003), Weber (2005) and Weldes (1999; 2003b) that have engaged with the 
cultural and the visual realm, I include visual representations from ‗mass culture‘ (Weldes 
1999) in my analysis. I do this because culture has to do with how we make sense of the 
world and how we produce, reproduce and circulate that sense (Weber 2005: 3). Culture is 
about how meanings are made. Consequently, since meaning construction is not limited to 
written text, there is no point in restricting analyses of the world in such a way. In this sense, 
popular culture has just as much to tell us about understandings of gender, agency and 
political violence as do more traditional sources of data and visual representations are equally 
important for the construction of meaning and knowledge. 
 
 
3. AIMS 
The first of three related aims of this study is to offer a poststructuralist account of gender, 
agency and political violence. As briefly touched upon above, I do so by analysing 
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representations of agency, by using a broader definition of political violence as well as of 
representation, and by exploring what gendered representations mean on a domestic level. 
The second aim is to demonstrate not only how representations of female agency in political 
violence are gendered but to show that the same gendered war stories are produced in both 
mass media and popular culture. The third aim of this research project is to show that 
motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ in representations of female agency in political violence and to 
demonstrate that motherhood is not just one narrative out of many through which women‘s 
agency in political violence is denied, but motherhood is also about how agency in political 
violence is enabled. Because motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ it is providing the key to 
understanding how representations of female agency in political violence are gendered. This 
is why it is useful to think about motherhood as a myth. Accordingly, I introduce the Myth of 
Motherhood and show how discourses of political violence are not only linked to each other 
but also constitutive of the myth. In this way, the myth functions as a meta-discourse 
disciplining representations of female agency in political violence.  
These aims, together and separately, make theoretical and methodological contributions to 
critical IR theory and critical security studies in general and feminist IR in particular. It 
enriches debates about the interpenetration of popular culture in IR and it enhances 
poststructuralist accounts of gender, agency and political violence in feminist IR. In order to 
make such contributions to knowledge, I have constructed an elaborate theoretical and 
methodological framework influenced and inspired by contributions to cultural studies. While 
the chosen approach of analysis is original, it also brings challenges and limitations for the 
research project as a whole. In the last section of my concluding chapter, I re-visit such 
challenges and critically reflect upon the empirical findings and the conclusions of the 
research project altogether. 
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4. EMPIRICAL CASES 
This research speaks directly to, and aims to make a contribution to, the feminist IR literature 
on gender, agency and political violence described in greater detail in Chapter 4. As 
mentioned above, one of the project‘s aims is to fill a gap in the existing literature by 
analysing gender, agency and political violence in non-traditional spaces such as popular 
culture. For this reason, I have chosen to analyse three ‗real‘ empirical cases and three 
fictional empirical cases. I put ‗real‘ within citation marks because following my theoretical 
and methodological framework, I argue that both ‗real‘ and fictional cases are representations 
of events. They are both part of story-telling. 
The cases I have chosen to analyse are Faye Turney, Lynndie England, Janis Karpinski, Britz 
(2007), Female Agents (2008) and The Baader-Meinhof Complex (2008). First, as mentioned 
above, Faye Turney was one of fifteen British sailors and marines held captive in Iran for two 
weeks in the spring of 2007. She was not only the only woman in the group but she was also a 
mother. The media attention during and after the event was predominantly focused on Turney 
and her role as a woman/mother. As a result, this is an excellent case for a study of gender, 
agency and political violence through motherhood. Lynndie England was one of three female 
US military police officers who got punished for their involvement in the so-called Abu 
Ghraib prison scandal in 2004. England remains the most famous face associated with the 
scandal and was by far the most written and published about. The disproportional focus on 
England, as well as her pregnancy, validates the selection of this case. Janis Karpinski was the 
US General in charge of all military police officers tasked with prisoner-of-war-operations in 
Iraq at the time of the Abu Ghraib scandal, including some of the military police officers 
depicted in the infamous photos. Karpinski was the first female General to command troops in 
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combat and she remains the only General ever to have been demoted in US military history. 
Karpinski‘s unusual high military rank for a woman and even more unusual subsequent 
demotion is the reason for why I have chosen this case. Britz is a Channel 4 television drama 
in two parts about a British female suicide bomber from 2007. Nasima, the main character, 
uses motherhood as a tactical strategy as she wears a maternity suit in order to hide 
explosives. As such, Britz offers an excellent account of how gender, agency and political 
violence is played out through motherhood. Female Agents is a French film from 2008 about 
a group of women who fought as agents for the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
during the Second World War when France was occupied by Germany. Female Agents was 
promoted with the slogan ‗heroism is not only for men‘ and, thereby, it attempts to 
retrospectively assign heroism to those women who played an active part in the war. Thus, 
this case is chosen because of its outspoken focus on female heroism. Last, The Baader-
Meinhof Complex from 2008 tells the story about the German left-wing terrorist organisation 
Red Army Faction (RAF) and their actions during the 1970s. The RAF, sometimes referred to 
as the Baader-Meinhof group after Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, included a large 
number of women in prominent roles. Thus, this case is chosen because of the high visibility 
of female ‗terrorists‘ and because of the references to a ‗war on terror‘. A more detailed 
description of, and the rationale for choosing, each case is provided in Chapter 3. In order to 
clarify who is who in the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, there is also an overview of 
each case and an alphabetical list of all empirical characters presented between Chapter 4 and 
5. 
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5. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical insights that underpin this project: poststructuralism, 
feminism and myth as inspired by Roland Barthes‘ work. I conceptualise the Myth of 
Motherhood as a meta-discourse disciplining representations of female agency in political 
violence. In Chapter 3, I discuss methodological concepts, including representations and mass 
culture, which are fundamental to this research project, and I situate these within discourse 
analysis. I also demonstrate how and why I am conducting a discourse analysis, what I will 
analyse (visual and textual representations) and where I will look for such representations 
(mass culture). Here, I also give an extended account for the rationale for choosing the 
empirical cases included in my analysis and I describe specific methods used to analyse the 
empirical data.  
In Chapter 4, I investigate the existing academic literature on gender, agency and political 
violence to which this research project aims to make a contribution. In the first section, I 
examine literature regarding gender and war in a broad sense. I discuss how women have 
traditionally been positioned in the role of victim, how female agency in war is most often 
linked to work for peace rather than participation in warfare, and how female heroism 
traditionally has been linked to motherhood. In the second section, I address literature 
regarding female perpetrators of political violence more specifically. I explore literature that 
deals with women‘s indirect agency in wars and political violence, literature that has shown 
that female agency is in fact denied, and literature that engages with women‘s proscribed 
violence. In the conclusion, I clarify how this research project makes original contributions to 
the existing literature. It does so in five main ways: by analysing visual representations of 
female agency in political violence; by using data from popular culture; by using a broader 
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definition of agency in political violence which encompass both legitimate and illegitimate 
agency; by arguing that ‗motherhood‘ is useful to think of as a myth, a meta-discourse 
disciplining representations of female agency in political violence; and by exploring how 
stories of war, rescue and heroism are used to police gender norms on a domestic level. 
Chapter 5-7 are the three empirical chapters. In order to show the complexity of 
representations of female agency in political violence, I decided to not divide the chapters up 
based on the different empirical cases. Instead, the discourses constituting the Myth of 
Motherhood guide the structure and the chapters are divided into three different ways in 
which the Myth of Motherhood is constituted: as versions, perversions and inversions of 
Motherhood. This means that it is possible that cases and characters simultaneously appear in 
all three empirical chapters. In Chapter 5, I show how stories of heroines are ordered by three 
different discourses: the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother and the Non-Mother. Here, the 
female subject is either written as an empty womb, in maternal language or as a masculine 
subject. Because of the centrality of motherhood/lack of motherhood, I argue that in 
representations of female agency in political violence heroine stories are all versions of 
motherhood. This is how the Myth of Motherhood is constantly being reinforced in such 
stories. 
In Chapter 6, I engage with how monsters are constructed and what function they fulfil. I 
show how stories of monsters are constructed through transgressions of gender boundaries 
constituting the Myth of Motherhood. These stories of ‗unnatural‘ femininity are influenced 
by three different discourses: the Monstrous-Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme 
Castratrice. Due to the close association between ‗natural‘ femininity and motherhood, I 
argue that these discourses are producing stories of perversions of motherhood as the 
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monster/subject is disrupting ‗natural‘ femininity. I argue that monster stories serve to 
highlight the boundary between ‗natural‘ and ‗unnatural‘ femininity in order to emphasise 
‗natural‘ femininity. Thus, even though the monster itself is disrupting the idea of ‗natural‘ 
femininity, what is communicated in these stories overall is still an emphasis on ‗natural‘ 
femininity which functions to constitute the Myth of Motherhood. 
In Chapter 7, I explore stories of victims in representations of female agency in political 
violence. I argue that discourses of Vulnerability and Emotionality influence such stories and 
function to deny the female subject agency in political violence. This takes place as female 
perpetrators of political violence who are represented as victims are portrayed as less than 
adult, as childlike, and therefore not deemed capable of raising children of their own. This is 
how agency is linked to adulthood and this is why I argue that victim stories are about 
inversions of motherhood. I show how female subjects are either written as vulnerable and 
passive objects in need of protection or as emotional and, therefore, weak subjects driven by 
personal motivations. Thus, by writing female agents of political violence as victims, not only 
is their agency in such violence denied, but because of gendered ideas about women‘s and 
men‘s roles during warfare as explained in Chapter 4, appropriate femininity is also rescued. 
This is how the Myth of Motherhood is reproduced in victim stories. 
In Chapter 8, I draw together the strands of argument developed in the chapters above and 
reflect on the implications of these findings. In the first section, I restate my argument that 
representations of female agency in political violence are told as stories of heroines, monsters 
and victims. Then, I argue that motherhood is not simply a narrative in which women‘s 
agency in political violence is denied, but motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ in representations of 
female agency in political violence. Heroine stories are told as versions of motherhood, 
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monster stories are told as perversions of motherhood and victim stories are inversions of 
motherhood. As a result, I make the case for thinking of motherhood as a myth. In the last 
section, I critically reflect upon strengths and weaknesses of my theoretical and 
methodological framework and discuss avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
THEORY 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I introduce the Myth of Motherhood as a conceptual fusion of the three main 
influences of this theoretical framework: poststructuralism, feminism and Roland Barthes‘ 
mythology framework. In the first section, I describe poststructuralist thought and discuss 
concepts relevant to this research project such as discourse, representation and meaning. In 
the second section, I introduce feminist theorising in general and the compatibility of 
poststructuralism and feminism in particular before I explain how I use concepts such as 
gender, sex, heteronormativity, subject and agency. The specific concepts discussed in the 
sub-sections are chosen not only because they clarify what a poststructuralist account of 
female agency in political violence entails and what it can offer to the existing literature, but 
also because these concepts are the foundations of the theoretical framework. As such, they 
will implicitly inform and guide the structure of the following chapters. In the third section, I 
introduce Roland Barthes‘ mythology framework as a theoretical inspiration for this research 
project. Indebted to the work of Cynthia Weber and Craig Saper, I explain how the mythology 
framework is compatible with poststructuralist theorising. In the conclusion, I conceptualise 
the Myth of Motherhood which, I argue, functions as a meta-discourse that both link and 
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discipline representations of female agency in political violence along essentialist ideas about 
gender, agency and political violence.  
 
 
2. POSTSTRUCTURALISM 
2.1 Introducing poststructuralism 
Richard Ashley argues that the task of poststructuralist scholarship is to: 
[C]ome to terms with the knowledgeable practices by which limits are 
imposed and paradigmatically inscribed, thus, to enable resistance to 
those practices, the transgression of those limits, and, with these 
transgressions, new cultural connections and new modes of political 
seeing, saying, and being. (Ashley 1989: 284)    
Accordingly, it is important to explore what structures and practices are repeated; how modes 
of order are produced, imposed, problematised and resisted. It is also important to study 
effects of continuity, effects of social spacing and framing, effects in the administration of 
social time, as well as to understand the workings of power and power‘s relation to 
knowledge (Ashley 1989: 279). In other words, by examining the limits of the present, it is 
possible to think and move beyond them (Lloyd 2005: 118). Furthermore, poststructuralism is 
no specific philosophy or a single theoretical framework. Rather, the history of 
poststructuralism as a form of textual and discursive enquiry has generated diverse, lengthy 
and competing accounts of itself (Baxter 2003: 21). Still, poststructuralism has a particular 
interest in language as constructing meaning and knowledge, and in critiquing the ways in 
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which competing forms of knowledge and the power interests these serve aspire to fix 
meaning once and for all (Baxter 2003: 23). It is only through the construction in language 
that ‗things‘, objects, subjects, states, living beings and material structures, are given meaning 
and endowed with a particular identity. This means that language is both social and political. 
The social aspect means that individuals are socialised into connecting sounds with particular 
objects and into a larger set of political discourses on, for example, ‗national security‘, 
‗democracy‘, and ‗the rule of law‘ (Hansen 2006: 18). Language as political means that 
discourses themselves are practices that systematically form or create the objects that they 
speak of. Discourses themselves produce knowledge and meaning (Baxter 2003: 7). 
Understanding language as a field of social and political practice in this way suggests there is 
no objective or ‗true meaning‘ even though discourses always strive to fix meaning around a 
closed structure. Instead, truth is understood as an effect of discourses, language and 
practices: 
Truth claims are generated by certain constellations of discourses, 
practices and institutions and they secure particular effects in the 
world. They determine whose voice matters in a specific context; they 
govern what qualifies as legitimate knowledge and what does not; 
they set the boundaries between ‗truth‘ and ‗falsity‘. (Lloyd 2005: 
125) 
Hence, instead of an absolute ‗truth‘, multiple, partial, contested and situated ‗truths‘ are 
found (Roseneil 1999: 165). Furthermore, this also means that individuals are never outside of 
cultural forces or discursive practices, but always ‗subject‘ to them. Their identities are 
determined by a range of ‗subject positions‘ (‗ways of being‘), approved by their culture and 
made available to them by means of the particular discourses operating within a given 
discursive context (Baxter 2003: 25). In other words, language and systems of representation 
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do not reflect an already existing reality so much as they organise, construct and mediate our 
understanding of reality, emotion and imagination (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 12-13).  
Because meaning is never finally fixed but always being negotiated and inflected to resonate 
with new situations (Hall 1997: 9), a poststructuralist analysis is not interested in attempting 
to interpret and fix a meaning central to a particular text or set of practices (Ashley 1989: 
278). Instead, poststructuralist theory is generally used in order to understand how meanings 
are produced rather than explaining why something occurs. According to Roxanne Doty, 
research projects asking why-questions are incomplete in that they presuppose a particular 
‗background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as 
well as the actors themselves‘ (Doty 1993: 298). Instead, by posing how-questions, 
poststructuralist research manages to deal with an important aspect of power that why-
questions too often neglect. This kind of power is productive of meanings, subject identities, 
their interrelationships and a range of imaginable conduct (Doty 1993: 299). In this way, what 
is explained is not why a particular outcome happened, but rather how the subjects, objects 
and interpretative dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made 
possible (Doty 1993: 298). This is how discourses are ‗practices of power by which the 
proliferation of meaning is disciplined and narrative structure is imposed upon history‘ 
(Ashley 1989: 282).  
Moreover, by re-politicising dominant representations, poststructuralist analyses call attention 
to the inclusions and exclusions involved in producing that which appears to be natural, fixed 
and timeless and argue that the political action which follows from naturalised understandings 
could be pursued differently (Campbell 2007: 225). This is the case because discourses 
exclude or silence contesting interpretations. In this way, discourses at the same time 
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construct the meaning, empower and fix the limits of socially recognised modes of 
objectivity, subjectivity and the conduct that is taken as the natural way of doing things 
(Ashley 1989: 282). This is how discourses are political practices and, as a result, knowledge 
is a matter of power and politics. Consequently, by analysing discursive structures of 
meaning-in-use (Milliken 1999), poststructuralism can offer something more than critique, it 
can offer a way to think differently about that which is taken for granted. It can critique that 
which is considered common sense.  
 
2.2 Representations: Connecting meaning and language to culture 
In this sub-section, I explain some concepts associated with poststructuralist theorising and 
crucial to this research project. These concepts give us access to the manifold aspects of 
power relations which inform representations and, as such, they offer insights into how 
meanings are made and communicated. In other words, these concepts clarify how I conduct a 
poststructuralist study.  
From a poststructuralist perspective, there is no ‗extra-discursive‘ materiality that is 
independent of its discursive representation (Hansen 2006: 25). However, this insight has 
been critiqued for denying reality as the argument has sometimes been misinterpreted from 
Foucault‘s insight that ‗nothing has any meaning outside of discourse‘ to ‗there is nothing 
outside of discourse‘ (Hall 1997: 44-5). Hence, poststructuralist theorising does not deny that 
things can have a real, material existence in the world. In fact, discourse incorporates material 
as well as ideational factors (Hansen 2006: 17). 
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Elements such as sounds, words, gestures, expressions, clothes are 
part of our natural and material world but their importance for 
language is not what they are but what they do, their function. They 
construct meaning and transmit it. They signify. They do not have any 
clear meaning in themselves. (Hall 1997: 5, emphasis in original.)  
In other words, the concept of discourse is not about whether things exist but about where 
meaning comes from (Hall 1997: 45). The point is not to disregard material facts but to study 
how these are produced and prioritised (Hansen 2006: 22). In Judith Butler‘s words: 
Language and materiality are fully embedded in each other, chiasmic 
in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another, 
i.e., reduced to one another, and yet neither fully ever exceeds the 
other. Always already implicated in each other, always already 
exceeding one another, language and materiality are never fully 
identical nor fully different. (Butler 1993: 69)  
I use discourse as ‗structures of meaning-in-use‘ (Milliken 1999: 231) and culture as ‗shared 
meanings‘ (Hall 1997: 1). Meanings regulate and organise our conduct and practices because 
they help to set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed 
(Hall 1997: 4). Practices of representation, therefore, are the embodying of concepts, ideas 
and emotions in a symbolic form which can be transmitted and meaningfully interpreted (Hall 
1997: 10). In this way, representation is the link between concepts and language that enables 
us to refer to either the ‗real‘ world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary 
worlds of fictional objects, people and events (Hall 1997: 17). However, representation works 
as much through what is shown as through what is not which means that meanings created do 
not reflect an already existing reality so much as they organise, construct and mediate our 
understanding or imagination of it (Hall 1997: 59; Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 13). In this 
sense, representation connects meaning and language to culture and it is only through the 
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process of representation that political reality comes into being (Bleiker 2001: 512). We give 
meaning by how we represent something, the words we use, the images we produce, the 
emotions we associate with, the ways we classify and conceptualise and the values we ascribe 
it (Hall 1997: 3). Thus, through language, representation is central to the processes by which 
meaning, but also culture, is produced (Hall 1997: 1). This is why cultural practices are also 
political practices and representation is always an act of power (Bleiker 2001: 515).  
 
 
3. FEMINISM 
3.1 Introducing poststructuralist feminism 
Feminism is a broad, varied and interdisciplinary theoretical perspective and there are by 
necessity many feminisms. Feminism is ‗a field of critical practices that cannot be totalized‘ 
(Butler and Scott 1992: xiii) and an insistent practice of critique rejecting what is 
unsatisfactory in the present (Lloyd 2005: 111). Since the 1980s, feminist scholarship has 
influenced the academic discipline of IR, which for some seventy years of its history was 
thought to be gender-neutral (Enloe 1989). Feminist insights have shown that both IR and 
international politics which provide IR‘s rationale are already gendered. In fact, gender is 
constitutive of both international politics and the discipline (Pettman 2004: 85). Contributions 
from prominent scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, J. Ann Tickner, Spike Peterson, Christine 
Sylvester, Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Weber have transformed not only the academic 
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discipline of IR but also the debate regarding what counts as politics.
3
 Because of the scope of 
this research project, here, I focus on explaining poststructuralist feminism as the two main 
components, poststructuralism and feminism, have been seen to constitute a ‗contradiction in 
terms‘ (Baxter 2003: 2).   
The alleged tension within poststructuralist feminism involves the poststructuralist insight that 
there is no singular feminine subject or feminist approach and, as a result, the category of 
‗woman‘ can never be fixed. For this reason, poststructuralism has been critiqued for taking 
the ‗heat off patriarchy‘ and seen as a ‗refusal to engage with grand structures of oppression‘ 
such as identify male domination as the rival challenge for feminism (Roseneil 1999). Some 
feminists argued that poststructuralist feminism is incapable of being truly critical because it 
is descriptive rather than explanatory and can therefore not lead to social transformation 
(Lloyd 2005: 111). There was a concern that a feminist theory ‗cannot proceed without 
presuming the materiality of women‘s bodies, the materiality of sex‘ (Butler 1992: 17) and the 
question of whether feminist politics require, as their foundation, the existence of the stable 
category of ‗woman‘ has, thus, been widely debated (Roseneil 1999: 163).4 In this sense, 
poststructuralist feminism was seen as undermining the feminist commitment to women‘s 
agency and, thus, not compatible with a commitment to feminist politics (Shepherd 2008: 4; 
Dietz 2003: 413). The emancipatory stance of feminism and the deconstructive purpose of 
poststructuralism seemed to constitute ‗a contradiction in terms‘ (Baxter 2003: 2). As a result, 
some feminists (the author included) reject the idea of truth as a metaphysical reality whereas 
other feminists hold onto truth as the ground of feminism (Lloyd 2005: 121). Next, I show 
                                                             
3 See for example Enloe (2000), Tickner (1992), Peterson (1992), Sylvester (2002), Zalewski (1995), Weber 
(2005). 
4 See Dietz (2003) and Squires (1999) for a more detailed overview of how various strands of feminism differ. 
See Zalewski (2000) for an exploration of differences and similarities between modernist and postmodernist 
feminisms.  
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how the combination of poststructuralism and feminism instead of constituting a contradiction 
is not only a highly compatible combination, but also offer new ways of thinking to identified 
political puzzles.  
According to Baxter, three of the most significant principles of poststructuralism that relate to 
feminism are, firstly, a scepticism towards universal causes and ‗grand narratives‘, secondly, 
the contestation of meaning and, last, the discursive construction of subjectivity (Baxter 2003: 
22). The insight that there is no single discourse that produces woman, but practices, 
institutions and discourses together produce the social category of woman also means that 
females always adopt multiple subject positions. Within certain subject positions, females 
may be powerful whereas in other subject positions they can be distinctly powerless (Baxter 
2003: 10; Lloyd 2005: 19).  
To understand ‗women‘ as a permanent site of contest, or as a feminist 
site of agonistic struggle, is to presume that there can be no closure on 
the category and that, for politically significant reasons, there ought 
never to be. That the category can never be descriptive is the very 
condition of its political efficiency. (Butler 1993: 221) 
In other words, the subject position of woman is never fixed by the signifier ‗woman‘ as that 
term does not describe a pre-existing constituency, but is rather, part of the very production 
and formulation of that constituency, one that is perpetually renegotiated and rearticulated in 
relation to other signifiers within the political field (Butler 1993: 195). This does not mean 
that poststructuralist feminism denies materiality in women‘s lived, embodied reality and 
subjective experiences. On the contrary, the ways in which individuals make sense of their 
lives is a necessary starting point for understanding the ways in which gendered discourses 
continue to structure social relations (Baxter 2003: 30). As Butler explains:  
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The debate between constructivism and essentialism misses the point 
of deconstruction altogether, for the point has never been that 
‗everything is discursively constructed‘; that point, when and where it 
is made, belongs to a kind of discursive monism or linguisticism that 
refuses the constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, violent 
foreclosure, abjection and its disruptive return within the very terms of 
discursive legitimacy. (Butler 1993: 8) 
Moreover, much of the critique of feminism‘s involvement with poststructuralism, as Baxter 
has shown, is actually based in modernist beliefs: 
There could be no obvious partnership between modernist feminism 
and poststructuralism, at least as it is conceived by male theorists such 
as Foucault and Derrida. There are theoretical contradictions in terms 
of the conception of the role of emancipatory causes, the individual‘s 
place in the world and the relationship between language and 
meaning. (Baxter 2003: 28)  
In this way, the supposed ‗contradiction in terms‘ in the merging of poststructuralist thought 
and feminism is a ‗productive contradiction‘ for discourse analysis, able to challenge old 
assumptions and invite the possibility of fresh readings, keener insights and changes in 
practice (Baxter 2003: 2). What poststructuralist feminism does is putting essentialist 
identities such as ‗woman‘ into question which opens up deeper issues for research such as 
how ‗woman‘ is constructed as a category within different discourses, how sexual difference 
is made a significant distinction in social relations and how relations of subordination are 
constructed through such a distinction (Mouffe 1992: 373). In this sense, poststructuralist 
feminism shows how ‗woman‘, as an effect of discourse, language and power, ‗get said‘ 
(Zalewski 2000: 69), but can also abandon the idea of ‗woman‘ as the centre of feminist 
practice and ask what then might become the subject of feminism (Lloyd 2005: 14). 
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Poststructuralist feminism does not share the feminist quest to expose the gendered nature of 
society or the structural inequalities it produces because it appreciates the unevenness and 
ambiguities of power relations between males and females but, more importantly, because 
‗the theories of females as universal victims of patriarchy no longer do‘ (Baxter 2003: 31). In 
the next sub-section, I disentangle the apparent tension inherent within poststructuralist 
feminism further by discussing concepts such as gender/sex, heteronormativity, subject and 
agency in greater detail.  
 
3.2 Gender/sex, heteronormativity, subject and agency   
Here, I explain how I use the concepts of gender/sex, heteronormativity, subject and agency in 
order to demonstrate that the tension within poststructuralist feminism is false and to show 
how a poststructuralist feminist perspective offers something different. First, the attention to 
the issue of gender/sex has been one of the defining features of feminist scholarship (Cooke 
1996: 14). Feminist scholars challenged the assumed notion that differences between men and 
women are given by nature. Instead, they argued, these differences between male and female 
are socially and culturally constructed (Lloyd 2005: 133). Gender, thus, has been seen as a set 
of discourses which can set, change, enforce and represent meaning on the basis of perceived 
membership in relation to sex categories (Sjoberg 2007: 6). Traditionally, the concept of 
gender has been referred to as the terms ‗masculine‘ and ‗feminine‘ as social classifications as 
opposed to sex, which denotes the physiological distinction between males and females. To 
think about gender is to think about beliefs about sexual differences, despite their social 
character (Parpart and Zalewski 2008: iix). Crucially, gender is not synonymous with women 
and feminine identities, but also about men and masculine identities and, more importantly, 
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about relations between men and women (Tickner 2002: 336). Marysia Zalewski argues that 
even though the contents of the categories of masculinities and femininities change across 
time and cultures, there appears to be a constant relationship between ‗masculinity‘ and 
‗femininity‘ characterised by two factors. Firstly, that they are not independent categories but 
are defined in oppositional relation to each other (to be feminine is to be not masculine), and, 
secondly, that that which is associated with masculinity tends to have a greater value than that 
associated with femininity (Zalewski 1995: 341). Hence, gender subordination is defined as 
the subordination of femininities to masculinities and remains a constant feature of social and 
political life across time and space (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 6).  
From a poststructuralist perspective, however, the separation between the biological and the 
social becomes blurred as the category of sex in itself is seen as a construction. Judith Butler‘s 
influential work has critiqued the nature of this gender/sex relation as a simple conception 
where gender gains its specificity through its opposition to sex, conceived as a biological fact. 
Butler recognises how gender and biological sex, in order to acquire their oppositional value, 
relied on each other for existence: 
The relation between culture and nature presupposed by some model 
of gender ‗construction‘ implies a culture or an agency of the social 
which acts upon nature, which is itself presupposed as a passive 
surface, outside the social and yet its necessary counterpart. (Butler 
1993: 4) 
Building on Michel Foucault, Butler argues that sex is from the start normative. In this sense, 
sex not only functions as a norm but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it 
governs, the bodies it controls (Butler 1993: 1). In this way, Butler challenges how materiality 
of ‗sex‘ has become a sign of irreducibility, that is, how materiality of sex is ‗understood as 
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that which only ears cultural constructions and, therefore, cannot be a construction itself‘ 
(Butler 1993: 28). This, to Butler, is a failure to historicise sex: sex is assumed to be natural 
and immutable, without history. If, however, sex is a historical construction, then it cannot be 
categorically distinguished from gender for both are cultural. This means that it cannot be 
conceived as the pre-discursive surface upon which gender writes, because there are no pre-
discursive, prior, or ‗natural‘ sites or foundations for either sex or gender on which to rest 
identity. Sexual difference, despite often being invoked as an issue of material differences, is 
never simply a function of material differences which are not in some way both marked and 
formed by discursive practices (Butler 1993: 1). The point is not to deny physical differences 
between men and women as biological animals. Butler does not dispute the materiality of the 
body as ‗the body is not simply linguistic stuff or that it has no bearing on language: it bears 
on language all the time‘ (Butler 1993: 68). On the contrary, Butler shows the normative 
conditions under which the materiality of the body is framed and formed, and, in particular, 
how it is formed through differential categories of sex (Butler 1992: 17).  
To deconstruct the concept of matter or that of bodies is not to negate 
or refuse either term. To deconstruct these terms means, rather, to 
continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and 
to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed 
as instruments of oppressive power. (Butler 1992: 17) 
In this way, Butler proposes a return to the notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a 
process of materialisation that stabilises over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity 
and surface we call matter. Thus, instead of asking how ‗gender is constituted as and through 
a certain interpretation of sex‘, which leaves the ‗matter‘ of sex untheorised, Butler asks 
‗through what regulatory norms is sex itself materialised‘ and how it is that ‗treating the 
materiality of sex as a given presupposes and consolidates the normative conditions of its own 
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emergence‘ (Butler 1993: 9-10). In effect, sex is as culturally constructed as gender and, 
therefore, sex is itself a ‗gendered category‘ (Butler 2006: 5). Sex is an ideal construct which 
is forcibly materialised through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a 
process whereby regulatory norms materialise sex and achieve this materialisation through a 
forcible reiteration of those norms (Butler 1993: 1).  
Butler critiques feminists who tend to hold onto the idea of a binary gender system. This 
incorporates the idea that there is a direct mapping between sex and gender such that 
femininity is connected to the female body and masculinity to the male (Lloyd 2005: 134). 
However, as Butler‘s research clearly shows, there are biological sexes that cannot be 
understood as either male or female, such as inter-/transsexuals, and there could potentially be 
more genders than sexes, such as asexuals or people in drag. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that biological sexual difference (absence/presence of body part or other physiological 
characteristics) should align itself with cultural sexual difference (active/passive, 
public/private and so on) or with the logical sexual difference (pure signifier/real) under the 
banner male/female (or man/woman, masculine/feminine) (Glynos 2000: 215). Masculinity 
could easily accrue to female bodies and vice versa (Lloyd 2005: 134). However, the political 
regulations and disciplinary practices that produce gender (as heterosexual difference) can be 
‗displaced from view‘ through the ‗play of signifying absences‘ that are sustained through 
‗corporeal signs and other discursive means‘ (Butler 2006: 136). With this, Butler argues that 
gender is ‗performative‘ (Butler 2006: 139). Butler asserts that a performative is ‗that 
discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names‘ (Butler 1993: 13; Lloyd 2005: 
25). This takes place through subversive speech acts of parody, repetition, and recitation as, 
for example, in the cultural practices of ‗drag‘, cross-dressing, and the ‗sexual stylisation of 
butch/femme identities‘ (Butler 2006: 137). To claim that discourse is performative is not to 
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claim that it originates causes or exhaustively composes that which it concedes. Rather, it is to 
claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further 
formation of that body. In this sense, the linguistic capacity to refer to sexed bodies is not 
denied, but the very meaning of ‗referentiality‘ is altered (Butler 1993: 10-11). Butler 
contends that gender is not an expression of what one is; it is something that one does (Lloyd 
2005: 25). Sexing the subject is the effect of the reiteration of a set of inescapable norms 
(Lloyd 2005: 26). Butler notes that it is the reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains (Butler 1993: 2). However, crucially, sexed bodies 
and gendered subjects are not produced through a single act of constitution but only through 
repetition (Lloyd 2005: 26). Gender identity can never be achieved once-and-for-all. Butler 
rejects the idea of gender as performance where this assumes the existence of a prior subject. 
Performing (doing) gender is neither an expression of a subject‘s will or the revelation of 
some gendered truth about them (Lloyd 2005: 138). Furthermore, since gender is cultural, it 
also varies across time and across societies and is cut across by considerations of class, race, 
age, and so forth. Therefore, there is no direct link back to the sexed body but gender 
identities are, at best, naturalised fictions (rather than natural entities) always prone to 
dissonance and uncertainty (Lloyd 2005: 133). Acknowledging this fictiveness enables gender 
to be de-coupled from sex. Once gender roles are recognised as ‗designated‘, not natural, any 
necessary link between women and femininity is broken (Lloyd 2005: 21). This is how 
poststructuralist insights regarding gender and sex enable a critique of ‗natural‘ femininity 
and, subsequently, of essentialist ideas about gender, agency and political violence. 
Second, another concept linked to ideas about gender/sex and poststructuralist theorising, and 
useful to this research project, is heteronormativity. The concept is commonly referred to as 
the normative power of heterosexuality present in both society and politics (Chambers and 
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Carver 2008: 121). It is argued that the cultural apparatus of gender produces binary sex in a 
way that normalises certain bodies, genders and sexualities and pathologises others (Lloyd 
2005: 134). Butler argues that gender is inflected with power and regulated through the 
institution of ‗a compulsory and naturalised heterosexuality‘ under the hierarchical and 
oppressive binary relation of masculine/feminine (Butler 2006: 22-23). Gender norms operate 
by requiring the embodiment of certain ideals of femininity and masculinity, ones that are 
almost always related to the idealisation of the heterosexual bond (Butler 1993: 231). 
Heteronormativity in this way constructs heterosexual practices as ‗normal‘ or ‗natural‘, but, 
at the same time, it also draws attention to those deviant, abjected or marginalised individuals 
who are discriminated against by the dominant sexual norm (Chambers and Carver 2008: 
121). I use the concept of heteronormativity in order to highlight and critique ‗natural‘ 
femininity and its association with motherhood; how motherhood functions as a symbol of 
heteronormativity.    
Third, the assumption that feminism requires a stable, coherent subject in order to justify and 
ground its politics and to challenge the oppressive structures confining women, relies on 
essentialist claims and, thus, sets a limit to how feminism conceives politics and disguises the 
power relations that underpin this conception (Lloyd 2005: 3). From a poststructuralist 
perspective, the subject is produced within discourse and cannot be outside of it because it 
must be subjected to it. The subject must submit to the discourse‘s rules and conventions, to 
its dispositions of power/knowledge (Hall 1997: 55). The critique of the feminist subject is 
not a negation or repudiation of the subject, but, rather, a way of interrogating its construction 
as a pre-given or foundationalist premise (Butler 1992: 9). Deconstruction only implies that 
we suspend all commitments to that to which the subject refers and that we consider the 
linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To deconstruct 
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is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to open 
up a term, like the subject, to a re-usage or redeployment that previously has not been 
authorised (Butler 1992: 15). To argue that the subject is constituted is to disclaim the idea 
that there is anything pre-discursively natural about that subject (Lloyd 2005: 41). 
All discourses construct subject positions, a place for the subject. This suggests that 
discourses themselves construct the subject positions from which they become meaningful 
and have effects. Every subject is a fluid, multiple subject (Lloyd 2005: 55). Lloyd adopts the 
idea of a subject-in-process, a subject that has no essential nature but is constituted in various, 
always incomplete ways (Lloyd 2005: 14). Particular attributes of subjects (or subject 
positions) may appear natural, but in reality these meanings are always already social. Their 
appearance as natural is the result of certain processes that attempt to make certain ideas seem 
commonsensical (Lloyd 2005: 20). 
Every identity (essential or historical) is performatively produced and 
at the same time each performative production involves positing a 
constative claim. Each time, that is, feminists appeal to the idea of 
women they performatively invoke her, but each performative 
invocation produces her anew and differently. (Lloyd 2005: 51) 
Another way in which to demonstrate that there is no tension within poststructuralist 
feminism and to show how I define agency is to discuss the distinction between subject 
positions and political subjectivity. First, the concept of subject positions accounts for the 
multiple forms through which agents are produced as social actors (Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000: 12). Subject positions are used to capture the positioning of subjects within a discursive 
structure, intelligible only with reference to a specific set of categories, concepts and practices 
(Doty 1993: 303, 309). This means that, rather than a homogenous subject with particular 
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interests, an individual can have multiple subject positions (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 
13). Similarly, there might be multiple physical individuals that constitute a single subject 
(Doty 1993: 309). Thus, subject positions should not be confused with individuals. The 
concept of political subjectivity on the other hand is commonly used to account for the agency 
of subjects. It concerns the way in which social actors act (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 12, 
13). Hence, by analysing subject positions rather than political subjectivity, this research 
project investigates how a female subject is written in a particular discourse rather than how 
individual women act, which most of the existing literature on female agency in political 
violence tend to do as explained in Chapter 4. This is one way in which this research project 
offers a poststructuralist feminist account of female agency in political violence. 
Related to this, another way in which this research project constitutes a poststructuralist 
account of female agency in political violence concerns the definition of agency. Here, I 
analyse representations of agency rather than ‗real‘ agency and, as mentioned above, through 
subject positions rather than political subjectivity. I follow Butler who argues that agency is 
not related to a theory of the self but is an effect of the operations of discourse-power through 
which subjects are produced. According to Butler, agency traditionally belongs to a way of 
thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But, she 
argues, politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are 
articulated and made possible, therefore, agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing 
to inquire into its construction (Butler 1992: 13). This is why agency cannot be separated 
from context (Lloyd 2005: 108) and this is why, in the analysis of agency, representations 
need to be broadly defined, including both the visual realm and cultural artefacts. To clarify, I 
define agency as representations of agency. I analyse how agency is represented through 
discourses which produce subjects. In order to understand how representations of gender and 
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agency are interpreted as common sense, it is now time to consider how myths construct 
meanings. 
 
 
4. MYTH 
4.1 Roland Barthes and mythology 
What if Barthes began over again and rewrote his mythological 
investigations after the later works? (Saper 1997: 13) 
In order to conceptualise the Myth of Motherhood as a meta-discourse influencing 
representations of female agency in political violence in mass culture, I build on Roland 
Barthes‘ theorising of myth. Barthes‘ insights are instrumental to this research project as he 
draws attention to construction of myths in popular culture and through visual imagery, which 
is relevant to the empirical cases included in this study. In fact, his essay collection 
Mythologies, initially published in 1957, is considered one of the founding texts of cultural 
studies (Storey 1993: 82). However, while Barthes, through his later works, is seen as a key 
figure within early poststructuralist theorising, his work on myth construction was produced at 
an earlier stage of his career when he was heavily influenced by structuralist linguistics for his 
narrative analysis. The earlier work sought to uncover, to expose, the singular meaning from a 
multitude of situations (Saper 1997: 13) and the ‗ideological abuse‘ hidden in myths (Weber 
2005: 10). Mythologies concludes with a theoretical essay, ‗Myth today‘, in which Barthes 
outlines semiology as a methodology for exploring the ideological function of myths and the 
reading of popular culture (Weber 2005: 10). The methodological quest to expose the ‗true‘ 
hidden meaning through representations is not compatible with poststructuralism‘s reflexive 
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approach as poststructuralism rejects the idea of an underlying structure upon which meaning 
can rest ‗secure and satisfied‘ (Storey 1993: 89). For this reason, most poststructuralists 
influenced by Barthes tend to build on his later writings.
5
  
In this section, I first explain the mythology framework in greater detail with this caveat in 
mind and, then, in the following sub-section I explain how I integrate Barthes‘ work on myth 
with poststructuralist theorising. Indebted to the work of Cynthia Weber (2005) and Craig 
Saper (1997), this effectively means that I read Barthes‘ theorising of myth through his later 
writings. I see Barthes‘ theorising of myths as work in progress and merely use his works on 
myth construction as theoretical inspiration, but, crucially, instead of following his 
methodological approach, I combine his theorisation of myth with a poststructuralist 
discourse analysis. This is how a ‗postmodernised Barthes‘ (Weber 2005: 10) informs this 
research project.  
Barthes‘mythology framework was an attempt to address the fact that semiotics, which draws 
on linguistics as a way to analyse signs, had been critiqued for ignoring social, political and 
historical factors and lacking ideology (Hall 1997). To Barthes, there are two semiological 
systems: a linguistic system, the language (or the modes of representation which are 
assimilated to it), which Barthes calls the language-object, and the myth itself, which he refers 
to as meta-language. The theory works in such a way that it is the first language which myth 
gets hold of in order to build its own system. In this way, the mythical speech, or meta-
language, is a second language in which one speaks about the first (Barthes 1993: 100):  
Mythical speech is made of a material which has already been worked 
on so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all the 
materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a 
                                                             
5 See for example the edited collection by Der Derian and Shapiro (1989).  
34 
 
signifying consciousness that one can reason about them while 
discounting their substance. (Barthes 1993: 95) 
Myth, in this sense, is a double system: ‗its point of departure is constituted by the arrival of a 
meaning‘ (Barthes 1993: 109). More specifically, mythical speech contains a three-
dimensional pattern of the signifier, the signified and the sign. First, the signifier can be 
looked at from two points of view: as the final term of the linguistic system, or as the first 
term of the mythical system. As the final term of the linguistic system, the language-object, 
Barthes calls the signifier ‗meaning‘ and as the first term of the mythical system, Barthes calls 
it ‗form‘ (Barthes 1993: 102). Moreover, of the signifier‘s two aspects, meaning is full and 
form is empty: 
The meaning is always there to present the form; the form is always 
there to outdistance the meaning. And there never is any contradiction, 
conflict, or split between the meaning and the form: they are never at 
the same place. (Barthes 1993: 110) 
Second, the signified is simply the concept, which unlike the form, is in no way abstract: it is 
filled with a situation. In the mythical concept, a signified can have an unlimited mass of 
signifiers, for example countless images (signifiers) can signify the concept of ‗poverty‘. In 
this way, the concept is a kind of condensation of certain knowledge (Barthes 1993: 108). 
Quantitatively, the concept is much poorer than the signifier, it often does nothing but re-
present itself (Barthes 1993: 105). Moreover, the concept can spread over a very large breadth 
of signifier. For instance, a whole book may be the signifier of a single concept. Conversely, a 
‗minute form‘ (a word, a gesture, as long it is noticed) can serve as a signifier to a concept 
filled with a very rich history (Barthes 1993: 106). The concept is a constituting element of 
myth which distorts the full signifier, the meaning of the signifier (Barthes 1993: 108).  
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Last, the third term is the sign, which it is called in the linguistic system. However, because, 
in myth, the signifier is already formed by the signs of language, (as the mythical speech 
builds on the linguistic speech), Barthes calls the third term of myth ‗the signification‘. The 
signification, which actually is the myth itself (Barthes 1993: 107), has a double function: ‗it 
points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something and it imposes it on us‘ (Barthes 
1993: 102). The third term is in fact an association of the first two. In this way, the myth is 
composed of the signifier, a sound, written word, or image, and the signified, which is the 
concept evoked by that word/image (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 29). The characteristic of 
myth, then, is to transform a meaning into form. In other words, myth is always a ‗language 
robbery‘ (Barthes 1993: 118).  
According to Barthes, myth is a type of speech, a system of communication, a message.  But 
it is also a value, a language which does not want to die (Barthes 1993: 110, 120). 
Furthermore, myth is by no means confined to oral speech. It can consist of modes of writing 
or of representations; both written and pictorial discourse, all of which can serve as a support 
to mythical speech (Barthes 1993: 94). Pictures become a kind of writing as soon as they are 
meaningful: 
We shall therefore take language, discourse, speech, etc., to mean any 
significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or visual: a photograph 
will be a kind of speech for us in the same way as a newspaper article; 
even objects will become speech, if they mean something. (Barthes 
1993: 95) 
This is why there is no need to separate between writing and pictures. They are both signs and 
they both reach the threshold of myth endowed with the same signifying function. They 
constitute one just as much as the other, a language-object (Barthes 1993: 100). As I will 
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come back to in Chapter 3, this resonates well with the inclusion of visual and cultural 
representations from mass culture for the empirical analysis of this project.  
The essential function of myth is the naturalisation of the concept (Barthes 1993: 118). In this 
sense, myth transforms what is particular, cultural and ideological into what appears to be 
universal, natural and purely empirical. It is naturalising meanings, making them into 
common sense, which are the products of cultural practices. The myth function is making a 
fact out of an interpretation (Weber 2005: 7). 
Myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, 
things lose the memory that they once were made […] A conjuring 
trick has taken place; it has turned reality inside out, it has emptied it 
of history and has filled it with Nature […] The function of myth is to 
empty reality: it is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a haemorrhage, 
or perhaps an evaporation, in short, a perceptible absence. (Barthes 
1993: 131) 
According to Barthes, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that s/he does 
not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. The signifier and the signified 
have an apparently natural relationship. This confusion can be expressed otherwise: any 
semiological system is a system of values but the myth consumer takes the signification for a 
system of facts. This means that the myth is read as a factual system, when it is only a 
semiological system (Barthes 1993: 118). According to Barthes, this is why myth is 
experienced as innocent speech. It is because intentions are naturalised, not because its 
intentions are hidden. Barthes also refers to myth as depoliticised speech (Barthes 1993: 118). 
Myth does not deny things. On the contrary, its function is to talk about them. Simply, it 
purifies them, it makes them innocent. It gives them a natural and eternal justification. Myth 
gives things a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact: 
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If I state the fact of French imperiality without explaining it, I am very 
near to finding that it is natural and goes without saying: I am 
reassured. (Barthes 1993: 132, emphasis in original) 
As mentioned above, Barthes‘ mythology framework is part of his early theorising and, as 
such, more heavily structuralist than his later works. Thus, in order to make it apparent how it 
is compatible with poststructuralist research, in the next section I discuss differences between 
semiotic and discursive approaches, I build on Cynthia Weber‘s and Craig Saper‘s 
understanding of a postmodernised Barthes, but I also emphasise how I only use Barthes‘ 
work on myths as theoretical inspiration rather than as methodology. 
  
4.2 Integrating myth with poststructuralism 
As mentioned above, it was Barthes‘ later work that explored more complex ways of thinking 
about how meanings are pluralised through reading and writing and as such more compatible 
with poststructuralist theorising (Weber 2005: 10). Here, I demonstrate three main ways in 
which the tension between a structural analysis prevalent in ‗Myth Today‘ and a 
poststructuralist research agenda can be overcome. This concerns ‗postmodernising‘ Barthes 
by reading his work on myth through his later works, moreover, it has to do with power and 
how myth is political, and it means that the methodology of denotation and connotation as 
described in ‗Myth Today‘ needs to be set aside for a poststructuralist discourse analysis.  
First, in order to ‗postmodernise‘ Barthes, I build on Craig Saper‘s (1997) and Cynthia 
Weber‘s (2005) reading of Barthes‘ work. Saper simply asks what we can learn about 
mythology from the later works (Saper 1997: 6): 
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Interpreting his later experiments in terms of his earliest works on 
myth depends on a speculation that takes the form of a question: What 
if Roland Barthes had lived longer? What if he had continued to write 
after the later works, the works that broke emphatically with earlier 
semiotic concerns, in order to introduce paradoxical arguments and 
experimental presentations? What if Barthes had returned to earlier 
concerns with his new attitude and methodologies? (Saper 1997: 5) 
The background to this speculation is that Roland Barthes died prematurely in a traffic 
accident in Paris in 1980 and his work can therefore be considered ‗unfinished‘. Saper argues 
that while the earlier work sought to uncover the singular meaning from a multitude of 
situations, the later work sought ‗polysemy from even the apparently most trivial details‘ 
(Saper 1997: 13). Most critics also agree that, with regards to his writing style, his later work 
abandoned didactic explanations and traditional structural analyses in favour of reflective 
essayistic texts that seemed to critique structuralism. In addition, Saper notes, Barthes‘ own 
remarks about his earlier works suggest that he rejected the unsophisticated methods and 
concerns of the earlier work (Saper 1997: 13).  
Reading and interpretating Barthes‘ early work on myths through the lens of his later writings 
produces a postmodernised Barthes. Hence, it is a postmodernised Barthes who informs my 
reading of myth in this research project. In order to illustrate this, I now turn to the idea of 
power and how myths are political in order to demonstrate how mythology can be compatible 
with a poststructuralist discourse analysis.  
According to Stuart Hall, one important difference between semiotic and discursive 
approaches is that the semiotic approach is concerned with the how of representation, with 
how language produces meaning; whereas the discursive approach is more concerned with the 
effects and consequences of representation- its ‗politics‘ (Hall 1997: 6). In this sense, a 
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semiological approach is assumed to be apolitical. Barthes‘ myth framework, however, is 
implicitly political which distinguishes it from semiotics. The mythical signification is never 
random; it is always in part motivated, and unavoidably contains some analogy (Barthes 
1993: 112). Myth plays on the analogy between meaning and form. There is no myth without 
motivated form (Barthes 1993: 113). Moreover, Cynthia Weber suggests that the process of 
transforming the cultural into the natural is a highly political practice that depends on all sorts 
of complex configurations of power. In a general sense, power works through myths by 
appearing to take the political out of the ideological. This is because something that appears to 
be natural and unalterable also appears to be apolitical. Yet, to Weber, such ‗natural facts‘ are 
the most intensely political stories of all, not just because of what they say (what the specific 
myth is) but because of what they do (they remove themselves and the tradition they support 
from political debate) (Weber 2005: 7). In Barthes‘ words: ‗Men do not have with myth a 
relationship based on truth but on use; they depoliticise according to their needs‘ (Barthes 
1993: 133). Hence, the overtly political character of Barthes‘ mythology framework shares a 
common ground with poststructuralist discourse analysis because it explores the concept of 
power. 
Another way in which to demonstrate how myths are political is to discuss the concept of 
ideologies. Ideologies are usually seen as systems of belief that exist within all cultures; as a 
‗world view‘, a more or less coherent system of beliefs, used to make judgements about 
society (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 21). To Barthes, mythology is a part both of semiology 
and ideology as it studies ideas-in-form; politics is already a representation, a fragment of 
ideology (Barthes 1993: 115, 127). As part of a postmodernised reading of Barthes, Cynthia 
Weber discusses the concept of ‗unconscious ideology‘, which is ideology that is not formally 
named and that is therefore difficult to identify. It is the common sense foundation of our 
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world views that is beyond debate (Weber 2005: 5). Weber argues that we use ‗unconscious 
ideologies‘ to help make sense of our worlds, very often without realising it. And because we 
do not realise we hold unconscious ideologies or use them to make sense of our worlds, we 
very rarely interrogate them. We rarely ask difficult questions about them that might upset 
them as common sense (Weber 2005: 5). In this way, we tend not to notice the ideological 
construction of our world is because ideology denies itself as an ideology. Ideology appears to 
be reality because it conceals its own construction (Lacey 1998: 101). This is the content of a 
myth.  
The main way in which I integrate Barthes‘ work on myths with poststructuralism, however, 
has to do with methodology. Barthes suggests that in order to ‗gauge the political load of an 
object and the mythical hollow which espouses it‘, one must never look at things from the 
point of view of the signification, but from that of the signifier, of the thing which has been 
robbed; and within the signifier, from the point of view of the language-object, that is, of the 
meaning (Barthes 1993: 133). Hence, one should focus on the mythical signifier as a whole, 
made of meaning and form. In this way, the researcher consumes the myth according to the 
very ends built into its structure: the reader lives the myth as a story at once true and unreal 
(Barthes 1993: 106). According to Barthes‘ methodology in ‗Myth Today‘, the deconstruction 
or reading of the myth takes place in two stages, first, denotation in which each of the 
signifiers of an image is decoded into a simple concept, and, then, connotation, where the 
concept yields a second and more elaborate and ideologically framed cultural meaning 
(Barthes 2000: 115). However, for the poststructuralist Barthes, denotation is no longer a 
neutral level. Instead, denotation itself is a part of of the production of myth. Denotation is 
just as ideological as connotation (Storey 1993: 89). As part of my reading of a 
postmodernised Barthes, I do not follow his methodological framework of denotation ad 
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connotation as published in ‗Myth Today‘ because, as explained above, this is incompatible 
with poststructuralism. Instead, I use his work on myths as theoretical inspiration and 
combine it with textual and visual methods associated with poststructuralist theorising and 
discourse analysis.  
Barthes‘ theorising of myths and his conceptualisation of ‗text‘ as meaning-making offers ‗a 
way of seeing language and text that enables citizens to grasp, and contest when need be, the 
covert structuring of their political thinking‘ (Fortin 1989: 192). Thus, despite its reliance on 
structuralist linguistics as part of its methodology, Barthes‘ theorising of myths is a highly 
valuable source of inspiration regarding boundaries of what counts as text, what counts as 
political and the inclusion of popular culture in the analysis of the political. By combining the 
theorisation of myth with a poststructuralist feminist methodology, a postmodernised Barthes 
informs this research project and the inherent tension between structuralist semiotics and 
poststructuralist discourse analysis is overcome. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: Introducing the Myth of Motherhood 
In this concluding section, I introduce the Myth of Motherhood by building on 
poststructuralist feminist theorising and Barthes‘ idea of myth as explained above. The 
conceptualisation of the Myth of Motherhood is one of this research project‘s main original 
contributions to knowledge as I argue that the Myth of Motherhood disciplines 
representations of female agency in political violence along essentialist ideas about gender, 
agency and political violence within a Western ‗war on terror‘ culture. In Chapter 5-7, I 
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illustrate this argument further, but here it is sufficient to show how thinking about 
motherhood as a myth is part of a poststructuralist account of female agency in political 
violence. 
I use the concept of myths as culturally relative formations of meaning. Thus, a myth cannot 
per definition be said to be universal; it will not resonate similarly in all cultures. Because of 
this, the arguments I make can only be made valid with reference to a specific culture in a 
specific time, the culture in which I live and have access to. Furthermore, I see myth as a set 
of discursive practices. The relationship between myth and discourse can therefore be 
described as one of ‗meta-discourse‘ and discourse. In this sense, the myth functions as an 
overarching ‗umbrella‘ entailing multiple discourses that are culturally specific. In my case, 
these discourses concern the subject of female and ideas about motherhood.  
The content of what I call the Myth of Motherhood is that ‗unconscious‘ ideologies write 
motherhood as natural, something we do not question, when it is in fact not natural but a 
social and cultural construction. Crucially, my definition of ‗motherhood‘ does not necessarily 
involve actual mothers or pregnant women, although such representations are more 
noticeable, but ideas about female bodies and the boundary between ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ 
femininity through the association of female bodies with motherhood. It is about the capacity 
of female bodies to give life. Because of the writing of ‗motherhood‘ as natural rather than 
constructed, representations of female agency in political violence include negotiations over 
boundaries of ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ femininity. There is a tension between female bodies‘ 
capacities to give life (Myth of Motherhood) and female bodies‘ capacities to take life 
(agency in political violence). The tension seems to indicate that because of women‘s 
assumed capacity to give life, they cannot ‗naturally‘ take life. Seemingly, motherhood, with 
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which women are ‗naturally‘ associated, and killing, is juxtaposed. In this sense, killing is the 
most ‗unnatural‘ feminine behaviour. This tension is not only a way in which the Myth of 
Motherhood is made visible but it also shows how female agents of political violence have 
multiple subject positions in various discursive practices. Consequently, it is representations 
of this tension which is the focus for my analysis.  
As mentioned above, myths are culturally relative productions of meaning. This does not only 
mean that myths might materialise differently in different cultural settings, but also that a 
myth can never be filled with one example. Although the arguments I make here could 
potentially be applied elsewhere, the scope of this research project is limited to 
understandings of female agency in political violence in a cultural context where the issue of 
terrorism was brought to the forefront of Western security thinking and resulted in the 
declaration of a global ‗war on terror‘ by the George W. Bush administration (Bush 2001).  
As I argue below, the Myth of Motherhood materialises as versions, perversions and 
inversions of motherhood in representations of female agency in political violence through 
stories of heroines, monsters and victims. The Myth of Motherhood, however, also speaks to 
other myths of motherhood, for example, within nationalist discourses. See Chapter 4, the 
literature review, and the empirical chapters for a more detailed discussion on how my 
conceptualisation of the Myth of Motherhood differs from feminist contributions to a 
‗maternal thinking‘ and the literature on agency and maternalism. 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Without theory there is nothing but description, and without 
methodology there is no transformation of theory into analysis. 
(Hansen 2006: 1) 
[T]heory is a method to expose the process of knowledge-making. 
(Zalewski 2000: 73) 
In this chapter, I discuss methodological implications of the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 2. First, I show how and why I use discourse analysis, what I analyse (visual and 
textual representations) and where I look for such representations (mass culture). I explain 
why there is a need for analysing textual and visual representations from mass culture in order 
to understand gendered representations of female agency in political violence. In the second 
section, I discuss specific methods that I use in order to analyse textual and visual 
representations of female agency in political violence. I describe textual methods such as 
presupposition and predication, predominantly visual methods such as iconology, concept of 
address and the ideal viewer, as well as the method of interpellation which I link to the 
concept of the abject. In the last section, I present the six empirical cases chosen for this 
study. I give a brief overview of each case as well as the rationale for choosing them. In the 
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conclusion, I draw together the methodological framework and re-state the focus on textual 
and visual representations as well as the use of popular culture as data. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 HOW: Discourse analysis 
What follows from the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 is an interest in 
exploring how gender and agency is represented in discourses of political violence. However, 
in IR there has not emerged a common understanding about the best ways to study discourse 
(Milliken 1999: 226) and discourse is, therefore, a highly contested term (Sunderland and 
Litosseliti 2002: 8). In this sub-section, I describe in greater detail what I mean by discourse 
and how I analyse discursive practices.  
Poststructuralism‘s focus on discourses as articulated in written and spoken text calls for 
particular attention to the methodology of reading and the methodology of textual selection 
(Hansen 2006: 2). Commonly defined, a discourse is a linguistic practice that puts into play 
sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers and themes (Shapiro 1990: 
329). As a result, traditionally, discourse analysis has been concerned with written language 
and tends to focus on elite (and academic) rather than popular sites of discursive practices, 
especially in the field of international politics (Weldes 1999: 118). Roxanne Doty defines 
discourse as a system of statements in which each individual statement makes sense. Thus, a 
discourse produces interpretive possibilities by making it virtually impossible to think outside 
of it (Doty 1993: 302). However, discourses do not simply communicate statements or 
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language, but are recognisable as systems that themselves produce and fix meaning, however 
temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world (Shepherd 2008b: 215). Discourses are 
not closed systems, but overlap and are open-ended. They draw on elements of other 
discourses and, thus, always contain traces of past discursive formations (Hall 1996: 202). A 
discourse provides discursive spaces, such as concepts, categories, metaphors, models and 
analogies by which meaning is intertextually created. Thus, the practice of analysing 
empirical raw material and information as discursive forms means that a wide range of 
linguistic and non-linguistic data is treated as ‗texts‘ or ‗writing‘ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000: 4). As I will come back to below, I use a broad definition of representations which 
means that any ways of representations by which a message is communicated is valid, 
including visual representations. As a result, discourse also needs to be broadly defined. I use 
discourse defined as ‗structures of meaning-in-use‘ (Milliken 1999: 231). 
According to Foucault, we can only have knowledge of things if they have a meaning but at 
the same time it is discourse, not the things themselves, which produces knowledge. In this 
sense, discourses are performative; ‗practices that systematically form the object of which 
they speak‘ (Foucault 1972: 49). In this way, Foucauldian notions of discourse are always 
inextricably linked with concepts of power, as something that constitutes and energises all 
discursive and social relations (Baxter 2003: 7). Discourses are forms of knowledge or 
powerful sets of assumptions, expectations and explanations that are governing mainstream 
social and cultural practices. Discursive practices are social practices that are produced 
by/through discourses (Baxter 2003: 7). The idea of discourse as social practice offers a way 
of seeing how we experience the world, in part through the representational capacity of 
language (Hall 1997). 
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Discourse analysis has clear political and ethical significance since in explaining discourse 
productivity, scholars can potentially denaturalise dominant forms of knowledge and expose 
to critical questioning the practices they enable (Milliken 1999: 236). In this way, (re)-telling 
stories can be a powerful political practice as it highlights the great deal of power invested in 
the way stories are presented (Zalewski 2000: 123). Moreover, politically contextualised 
discourse analysis combines the analysis of how texts seek to create stability with analysis of 
whether these constructions are being accepted or contested within the political and public 
domain (Hansen 2006: 30). As described in Chapter 2, I build on Cynthia Weber‘s concept of 
unconscious ideology in order to show how myths are political. I also follow Jutta Weldes‘ 
suggestion and see discourse as enabling a process of making meaning and ideology as an 
effect of that process. This way, a discourse has ideological effects, even though they might 
be invisible or unconscious, and is always implicated in the production and reproduction of 
power relations (Weldes 2003a: 20).  
 
2.2 WHAT: Representations 
If discursive practices both manifest and construct discourse through representation and 
reproduction, it is practices of representation and reproduction that are the sites at which 
knowledge is reproduced and power is located (Hall 1997: 43; Shepherd 2008b: 215). As I 
explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, the existing literature on gender, agency and political 
violence in IR tends to focus on narratives as a form of representation which means that visual 
and cultural representations are excluded. Thus, in this sub-section, it is theorising of such 
representations that is emphasised.  
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As mentioned above, discourse analysis has traditionally concerned written language. 
However, language does not have to be verbal. In fact, discourse analysis, I argue, should not 
be confined to the linguistic simply because communicative structures and meaning-
production by no means are limited to the linguistic. Fittingly, it was Roland Barthes who 
established the precedent of taking various non-discursive artefacts from popular culture as 
‗text‘. His concept of ‗textuality‘ loosened the written text from the author and relocated 
authority within the culture (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989: xix). More recently in IR, the 
‗aesthetic turn‘ has moved scholarship away from an exclusive and often very narrow reliance 
on diplomatic documents, statistical data, political speeches, academic treaties and other 
traditional sources of knowledge about the international by legitimising images, narratives 
and sounds as important sources for insight into world politics (Bleiker 2001: 526). In 
accordance with poststructuralist thought, an aesthetic approach assumes that there is always a 
gap between a form of representation and what is represented therein. Rather than ignoring or 
seeking to narrow this gap, aesthetic insight recognises that the inevitable difference between 
the represented and its representation is the very location of politics (Bleiker 2001: 510).  
Visual representation has historically involved drawings, photography and television, but with 
the growth of mass media and the Internet, the relative importance of the visual has amplified 
(Hansen 2000: 300). Today, our culture is increasingly permeated by visual images with a 
variety of purposes and intended effects, whether it is CCTV footage, Google Earth, 
Facebook or images‘ preponderance in the news media. Such images can produce in us a wide 
array of emotions and responses, such as pleasure, desire, disgust, anger, curiosity, shock, or 
confusion, but they can also both exert power and act as instruments of power (Sturken and 
Cartwright 2001: 10, 93). This is because the images we interact with on a daily basis are 
caught up in the power relations of the societies in which we live. We invest images with the 
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power to incite emotions within us, and images are also elements within the power relations 
between human subjects, and between individuals and institutions. Just as images are both 
representations and producers of the ideologies of their time, they are also factors in relations 
of power (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 72). Because visual imagery calls attention to 
questions of interpretation, perspective and their political effects and foregrounds 
representation, the use of visual representations suits well with a poststructuralist account 
(Campbell 2007: 220). 
Many now argue that the visual is central to the cultural construction of social life in 
contemporary Western societies (Rose 2001: 6). Some scholars argue that the recent interest 
in images and visual representations is a result of a pictorial turn that is taking over from the 
linguistic turn of twentieth century philosophy in social theory (Campbell 2003: 72). From 
cultural studies, which has a longer history of analysing the visual than IR, we learn that the 
capacity of images to affect us as viewers and consumers is dependent on the larger cultural 
meanings they invoke and the social, political and cultural contexts in which they are viewed 
(Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 25). Hence, using theories to study images allows us to 
examine what images tell us about the cultures in which they are produced and, at the same 
time, reading and interpreting images is one way that we, as viewers, contribute to the process 
of assigning value to the culture in which we live (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 6, 42).  
Meanings of images are created in a complex relationship among producer, viewer, image or 
text and social context (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 56). When images are read, readers 
draw upon a store of social knowledge, a cultural repertoire, a shared code (conscious or 
unconscious), which is always both historical and cultural. That is to say, it might differ from 
one culture to another, and from one historical moment to another (Storey 1993: 87). 
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Challenging the notion that ‗reality‘ can somehow present itself unmediated to interpretation 
(Shepherd 2008b: 214), a poststructuralist approach offers a way to study how knowledge and 
power is distributed in the cultures and societies we live in. It is important that visual culture 
is understood in an analytical way not only by art historians and other ‗image specialists,‘ but 
by all of us who increasingly encounter a startling array of images in our daily lives (Sturken 
and Cartwright 2001: 4). However, it needs to be pointed out that foregrounding the visual in 
visual culture does not mean separating images from writing, speech, language, or others 
modes of representation and experience as images are often integrated with words (Sturken 
and Cartwright 2001: 5). Therefore, when I discuss representations, I mean meaning 
construction in a broad sense including both visual and textual representations.  
 
2.3 WHERE: Mass culture  
There are many different ways of defining ‗culture‘. Stuart Hall defines culture as a process, a 
set of practices, but also, Hall argues, culture is about feelings, attachments and emotions as 
well as concepts and ideas (Hall 1997: 2). According to Cynthia Weber, culture has to do with 
how we make sense of the world and how we produce, reproduce, and circulate that sense 
(Weber 2005: 3). Studying culture understood as ‗sense-making‘, ‗signifying practices‘ or ‗an 
ensemble of stories, beliefs and habits‘ means we have to pay attention to how meanings are 
made. We must think about how meaning-making relies on what is said and what goes 
without saying (Weber 2005: 4). Thus, as mentioned in Chapter 2, I define culture as ‗shared 
meanings‘ (Hall 1997: 1). 
Similar to academic analysis of visual representations, the study of popular culture has a much 
longer history in cultural studies than in IR. The politics of the popular is in fact ‗among the 
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most undervalued and therefore under-analysed aspects of international politics‘ (Weber 
2005: 187). Still, an increasing number of scholars have and do engage with popular culture 
as a site to study international politics. Christine Sylvester has explored how art and museums 
are used within IR (Sylvester 2006). Michael Shapiro has highlighted that, in many respects, 
various aspects of popular culture provide counter-discourses to official strategic discourse 
(Shapiro 1990: 335). Lene Hansen (2006), exploring the western discourse on the Balkans 
during 1990s war in Bosnia, has shown how non-academic and non-political texts might 
influence on central foreign policy decision-makers. Jutta Weldes has shown that state policy 
has a pervasive cultural basis and that state action is made commonsensical through popular 
culture (Weldes 1999: 119). For example, Weldes has illuminated a number of strong and 
telling parallels between how US foreign policy discourses and the discursive universe of Star 
Trek is structured: 
There might be more going on when audiences sit down to watch 
television than students of international relations have previously 
assumed. (Weldes 1999: 133) 
Moreover, Weldes argues that it is possible for popular culture to challenge the boundaries of 
common sense, to contest the taken-for-granted (Weldes 2003a: 6). To Cynthia Weber, 
accessing visual culture through popular films allows us to consider the connections between 
IR theory and our everyday lives, between the popular and the political (Weber 2005). Weber 
argues that the stories and myths we find in IR theory are often the same ones we find in 
popular films, which means that meanings of IR theory are produced and circulated in both 
traditional academic ‗high cultural‘ realms and popular ‗low culture‘:  
If the work of propagating and circulating IR myths occurs in popular 
films as well as in IR theories, then neglecting this realm of ‗low 
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politics‘ in our attempts to come to grips with how the world works 
would be a mistake. We must interrogate IR theory as a site for 
cultural practice wherever it occurs- in classic IR texts, in classrooms, 
and in more popular sites of culture like film, literature, art, and 
television. (Weber 2005: 186) 
Similarly, Roland Bleiker points out that: 
If a puzzle is the main research challenge, then it can be addressed 
with all means available, independently of their provenance or label. 
A source may stem from this or that discipline, it may be academically 
sanctioned or not, expressed in prose or poetic form, it may be 
language based on visual or musical or take any other shape or form: it 
is legitimate as long as it helps to illuminate the puzzle in question. 
(Bleiker 2003: 420)  
Studies of popular culture and world politics include film, fiction, television, computer games, 
photography and comic books that, for example, analyses how a particular region, country, or 
people is cinematically represented; how espionage is treated within popular fiction; or how a 
war (the Vietnam war) can be won through another (American success in the Gulf war) 
(Hansen 2006: 58; Cooke 1996: 93). Still, even if a growing number of scholars are including 
visual representations from popular culture in their analysis: some have pointed out that ‗the 
legacy of the cold war lives on through popular culture‘ (Der Derian 2005: 27), others that we 
need to ‗go cultural‘ (Weldes 1999), it remains the case that the use of popular culture is still 
marginalised in the study of international politics. 
Today, interpretations or readings of the world often come to us through the mass media and 
‗television is perhaps the most crucial source of collective consciousness‘ (Bleiker 2001: 
525). At the same time, reality and representation increasingly blur into one another as fiction 
makes fact. As an example, Miriam Cooke mentions an episode during the 1990s wars in the 
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Balkans when a Croatian admiral in Dubrovnik asked the local television station to show ten 
minutes of Top Gun on the evening news in order to make the Serbian fleet withdraw. The 
ploy worked (Cooke 1996: 76). Weber suggests that interpretations of historical narratives 
and their popular signifying forms are so crossed and confused with one another that 
attempting to police fact from fiction is likely to fail. In addition, such attempts turn a blind 
eye to what popular representations can tell us about the politics and the politics of desire 
bound up in interpretations of historical events (Weber 2002: 131). As mentioned above, the 
most important part of (unconscious) ideologies is that they appear to be natural or given, 
rather than part of a system of belief that a culture produces in order to function in a particular 
way (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 21). Therefore, as Weber argues:  
All cultural sites are powerful arenas in which political struggles take 
place. Culture is not opposed to politics. Culture is political, and 
politics is cultural. (Weber 2005: 188, emphasis in original) 
Popular culture has traditionally been defined as those cultural artefacts actually produced by 
‗the people‘, specifically by subordinated classes. However, following Weldes, I argue the 
term ‗mass culture‘ is more useful as it designates those artefacts that, while consumed by 
‗the people‘, are not necessarily produced by them (Weldes 1999: 117). With this theoretical 
move, popular culture is not contrasted to ‗high‘ culture, culture is not opposed to politics, 
and both traditional news media and popular sites of discursive practices are included in the 
analysis of world politics. Moreover, what is considered ‗real‘ does not have to be separated 
from ‗fiction‘ as both are representations of events; both include the telling of stories. 
Furthermore, popular culture is one of the narrative spaces of visual culture which in turn is 
fundamental to (unconscious) ideologies and power relations. Film and television are 
therefore media through which we see reinforced ideological constructions (Sturken and 
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Cartwright 2001: 21-22). A particular representation in a popular cultural text might support 
or undermine existing relations of power, or both at once. Thus, examining such texts helps us 
to highlight the workings of power (Weldes 2003a: 7). By focusing on representations in 
popular culture and mass media, this research project contributes to Weldes‘ wider attempt to 
‗pluralise‘ world politics by multiplying ‗the sites and categories that count as political‘ 
(Weldes 2003a: 6). This is because, as Bleiker states: 
The dilemmas that currently haunt world politics, from terrorism to 
raising inequalities, are far too serious not to employ the full register 
of human intelligence to understand and deal with them. (Bleiker 
2001: 529) 
By using broad definitions of both what to study and where to find the empirical data, this 
research project aims to capture a deeper understanding of how female agency in political 
violence is communicated and what such communications mean. This is how this research 
project offers a way of thinking differently about gender, agency and political violence.  
 
 
3. METHODS 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, I build on Barthes‘ work on myth construction as theoretical 
inspiration but, crucially, I do not follow his methodological framework of denotation and 
connotation. Instead, in this sub-section, I explain specific textual and visual methods 
associated with poststructuralist discourse analysis and used in order to analyse 
representations in mass culture. 
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3.1 Textual methods 
Presupposition is a method that concerns background knowledge when reading a text or an 
image. It is about what is taken for granted in the representation, what kind of world the 
representation is constructing and what is considered true in that constructed world. As 
Roxanne Doty explains:  
Statements rarely speak for themselves. Even the most straightforward 
and ostensibly clear statements bring with them all sorts of 
presuppositions or background knowledge that is taken to be true. In 
the absence of the ‗truth‘ of the background knowledge and the world 
it presupposes, the statement would not make sense. (Doty 1993: 306)  
Presupposition is, therefore, an important textual mechanism that by creating background 
knowledge constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognised as true 
(Doty 1993: 306). Furthermore, predication involves the linking of certain qualities to 
particular subjects through the use of predicates and the adverbs and adjectives that modify 
them (Milliken 1990: 231). A predicate affirms a quality, attribute or property of a person or 
thing. Attributes attached to subjects are important for constructing identities for those 
subjects and for telling us what subjects can and cannot do. This is linked to whether the 
subject is ascribed agency or not. 
In combination, presupposition and predication offer to illuminate the tension between 
identities of life-giving and life-taking and thereby make the Myth of Motherhood visible in 
representations of female agency in political violence. According to Doty, if differences are 
constructed according to the same logic in a variety of texts, we can reasonably suggest that 
there is a dominant discourse (Doty 1993: 309). In a similar manner, if tensions between 
identities of life-giving and life-taking are presented according to the same logic in these 
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different empirical cases, there is a dominant discourse. This also means that the unconscious 
ideology, which is an effect of that discourse, has been made conscious and the myth has been 
re-politicised. 
Moreover, texts create a ‗reality‘ by linking particular subjects and objects to one another. 
The production of subjects and objects are always vis-à-vis other subjects and objects. This is 
called subject positioning. What defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the 
relationships which that subject is positioned in relation to other kinds of subjects. In this way, 
subject positioning involves a degree of agency ascribed to the subject. According to Doty, 
some of the important kinds of relationships that position subjects are those of opposition, 
identity, similarity, and complementarity (Doty 1993: 306). Subjects can be thought of as 
positions within particular discourses, intelligible only with reference to a specific set of 
categories, concepts and practices (Doty 1993: 303). Subject positioning is not limited to 
textual representations, thus, below I link the method of subject positioning with the concept 
of the ideal viewer, interpellation and the abject. 
 
3.2 Visual methods 
According to Rose, interpretations of visual images broadly concur that there are three sites at 
which the meanings of an image are made: the site(s) of the production of an image, the site 
of the image itself, and the site(s) where it is seen by various audiences (Rose 2001: 16). Most 
if not all images have a meaning that is preferred by their producers, but analysing images 
according to the intentions of their producers is rarely a completely useful strategy since 
readers have no way of knowing for certain what a producer intended his or her image to 
mean. Furthermore, finding out a producer‘s intentions often does not tell us much about the 
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image, since intentions may not match up with what viewers actually take away from an 
image or text. In addition, viewers themselves bring a particular set of cultural associations 
with them which will affect their individual interpretation of an image (Sturken and 
Cartwright 2001: 45-6). Thus, the focus of this research project lies on the site of the image 
itself.  
When analysing images you can either focus on issues of reception or concepts of address. 
The distinction between address and reception is one between thinking about the ideal viewer 
of an image, and the potential real viewer who looks. Address refers to the way that an image 
constructs certain responses from an idealised viewer, whereas reception is about the ways in 
which actual viewers respond (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 72). Here, I focus on address 
only, which means that I am not interested in how audiences actually interpret an image. In 
other words, I am not trying to find the ‗real‘ meaning of an image, but how an image 
constructs certain responses from an idealised viewer. I analyse how discourses construct 
meaning. 
Another method useful in order to study visual representations is iconology. An icon is an 
image that refers to something outside of its individual components, something (or someone) 
that has great symbolic meaning for many people. Icons are often perceived to represent 
universal concepts, emotions and meanings (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 36). However, 
icons do not represent individuals, nor do they represent universal values (Sturken and 
Cartwright 2001: 37). For example, the image of mother and child is everywhere in Western 
art. It is widely believed to represent universal concepts of maternal emotion and devotion, 
the crucial bond between a mother and her offspring, and the dependence of that child upon 
her. The image is perceived as an icon of motherhood and, by extension, the importance of 
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motherhood throughout the world and in all human history. The sheer number of paintings 
created with a mother and child theme throughout the history of Western art attests not simply 
to the centrality of the Madonna figure in Christianity but also to the idea that the bond 
between mother and child represented in images like this is universally understood to be 
natural, not culturally constructed (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 36). More recent images of 
women and children subsequently gain meaning in relation to this tradition of Madonna and 
child paintings. However, these images might not serve as icon for motherhood in other 
cultures, thus, rather than being read as evidence of universal ideals of motherhood, such 
images should be read as an example of specifically Western and particularly Christian beliefs 
about women‘s roles as mothers in Western culture (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 37; 56). 
For this project, iconology involves relating the image of mother and child to this historicity 
of similar images or icons. In this way, the images are read as representations of cultural 
values of motherhood and its association with ‗natural‘ femininity; as representations of 
heteronormativity.  
As mentioned above, the method of subject positioning involves a degree of agency ascribed 
to the subject, as well as its relation to the object and other subjects. Moreover, as theorised 
by Foucault, subject position is the place that a particular discourse asks a human subject to 
adopt within it (Sturken and Cartwright 2001: 368). In this sense, subject position is a term 
used to define those ways that images designate an ideal position for their intended spectators. 
There is an ideal spectator of a film regardless of how any particular viewer might make 
personal meaning of the film. In this way, subject positioning facilitates analysis of not only 
how a subject is positioned in an image, its relation to objects, if the subject has agency in the 
image, who is passive, who is active, who is looking at who etc, but also in order to analyse 
59 
 
the discourse‘s ideal position for their intended spectators; what subject positioning the image 
tells us to take. This is also linked to the method of interpellation. 
In order to offer a deeper analysis of female agency in political violence, this research project 
is interested in the communicative processes of how representations of female agency in 
political violence are gendered. In order to explain this, the concepts of interpellation and the 
abject are crucial. Interpellation is a term coined by Louis Althusser to describe the process 
by which ideological systems call out to or ‗hail‘ social subjects and tell them their place in 
the system. Interpellation is when we come to recognise ourselves and identify with the ideal 
subject in the subject position offered in a particular visual representation (Sturken and 
Cartwright 2001: 203). Interpellation is similar to how subject positioning of a discourse 
works but interpellation also refers to how these representations work to hail individuals so 
that they come to accept the representations as natural and accurate (Weldes 1999: 163). I 
argue that this resonates strongly with myth construction and the concept of unconscious 
ideologies. It resonates with myth construction in the sense that the essential function of myth 
is the naturalisation of the concept. By accepting the representations as natural and accurate, 
the myth is hidden and the ideologies at work are kept unconscious. This is how we interpret 
representations as common sense. To clarify, I use the concept of interpellation, rather than 
just subject positioning, in order to dig deeper into how common sense is communicated. 
Furthermore, I only use the concept of interpellation in the context of unconscious ideology, 
not as linked to ideology in a traditional (Marxist) sense.   
As another innovation of this new theoretical move, I also suggest that by building on Julia 
Kristeva‘s notion of the abject, the concept of interpellation can be used where unconscious 
ideologies call out to social subjects not to identify with the subject position, but rather in 
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opposition to the subject position. In Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva explores, through 
literature, different ways in which abjection, as a source of horror, works within patriarchal 
societies. Here, I will draw on her discussion of abjection in its construction of the human 
subject constituted through transgression of borders and through exclusion of what is different 
or other.  
Like the object, the abject is opposed to the subject, but the difference is as follows: ‗What is 
abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the 
place where meaning collapses‘ (Kristeva 1982: 2).  
Abjection […] is immoral, sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that 
dissembles, a hatred that smiles, a passion that uses the body for barter 
instead of flaming it, a debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs 
you… (Kristeva 1982: 4) 
Kristeva defines the abject as that which ‗disturbs identity, system, order‘ and ‗does not 
respect borders, positions, rules‘ (Kristeva 1982: 4). Ultimately, the abject is part of ourselves. 
We reject it, locating it as that which we are not. Because of this, the abject may reveal as 
much about ourselves as it does about external reality. The abject both fascinates and horrifies 
because it thrives on ambiguity and the transgression of taboos and boundaries. This is how 
the abject reveals our own conceptions of the world and our normative disposition (Kristeva 
1982: 10). In this sense, the abject has transgressed the borders and rules and, as a result, 
unconscious ideologies call out to social subjects not to identify with the subject/abject 
position but rather to connect individuals as different from it, within the boundaries of normal 
and appropriate behaviour. This is how the abject not only highlights the boundary of the 
myth but also challenges its content to a point where meaning risks collapsing.  
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4. EMPIRICAL CASES 
4.1 Introducing the empirical cases 
As mentioned in the introduction, the cases I have chosen to analyse are Faye Turney, 
Lynndie England, Janis Karpinski, Britz (2007), Female Agents (2008) and The Baader-
Meinhof Complex (2008). Here, I will give a more detailed account of each case and then 
discuss the rationale for choosing them. 
 
Faye Turney 
Faye Turney was one of fifteen British sailors and marines held captive in Iran for two weeks 
in the spring of 2007. The Navy personnel were patrolling the waters between Iraq and Iran 
when they were arrested and taken to Iran by the Revolutionary guards. Faye Turney was not 
only the lone woman in the group but she was also a mother, information which was revealed 
in the Sun on the fourth day of their captivity. Once this information became known, most 
media representation was focused on Turney and her role as a mother. Her identity as a 
mother seemed to be in contention with her identity as a soldier and in the UK a debate was 
sparked regarding female soldiers on ‗the frontline‘ and female soldiers in combat positions. 
Turney was also used by the Iranians as she was forced to write letters to the British 
government and her family asking them to make sure British forces pull out of Iraq. Once 
released, Faye Turney was offered and accepted close to £100,000 to tell about ‗her ordeal‘ in 
the Sun and in an hour-long interview with one of the UK‘s main terrestrial television 
channels, ITV. 
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Lynndie England 
In May 2004, the New Yorker ran the story ‗Torture at Abu Ghraib: American soldiers 
brutalized Iraqis‘ (Hersh 2004) and soon thousands of photos seemingly depicting US soldiers 
abusing and degrading Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, many with sexual 
undertones, were released. This is commonly known as the Abu Ghraib scandal. Lynndie 
England was one of three female army personnel amongst a small group of US military police 
officers who were punished for the scandal. England is the most well-known of the people 
involved and she is by far the most published and written about. England was not actually a 
military officer but a desk clerk tasked with logging prisoners. As such, she was not supposed 
to be in the particular part of the prison where interrogations took place by intelligence 
officers and where most of the photos were taken. However, England was in a relationship 
with one of the military police officers, Charles Graner, and supposedly came to the see him 
while he was working the nightshift in that part of the prison (Morris 2008). When the news 
story regarding prisoner abuse broke, as well as during her trials, England was pregnant with 
Graner‘s child, which emphasised her role as a woman and as a mother. Graner later married 
one of the other women involved and England was abandoned with her unborn baby. In order 
to receive a lower punishment England initially agreed to plead guilty, but after a witness 
statement by Graner, who said that England was only following orders by superiors, the deal 
was thrown out. Then, in her second trial, her defence team instead tried to demonstrate her 
innocence. In the end, she was sentenced to three years in prison for ‗posing‘ in photos. 
Graner and another senior officer received ten-year sentences whereas the other low-ranking 
soldiers received much shorter sentences (Morris 2008; Sjoberg 2007).  
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Janis Karpinski 
Janis Karpinski became the first female US General ever to command soldiers in a combat 
zone when she took control of the 800
th
 Military Police Brigade tasked with running all prison 
facilities in Iraq in June 2003 (Karpinski with Strassner 2005: 4). Their mission was prisoner 
of war operations in 16 different facilities spread all over Iraq. Abu Ghraib prison was the 
biggest and the only one in which interrogations were carried out (by military intelligence 
officers). During the autumn of 2003, the control of Abu Ghraib prison was transferred from 
Karpinski‘s Military Police Brigade to a Military Intelligence Brigade. Crucially, however, 
military police officers were still working at Abu Ghraib. This created a blurry chain of 
command structure. In effect, it meant that Janis Karpinski was no longer in charge of Abu 
Ghraib, but at the same time some of her soldiers were working in that facility. The blurry 
chain of command structure enabled Karpinski to be made a scapegoat for the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. The Pentagon and the Army accused her of bad leadership because she was unaware 
of what her soldiers were up to. In reality, Karpinski only had limited access to Abu Ghraib 
(Karpinski, Signal City, 13/11/2005). 
In the media representations, Janis Karpinski is referred to as the highest officer to be 
punished for the scandal. However, she was actually cleared of any involvement in the abuse. 
Instead, Karpinski was punished for weak leadership and for not having disclosed a false 
shoplifting accusation before she was promoted to General. Janis Karpinski is the first 
General ever to have been demoted in US military history (Karpinski, Signal City, 
13/11/2005).  
Janis Karpinski refused to be silenced and protested loudly to the representation of herself but 
also her soldiers. She published an autobiography and appeared in various media outlets 
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telling her story. Her alternative story of events has since been supported by for example Errol 
Morris‘ film Standard Operating Procedure (2008) and higher ranking officers, such as 
General Sanchez who was the Head of the Army in Iraq, have since been punished (although 
not demoted).  
  
Britz 
Britz is a BAFTA-award winning two-part television drama shown in 2007 at primetime on 
one of the UK‘s mainstream terrestrial television channels, Channel 4. The drama is about a 
brother and a sister, Sohail and Nasima, and their different personal experiences as British 
Muslims during increasing tensions between counter-terrorism laws and civil liberties in a 
post-‗9/11‘ and ‗7/7‘ ‗war on terror‘ society. In the first part, ‗Sohail‘s story‘, we follow the 
male lead character, Sohail, as he secretly joins the Security Service (MI5) and takes part in 
surveillance operations of terrorist suspects within Muslim communities. In the last part, 
‗Nasima‘s story‘, we follow the lead female character, Nasima, and her transformation into a 
suicide bomber. Consequently, this analysis focuses on scenes from ‗Nasima‘s story‘. Nasima 
travels to Pakistan to train as a fighter before she returns to London and makes the last 
preparations. At the end, Sohail who has been gathering intelligence is trying to prevent the 
terror attack, unaware of that it is his own sister who is the perpetrator. Just before Nasima is 
about to push the button and ignite her bomb (which she is wearing under a maternity suit), 
Sohail reaches for her, hugs her and asks her not to do it. In ‗Sohail‘s story‘ the screen then 
turns black. In ‗Nasima‘s story‘ the screen turns white. In the epilogue of ‗Nasima‘s story‘, a 
martyrdom statement is read out where Nasima explains her political motifs.   
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Female Agents 
Female Agents is a French popular film from 2008 inspired by the women who fought as 
secret agents during the Second World War when France was occupied by Germany. Female 
Agents is a film about heroines and heroism. It was promoted with the slogan: ‗In times of 
war, heroism is not just for men‘ and the subtitle on the DVD-cover states: ‗D-day depends on 
them‘. The film follows a group of female agents who are put together by the British Special 
Operations Executive (SOE), set up by Winston Churchill and run by a man called 
Buckmaster. The group of four women (Louise, Jeanne, Gaelle and Suzy) is initially formed 
by Louise‘s brother Pierre, a SOE agent, in order to rescue a British geologist who is being 
treated at a German military hospital in Normandy thanks to being disguised as a German 
soldier. The geologist‘s mission was to take samples from the beaches in Normandy in 
preparation for Operation Phoenix, the construction of artificial harbours that enabled the 
landing on D-day. This is why D-day depends on these particular female agents.  
After their first successful mission, Pierre refuses to let the women return to safety in the UK. 
Instead, he wants them to undertake another mission: to travel to Paris and kill an influential 
Nazi officer, Heindrich. In Paris, all agents but Jeanne soon finds themselves caught by the 
Germans. Gaelle commits suicide in prison, Suzy is shot and killed by Heindrich, her former 
fiancé. Louise is tortured while in captivity but later rescued by Jeanne. At the end of the film, 
Louise finally manages to kill Heindrich, but only because Jeanne diverts attention to herself 
and subsequently is arrested. When the war is over, Louise, who is back at safety in the UK, 
learns that Jeanne, who bravely sacrificed herself, was eventually hanged in a concentration 
camp. Louise is the only one amongst the group of female agents who survives the war. 
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The Baader-Meinhof Complex 
The Baader-Meinhof Complex is a German popular film from 2008 about the German terrorist 
organisation Red Army Faction (RAF) and their activities in the 1970s. The organisation is 
often also referred to as the Baader-Meinhof group after Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof 
who were part of the core group. Baader and Meinhof, but also Baader‘s girlfriend Gudrun 
Ensslin, are the main characters of the film. The narrative of the film particularly follows 
Ulrike Meinhof‘s transformation from a politically minded and outspoken journalist to a 
perpetrator and instigator of political violence. The film shows how the members of the core 
group meet and how Ulrike, an established journalist at the time, joins Baader and Ensslin in 
the new formation named the Red Army Faction. Influenced by political events such as the 
Vietnam War, the group‘s mission is to defeat US imperialism. Much of their attacks are, 
therefore, targeting US Army bases and headquarters, banks and influential publishers. 
Due to the RAF‘s violent actions, West Germany declared its own ‗war on terror‘ (Colvin 
2009: 14) and soon most members of the organisation were arrested. Meinhof, Baader, 
Ensslin and a few other core members were initially kept in isolation at a high-security prison 
but were united at another prison after a couple of years. Their trials went on for several years 
and Ulrike Meinhof never saw the end of them. She died an unexplained death in her prison 
cell. The media reported on her suicide but the RAF members believed she was murdered. 
Outside the prison, new members, some of whom had never met Baader, Meinhof or Ensslin, 
continued the struggle. They took hostages at the US embassy in Stockholm and in alliance 
with people fighting for the liberation of Palestine, they hijacked a plane, demanding the core 
members of RAF to be released (as well as Palestinian political prisoners held in Israel). 
When the hijacking operation failed, Baader, Ensslin and two other RAF members chose to 
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commit suicide in prison (one woman survived). While the film continues with the newer 
formations of the RAF and while a majority of the RAF members were women, I focus on the 
representation of Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin as they are not only the most famous 
members of the RAF and the main characters of the film (with Andreas Baader), but also 
because they are positioned against each other in the film negotiating both femininity, 
masculinity and motherhood. 
 
4.2 Rationale for case selection 
As mentioned above, one of this research project‘s contributions to feminist IR scholarship is 
to analyse gender, agency and political violence in non-traditional spaces such as popular 
culture. For this reason, I have chosen to look into three ‗real‘ empirical cases and three 
fictional empirical cases. These cases by no means provide a sample of the world, but are 
merely a series of representations of the puzzle in question. I put ‗real‘ within citation marks 
because following my theoretical and methodological framework, I argue that both ‗real‘ and 
fictional cases are representations of events. They are both part of story-telling.  
More specifically, ‗Nasima‘s story‘ in Britz is not only one of few representations in popular 
culture where the focus is on a female perpetrator of political violence, but the lead character 
also wears a maternity suit and hides the explosives by looking pregnant. In other words, 
Nasima is using ‗motherhood‘ as a political strategy in order to achieve her political goal. 
Therefore, Britz not only speaks directly to female agency in political violence but also 
provides an excellent example of how ideas about motherhood functions to discipline the 
audience into essentialist understandings of gender, agency and violence. As mentioned 
above, Faye Turney was predominantly described in her role as a mother rather than her role 
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as British navy personnel which makes her an excellent case to use in order to study gender, 
agency and political violence through motherhood. In addition, even though Janis Karpinski 
did not have children, there was still a focus on motherhood, or rather a lack of motherhood, 
as she was often referred to as ‗childless‘ in the media representation. Moreover, the case of 
Karpinski is also validated by the fact that she held an unusual high military ranking for a 
woman and because she remains the only General to have been demoted in US military 
history. Lynndie England was pregnant when the Abu Ghraib scandal was revealed as well as 
during her trials which put her motherhood to the fore. England was also chosen because she 
was by far the most written about and because she received a disproportionately high penalty. 
Last, in both Female Agents and The Baader-Meinhof Complex, motherhood is absolutely 
central to the storyline. In Female Agents all of the female agents involved are childless, yet, 
the film is all about motherhood. Most obviously, we follow Louise‘s pregnancy through the 
film, a pregnancy that in the end is sacrificed for the mission. Louise knows that she is 
pregnant with her dead husband‘s child when she is being tortured. In the epilogue, we learn 
that the real character that Louise is based upon died childless. Female Agents is also chosen 
because it claims to ascribe heroism in war to women. Thus, through heroism, Female Agents 
communicates ideas about gender, agency and political violence. In The Baader-Meinhof 
Complex, the majority of the members, and thereby perpetrators of political violence, are 
women. As such, the film provides an exceptional example of representations of female 
agency in political violence. The introduction to the book upon which the film is based also 
makes several references to the ‗war on terror‘ (Aust 2008). As such, this film is understood 
with references to the ‗war on terror‘. Furthermore, Ulrike Meinhof‘s transformation from 
non-violent to a perpetrator of violence is negotiated and constructed with references to her 
role as a mother.  
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The empirical material might have been produced in different national cultures, but it has 
been interpreted and mediated for an English-speaking culture or population. Moreover, the 
stories written about these cases are all constructed and produced within a Western ‗war on 
terror‘ culture. This means that even though two of the empirical cases are depicting events 
that took place long before the launch of the global ‗war on terror‘, we still interpret and 
understand these films with references to the ‗war on terror‘. All cases were made by/for 
people inhabiting such a cultural terrain. Furthermore, all cases include the tension between 
life-giving and life-taking female identity and, as such, they all communicate ‗motherhood‘. 
In this sense, ‗motherhood‘ is everywhere and all cases, therefore, directly speak to the Myth 
of Motherhood. Each case is part of discursive practices that construct knowledge about 
gender, agency and political violence. Separate and combined these cases tell us something 
about how female agency in political violence is communicated in our culture. This is the 
rationale for choosing these particular cases. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have discussed methodological implications of the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter 2. Following the introduction, I discussed how and why I use discourse 
analysis, that it is representations that I analyse and that I find such representations, textual 
and visual, in mass culture. In the third section, I described specific textual methods such as 
presupposition, predication and subject positioning, as well as methods useful in the analysis 
of visual representations such as the concept of address, the ideal viewer, iconology and 
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interpellation. In the last section, I presented the six empirical cases and argued that because 
all of them address ‗motherhood‘ and reference the ‗war on terror‘, all of them, separately and 
combined, can tell us not only how representations of female agency in political violence are 
gendered but also what implications and meanings such gendered representations have in a 
Western ‗war on terror‘ culture. 
Following on from the theoretical insights explained in Chapter 2 and the methodological 
implications of those insights described in this chapter, the next chapter explores the existing 
literature on gender, agency and political violence in IR in order to illustrate more clearly how 
a research project with this theoretical and methodological framework fills a gap and as such 
makes original contributions to existing knowledge. 
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Chapter 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, I analyse representations of agency and, more specifically, I use 
the concept of subject positions rather than political subjectivity in my analysis of agency. 
This is different from most feminist contributions on female agency in political violence. 
However, in order to clearly demonstrate how this research project makes original 
contributions to knowledge, I start by discussing a broader range of feminist IR literature on 
gender, agency and war before I discuss academic works more closely linked to this research 
project. The chapter has two main sections. First, I unpack two gendered assumptions present 
in stories of war and peace: the idea of women as victims of war and women‘s association 
with peace, in particular through their roles as mothers. Here, I discuss contributions that have 
shown how stories of war are gendered and how, as a result, women are denied agency as they 
are positioned as victims in need of protection. Then, I discuss how stories of peace are 
gendered. In particular, I explore theorising from a feminist standpoint because this is where 
motherhood has been most closely linked to agency and peace within feminist IR. This 
includes concepts such as a maternal thinking and an ethics of care, as well as women‘s 
political activism for peace. In this section, agency remains associated with working for peace 
rather than as participation in warfare. 
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The second body of literature concerns female agency in political violence and warfare more 
specifically. First, I discuss literature that engages with ideas about women‘s heroism in war 
and how such heroism is linked to motherhood. Second, I address literature that has 
illuminated how individual women are actually participating in and contributing to warfare as 
a way of countering stereotypes of women as ‗naturally‘ peaceful. In the last sub-section, I 
engage with literature on gender, agency and the military because, as I explain in Chapter 2, I 
define agency in political violence as a capacity to kill in order to capture the idea of life-
taking which unites both legitimate and illegitimate agency. In the conclusion, I recap and re-
state how this research project fills a gap in the existing literature and as such makes original 
contributions to knowledge. Mostly, such contributions are a result of this research project‘s 
poststructuralist account of female agency in political violence. More specifically, such 
contributions include the analysis of representations of agency rather than ‗real‘ agency; the 
use of a broader definition of agency in political violence encompassing both legitimate and 
illegitimate agency; and the inclusion of visual and cultural representations of gender, agency 
and political violence. I argue that a poststructuralist account of female agency in political 
violence in this way offers a nuanced understanding of gender, agency and political violence. 
 
 
2. GENDER, AGENCY AND WAR  
In this section, I consider two ways in which feminist contributions have pointed out that 
traditional war stories are gendered. First, I explain literature that show how women are most 
often positioned in the role of victims in need of protection. In the second sub-section, I 
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unpack the links between motherhood, peace and nonviolence and show how women‘s 
political activism has utilised gendered assumptions about war and peace. I also discuss 
contributions to feminist standpoint theorising as this is where motherhood has been linked to 
agency for peace.  
  
2.1 Gendered war stories 
Traditionally, in most cultures, it has been men‘s lot to fight while 
women watch, suffer, applaud, ameliorate, and forgive. In war men 
become ‗warriors.‘ If they are killed, they are killed in action. Their 
deaths represent a sacrifice that is in part chosen and thus is a 
testament to courage. A man makes war partly for the woman he 
protects, who is his audience...her admiring tears make his fighting 
possible; her danger from his enemy makes his fighting necessary. 
Raped or killed, her possessions plundered, ‗his‘ woman is the last 
prize and the sweetest revenge his enemy exacts from him. (Ruddick 
2002: 143) 
Historically, war has been linked to men and masculinity, whereas peace has long historical 
associations with women and femininity. Feminist scholars have shown that in traditional 
stories of war, men make war and women keep the peace; men go to the front and women stay 
at home; men fight and women are fought for (Cooke 1996: 80; Cooke and Woollacott 1993). 
Jean-Bethke Elshtain phrases these binary constructions of men‘s and women‘s roles as the 
personae of Just Warriors and Beautiful Souls. Here, man is construed as violent and 
aggressive and woman as nonviolent and pacifist (Elshtain 1995). Because of these 
categorisations, women are seen as incapable of protecting themselves, and this subsequently 
serves as the grounds on which to persuade men to exert their masculinity and vanquish the 
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enemy; they are the reason why men fight (Kumar 2004: 298). Hence, women, as ‗Beautiful 
Souls‘, are innocent of the war but the thing that warriors are responsible for defending. 
Women, in these discourses, become at once the victims of war and the causes for war 
(Elshtain 1995: 4). This is what Elshtain termed the ‗myth of protection‘. Moreover, Iris 
Marion Young argues that the subordinate relation of those in the protected position is central 
to the logic of masculinist protection. Hence, the logic of masculinist protection provides a 
framework where in return for male-protection, the woman concedes critical distance from 
decision-making autonomy (Young 2003: 4). According to this logic, the most prominent role 
that women can play is that of victim. Women can suffer rape, torture, or death during war, 
giving the male soldier the special duty to protect her from such consequences (Kumar 2004: 
297; German 2008: 142). What is more, the binary constructions of war stories in this way 
proclaim that the sex segregation is justified for biological reasons: the men are strong, 
therefore, they must protect the women who are weak. It is written in their genes that men 
shall be active and women passive; men are the subject and women are the objects (Cooke 
1996: 16; Young 2003: 8). The myth of protection has not only been an important motivator 
for the recruitment of armed forces as well as to motivate aggressive war (Young 2003: 10), 
but it has also sustained support for war by both men and women (Tickner 2002: 337).  
Not only do traditional narratives of war make many other aspects of war such as stories of 
pacific males or aggressive women invisible, but it also underlines men as agents and women 
as passive objects in international politics, regardless of what individual men and women are 
doing (Pettman 2004: 89). These social identities of men and women, past and present, do not 
denote what men and women really are in time of war, but function instead to re-create and 
secure women‘s location as non-combatants and men as warriors (Elshtain 1995: 4). Even 
though there is evidence of women‘s active participation in warfare, the polarisation of men 
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and women as corresponding to war/peace, frontline/home and other notions of women‘s and 
men‘s gendered roles in war and conflict persists (Coulter 2008: 57; Steans 2008: 160). 
During the 1990s, mass rape and sexual violence became a visible and highly ‗successful‘ 
weapon of war in conflicts in the Balkans, the genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere, which led 
to the inclusion of rape as a war crime by the international legal community (Goldstein 2001: 
363). As a result, literature engaging with women as victims of rape and sexual violence also 
became prominent. Scholars such as Korac noted that within nationalist discourses, women 
are seen as precious property of the enemy. Women and their bodies become territories to be 
seized and conquered; and rape, thus, becomes a powerful symbolic weapon against the 
enemy (Korac 1996: 137). Inger Skjelsbæk argues that the use of sexual violence in times of 
war can be perceived as a way of reaffirming patriarchal hierarchies between men and women 
(or between males). The strategic purpose of the use of sexual violence in this way is to 
manifest the militaristic masculine identity of the male perpetrator (Skjelsbæk 2001: 216). 
Although important, the literature on women as rape victims risks reinforcing traditional 
boundaries of victim and perpetrators and the myth of protection. Scholars such as Miranda 
Alison and Lynne Segal have noted that much of the feminist work on rape, including 
wartime rape, presents the issue purely in the context of male-female gendered power 
relations. Alison points out that some see rape as a universal male tendency towards 
indiscriminate violence against women and a generalised masculine desire to maintain a 
system of social control over all women (Alison 2007: 78). Instead, both Segal and Alison 
have emphasised that men too are victims of sexual humiliation and rape. Male to male 
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wartime sexual violence is no less gendered nor any less ethnicised than male to female 
violence (Segal 2008: 32; Alison 2007).
6
  
Other contributions have highlighted that the distinction between perpetrators, victims or 
actors is much more complicated (Moser and Clark 2001; Shepherd 2007). Chris Coulter has 
explored the difference between ideas about women in humanitarian discourses and conflict 
analyses, where someone who has been raped generally is regarded as a victim and someone 
who has been a fighter is a perpetrator, with women‘s own ‗real‘ motivations for becoming 
fighters during the wars in Sierra Leone (Coulter 2008: 65-66). Coulter found that most 
women fighting in the war in Sierra Leone had multiple experiences of having been at one 
time or another fighters, rape victims, looters, mothers, or lovers. Thus, Coulter suggests that 
women are agents and make their own choices but that these choices are often circumscribed 
by hierarchical structures and specific contexts: ‗My informants were neither ill-fated victims 
with no agency, nor ferocious perpetrators in command of their own destiny‘ (Coulter 2008: 
69). For some women, becoming a fighter was their best option, there were few alternative 
strategies. By becoming a perpetrator, Coulter suggests, one perhaps also feels that one 
escapes being a victim and perhaps the only way to gain even the least bit of control over 
one‘s own life in this milieu was to take up a weapon and assume the role of a killer (Coulter 
2008: 61). The point is, however, that ‗one does not suddenly stop being a victim just by 
committing a violent act, just as one does not escape being a perpetrator just because one is 
also a victim‘ (Coulter 2008: 69). Mats Utas has also highlighted problems in the prevailing 
humanitarian aid discourse in Liberia as he argues that women are encouraged to present 
themselves as predominantly ‗victims‘, in particular by mentioning that they have been raped 
(Utas 2005).  
                                                             
6 See also Zarkov (2001) on sexual violence and the construction of masculinity. 
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Another body of literature has focused on how wars have been motivated and fought on 
gendered terms. Since the attacks in the US on 11 September, 2001 and the launch of the ‗war 
on terror‘, feminist scholars have shown how the myth of protection underpins the Bush 
administration‘s security rhetoric: 
In spite of the Bush administration‘s appointment of the first female 
national security advisor, our TV screens after 9/11 were full of 
(mostly white) men in charge briefing us about ‗America‘s new war‘ 
both at home and abroad. (Tickner 2002: 335)  
As a result, ‗September 11 and its repercussions have appeared, then, to be all about men 
attacking, saving lives, and responding through further attack, which seems normal‘ (Pettman 
2004: 88). The reason for women‘s exclusion, J. Ann Tickner argues, was a process of re-
masculinisation in the US. Tickner argues that gender is a powerful legitimator of war and 
national security and that our acceptance of a re-masculinised society during times of war and 
uncertainty rises considerably (Tickner 2002: 336). Tickner suggests that we feel safer when 
‗our men‘ are protecting us (against other men) and our way of life and that often in times of 
conflict, women are seen only as victims (Tickner 2002: 334-335). However, both Jan Jindy 
Pettman and Laura Shepherd have pointed out that rather than being invisible, women 
appeared in ways long embedded in the traditional gendered war story: alongside men as 
victims and relatives of victims of the attacks on 11 September 2001 (Pettman 2004: 88). In 
this way, women are identified with the family as mothers, sisters and daughters rather than as 
citizens. Shepherd argues that ‗woman‘ was discursively permitted to mother, care, shop and 
support, all behaviours associated with a very traditionalist model of gender (Shepherd 2006: 
24). Other than these allowable demonstrations of agency, women performing femininities 
post-‗9/11‘ were silenced and absented from public debate (Hunt and Rygiel 2006). 
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A gendered terminology was also used in order to separate ‗us‘ from ‗them‘. Iris Marion 
Young argues that the US has repeatedly appealed to the primacy of its role as protector of 
innocent citizens and liberator of women and children to justify consolidating and centralising 
executive power at home and dominative war abroad (Young 2003: 10). The women of 
Afghanistan constituted the ultimate victims, putting the US in the position of the ultimate 
protector (Young 2003: 17). Similarly, Shepherd argues that a gendered discourse that centred 
on notions of appropriate protection and care towards women served to create and perpetuate 
a particular understanding of the situation and to organise a response based on this 
understanding, a response that meant war was appropriate to the situation in Afghanistan. The 
construction of woman-as-victim marked the enemy abroad as the ‗Irrational Barbarian‘ in 
need of rectification and punishment from the ‗Figure of Authority‘ (Shepherd 2006: 19-20, 
27). Pettman argues that the women of Afghanistan, as symbols of difference, of Otherness, 
were utilised by ‗our men setting out to rescue their women, from their men‘ echoing the 
myth of protection (Pettman 2004: 89). Furthermore, Ferguson argues that the ‗war on terror‘ 
was launched in the name of women‘s rights through a narrative of chivalry where those who 
respect their women are civilised, those who do not are barbarians (Ferguson 2005: 12, 19). 
However, as Jill Steans has pointed out, despite the use of a women‘s rights rhetoric, the Bush 
administration was unwilling to listen to the same women they were seeking to liberate 
(Steans 2008: 164). A similar rhetoric was later applied to Iraq as gendered and racialised 
representations of the war were used to convince Americans that the invasion of Iraq would 
liberate the Iraqi people from a brutal dictator. Hunt and Rygiel argue that this engendering of 
the war not only constructs the ‗victimized women to be rescued‘, but also their ‗hyper-
masculine rescuers‘ and ‗cowardly oppressors‘ (Hunt and Rygiel 2006: 9). Ferguson argues 
that the feminisation of the victims of the Taliban and of Saddam Hussein serves to 
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masculinise and justify US military action (Ferguson 2005: 31). Therefore, women, when and 
if they appear, are typically represented as being acted upon rather than as actors themselves, 
as casualties of the terror attacks, mothers of fallen soldiers, victims of repressive dictators, 
and widows rebuilding their lives in the aftermath of war (Hunt and Rygiel 2006: 1). 
This body of literature has done much to show how ideas about women‘s and men‘s roles 
during war are gendered, how wars are fought on gendered terms and how the idea of women 
as victims construct them as passive objects in need of protection and as such without agency. 
As such, the literature covered in this section fails to acknowledge women‘s agency during 
war. Next, I turn to contexts in which women traditionally have been ascribed agency, 
namely, in their work for peace. 
 
2.2 Gendered peace stories: Motherhood and agency 
A distinctive and joint creation of philosophical abstraction and sexual 
fantasy, war‘s body kills and suffers; it does not give birth. (Ruddick 
2002: 204) 
Within the system of signs in war, there are certain myths about male and female identities 
which become accentuated; female identity is seen as life-giving, whereas male identity is 
seen as life-taking (Skjelsbæk 2001: 220). Thus, women are designated as non-combatants 
and, in effect, peaceful, because of the part they play in the reproductive process. In this sub-
section, I focus on motherhood as a starting point for work on agency and peace.   
Historically, it is predominantly women who in greater numbers have organised against 
militarism and committed themselves to working for peace. According to Nira Yuval-Davies, 
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the image of women resisting wars has been in existence in the Western public imagination at 
least since Lysistrata was first shown in Athens in the fifth century BC (Yuval-Davies 1997: 
94). The long history of women‘s activism in peace movements include the Women‘s Peace 
Party which during the First World War drew together over a thousand women and founded 
the Women‘s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), aimed at tracing the 
links between war, nationalism, masculinity and violence (Pettman 2004: 85). Furthermore, 
women‘s peace groups helped win the Test Ban Treaty in the early 1960s, influenced US 
disengagement from Vietnam War in the 1970s, and during the 1980s, women organisations 
notably the Greenham common protests in the UK developed specifically feminine modes of 
politics to work for peace (Goldstein 2001: 44; Enloe 2000). In this sense, the gendered nature 
of war created a political space for women as peace activists; peace became a subject that 
women could legitimately speak about (Steans 2006: 59). Indeed, women peace activists often 
invoke the ‗natural‘ peacefulness of women and thereby use gendered identities provided by 
traditional narratives of war as a platform for political action. In particular, women‘s 
legitimacy as peace activists were made through their roles as mothers, linking motherhood, 
peace and women‘s rights (Segal 2008: 23; Steans 2006: 59). For example, the early 
suffragette movement argued that maternal urges made women different from men, but that 
women‘s peacefulness was evidence of moral superiority rather than inferiority (Steans 2006: 
58). More recent examples include organisations such as Women in Black, an anti-war 
movement originated in Israel but also active in the former Yugoslavia, CodePink, which 
among other things organises annual rallies on Mother‘s Day and Valentine‘s Day against US 
involvement in current wars, and individuals such as Cindy Sheehan who protested against 
the war in Iraq through her role as a mother after her son was killed in action.
7
 Among women 
                                                             
7 For more information see www.womeninblack.org, www.codepink4peace.org and Sheehan (2006). 
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involved in such transnational political activity, motherhood tends to serve as a unifying idea 
since all women are perceived to be potential mothers. This way, barriers of race, class and 
religious differences among activists can be overcome (Steans 2006: 59). 
Despite the close links between peace and femininity visible in women‘s political activism, 
most feminist scholarship in IR, due to their constructivist orientation, is critical of such 
essentialist claims rendering women ‗naturally‘ peaceful. Yet, contributions to standpoint 
feminism, sometimes referred to as ‗difference feminism‘, have argued that women do have a 
special relationship to peace based in their experience of motherhood with its obligation to 
care on the part of the vast majority of women. This experience, they argue, offers a way to 
critique traditional approaches to the study of war and peace and to tell alternative war stories 
(Steans 2006: 48, 58). Hence, within IR it is contributions to standpoint feminism that most 
clearly have forged a link between motherhood, agency and peace. Standpoint feminism shifts 
the study from abstract states to how real living women are impacted by economic and 
security structures within and across state boundaries. In particular, standpoint feminists 
emphasise a focus on marginalised women as these are particularly disadvantaged, yet 
systematically overlooked (Hansen 2010: 21). A feminist standpoint is ‗a superior vision 
produced by the political conditions and distinctive work of women‘ (Ruddick 2002: 129). In 
particular, such a woman‘s work often comes back to mothering, care and nurturing and 
contributions are, therefore, often referred to as maternalists. Here, I focus on the works of 
Nancy Chodorow (1978), Carol Gilligan (1982) and, in particular, Sara Ruddick (1989) 
because such works are arguably most relevant for the development of a feminist standpoint 
that in my reading have forged a link between motherhood, agency and peace.    
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Nancy Chodorow‘s The Reproduction of Mothering is a psychoanalytic study of how and why 
mothering remains to be seen as a ‗natural‘ fact and why it is ‗naturally‘ linked to women. 
Chodorow argues that it is because women are the primary caretakers that mothering is 
reproduced as ‗naturally‘ linked to women. This creates a focus on social relations and care 
rather than on women‘s capactity to give birth:  
Being a mother, then, is not only bearing a child- it is being a person 
who socializes and nurtures. It is being a primary parent or caretaker. 
(Chodorow 1978: 11) 
With In a Different Voice (1982), Carol Gilligan builds on Chodorow and claims that 
women‘s experience of interconnection shapes their moral domain and gives rise to a different 
moral voice: 
In the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the 
tie between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of 
aggression in the failure of connection. (Gilligan 1982: 173) 
Women‘s ethic of care, moreover, is contrasted to a (male) ethic of justice. Gilligan argues 
that while an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality and that everyone should 
be treated the same, an ethic of care rests on the premise of nonviolence and that no one 
should be hurt (Gilligan 1982: 174). It is this distinctive form of ethics that has been echoed in 
writings that articulate a female political consciousness grounded in difference and the virtues 
of women‘s private sphere, primarily mothering. Amongst such maternalist theorising, Sara 
Ruddick‘s A Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (2002 [1989]) has most clearly 
emphasised the links between motherhood, agency and peace.  
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Ruddick argues that there is a peacefulness latent in maternal practice which means that a 
transformed maternal thinking could make a distinctive contribution to peace politics 
(Ruddick 2002: 137): 
Although mothers are not intrinsically peaceful, maternal practice is a 
‗natural resource‘ for peace politics.... A peace-maker‘s hope is a 
militarist‘s fear: that the rhetoric and passion of maternity can turn 
against the military cause that depends on it. Mothers have supported 
their boys and their leaders, but in the contradiction of maternal and 
military aims there is a dangerous source of resistance. (Ruddick 
2002: 157) 
Ruddick combines a women‘s politics of resistance, which she defines as identified by three 
characteristics: its participants are women, they explicitly invoke their culture‘s symbols of 
femininity and their purpose is to resist certain practices or policies of their governors, with 
motherhood and a feminist politics (Ruddick 2002: 222): 
Although neither a women‘s politics of resistance nor a feminist 
politics is inherently a peace politics, each instructs and strengthens 
peacemaking. Both politics are intricately connected to mothering, yet 
each also challenges just those aspects of maternal practice that limit 
its public, effective peacefulness. Hence separately and, even more, in 
combination, they transform maternal practice into a work of peace. 
(Ruddick 2002: 222)  
Ruddick argues that by combining motherhood, with a politics of resistance and standpoint 
feminism, a new political identity can be constructed: the feminist, maternal peacemaker who 
draws upon the history and traditions of women to create a human-respecting politics of peace 
(Ruddick 1989: 245). As illustration, Ruddick uses the political resistance of the Madres 
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(mothers) of Argentina to its military regime and the similar resistance of Chilean women to 
the Pinochet dictatorship (Ruddick 1989: 225): 
These women are the daughters, the heirs, of Kollwitz‘s mater 
dolorosa.
8
 As in Kollwitz‘s representations, a mother is victimized 
through the victimization of her children. These women are 
themselves victims...Yet there is a sense in which, by their active 
courage, they refuse victimization....The Latin American mater 
dolorosa has learned how to fight as a victim for victims, not by 
joining the strong, but by resisting them. (Ruddick 1989: 233) 
The maternalist position, predominant in Ruddick‘s work and through the activism of the 
women‘s peace movement mentioned above, might be critiqued for expressing biological 
determinism and essentialism as it tends to link mothering and an ethics of care to 
(heterosexual) women and ‗real‘ mothers only.9 However, Ruddick emphasises the distinction 
between women‘s biological capacity to give birth and their social work in mothering as she 
argues that the work of mothering does not require a particular sexual commitment nor that 
there is any reason why mothering work should be distinctly female: 
While most mothering has been and still is undertaken by women, 
there has always been men who mother...When mothering is construed 
as gender-free work, birthgiving and mothering appear as two distinct 
and quite different activities. (Ruddick 2002: xii) 
In other words, Ruddick is still critical of women‘s ‗natural‘ peacefulness:  
There is nothing in a woman‘s genetic makeup of history that prevents 
her from firing a missile or spraying nerve gas over a sleeping village 
                                                             
8 The Mater Dolorosa is the ‗mother of sorrows‘ who is ‗weeping over the body of her son, nursing survivors, 
sadly rebuilding her home, reweaving the connections that war has destroyed – as she grieves over her particular 
loss, she mourns war itself. Where she gives birth and sustains life, his war only hurts and destroys.‘ The mater 
dolorosa is the ‗heroine of maternal peacefulness‘ (Ruddick 2002: 142). 
9 See Dietz (1985) for a critique of the maternalist position to citizenship. 
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if she desires this or believes it to be her duty...War is exciting; 
women, like men, are prey to the excitements of violence and 
community sacrifice it promises. (Ruddick 2002: 154) 
Although distinctly maternal desires and capacities for peacemaking exist, it is through 
maternal efforts to be peaceful rather than an achieved peacefulness that Ruddick finds 
‗resources for creating a less violent world‘ (Ruddick 2002: 136). Crucially, Ruddick does not 
argue that women are naturally peaceful in an ideological sense but interested in the material 
political agency of mothers (male or female). The analysis of material agency through 
motherhood is, as I come back to below, significantly different to how motherhood and 
agency is explored in this research project.   
Today, feminist standpoint theorising and maternalist thinking is echoed in literature on both 
citizenship and ‗women building peace‘. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini‘s contribution (2007), for 
example, explores ‗what they do and why it matters‘. Anderlini argues that ‗women bring 
alternative perspectives and approaches; they can be strong allies in spreading the message of 
peace, but they also have needs‘ (Anderlini 2007: 230). As a policy tool for women‘s 
inclusion in peace processes, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on ‗Women, Peace and 
Security‘ from the year 2000 was a ‗watershed political framework‘ (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 
3) which in addition to acknowledging women‘s particular vulnerability to gendered practices 
of violence also acknowledged that women have different experiences during war and 
therefore needs to be included in all stages of peacebuilding (UNSC 2000). With UNSCR 
1325, women were not only seen as victims of war, but as agents for peace: 
Women must be considered and included at every stage and juncture: 
from analysis to practice, in the early planning and states of any peace 
process, in the talks about the talks about the talks. This responsibility 
cannot be left to a lone gender advisor. Rather, consideration of the 
86 
 
differing situations and needs of women and men (i.e. gendered 
perspectives) must be an integral part of every facet of work by 
governments and international actors. (Anderlini 2007: 230) 
 However, some feminists have pointed out that the resolution risks perpetuating the idea of 
women-as-peacemakers (Pankhurst 2004). Tickner argues that women‘s political organising 
with peace is not necessarily a good thing as ‗peace is frequently seen as an ideal, and even 
uninteresting, state with little chance of success in the ‗real‘ world‘ (Tickner 2002: 337). 
Thus, the association of women with peace renders both women and peace as idealistic, 
utopian, and unrealistic and this is profoundly disempowering for both (Tickner 2002: 338). 
Similarly, Goldstein argues that making peace feminine both masculinises war and draws 
gender divisions that help soldiers to kill (knowing that they are outside a ‗normal‘ world). 
Thus, as long as peace remains associated with women, this may reinforce militarised 
masculinity (Goldstein 2001: 331, 413). 
Discussing maternalism and agency, Caron Gentry (2009) distinguishes between different 
versions of maternalism as ‗active‘, ‗passive‘ and ‗twisted‘ maternalism. The maternal 
thinking represented by standpoint feminists, in particular by Ruddick, as well as by women‘s 
peace activists in Gentry‘s categorisation constitutes an active maternalist position as it 
focuses on how real (material) women are concerned with promoting peace and anti-violent 
policies (mothers for peace). Passive maternalism, on the other hand, refers to situations in 
which women‘s gendered role as mother is claimed by the nation, movement or state to 
symbolise the collectivity. Here, women themselves are not active participants in the conflict. 
Instead, they are placed by others in nationalist ideology and as such subordinately held as an 
idealised subject (mothers of nations) (Gentry 2009: 238-9). Gentry argues that both active 
and passive maternalism associates women with nonviolence, but that women only have 
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agency within active maternalism. I return to passive maternalism in the next section when I 
discuss agency, war and motherhood. 
Whether the contributions discussed in this section find the association of women and the 
feminine with nonviolence and peace as problematic or not, agency is still defined in material 
terms and remains associated with peace and nonviolence. As such, this literature fails to 
acknowledge not only agency as an idea, but also female agency in political violence. Thus, in 
the next section, I turn to literature that, rather than showing how women‘s agency has 
involved working for peace, has engaged with female agency in political violence more 
specifically.  
 
 
3. AGENCY IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
In this section, I first discuss literature on how women‘s heroism and their roles and 
participation in wars are linked to motherhood. Second, I highlight literature that has 
problematised women‘s association with peace and victimhood by explaining how women are 
actually acting and participating in political violence, directly or indirectly.  Here, there is an 
emphasis on non-state perpetrators of political violence or actors‘ proscribed violence and 
agency tends to be defined as political subjectivity. Last, I focus on literature dealing with 
female agency as soldiers in state-armies.  
 
3.1 Agency, war and motherhood 
88 
 
As mentioned above, in traditional stories of war it is usually men who are written as heroes 
and thereby ascribed agency. Gentry argues that both active and passive maternalism link 
women‘s political activism with peace and non-violence but that it is only active maternalism 
that carries with it some agency on the part of the women (Gentry 2009: 236). In contrast to 
Gentry, I suggest that women are ascribed indirect agency in passive maternalism. Within 
certain, often nationalist discourses, women are ideologically allowed heroism through their 
roles as mothers. Instead of showing how individual women act, these contributions focus on 
ideas, norms and values in the construction of war stories. There is the ‗Patriotic Mother‘ who 
is the ever-ready womb for war (Cooke 1996). According to this discourse, women serve their 
nation by ‗producing‘ children/soldiers of the nation. Here, women‘s heroism is measured in 
their life-giving capacities since the more children/soldiers a woman gives birth to, the more 
significant is her heroism. Women have even been awarded medals for giving birth to a large 
amount of children. For example, in 1993, on the date of the 1389 defeat of the Serbs at 
Kosovo, Serbian mothers of more than four children were honoured with medals in a 
ceremony in Pristina by dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Bracewell 1996: 30). In 
this sense, motherhood functions as a form of ‗weapon‘ since a multi-birthing woman will 
give life to many new fighters (Brunner 2005: 36).  
Another nationalist discourse is the ‗Spartan Mother‘: a woman who raises her son as warrior 
ready to die for the nation. Here, it is women‘s social roles as mothers rather than their 
physiological and quantifiable capacity to give life that writes women as heroines. In this 
rhetoric, a woman‘s heroism and patriotism is to urge sons and husbands to fight and thereby 
foster nationalism and warfare (Elshtain 1995; Varzi 2008). The Spartan Mother is heroic 
because she sacrifices her sons for the greater good of the nation-state. As mentioned, both 
these nationalist discourses on women‘s agency in political violence are versions of what 
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Gentry refers to as passive maternalism and, as such, traditionalist ideas about gender, agency 
and war are reinforced rather than challenged.  
It also needs to be pointed out that similarly to how women have used traditionalist 
perceptions of gender roles in their protesting as peace activists, women also frequently utilise 
existing stereotypes to pursue their political objectives in warfare. Not only are women 
exploiting their label of innocence in becoming spies and smugglers (Coulter 2008: 63; Alison 
2004: 448) but motherhood is also used more directly as a strategy for political violence. In 
Sri Lanka, Tamil nationalist women have utilised cultural expectations related to their 
behaviour and dress to gain access to targets as suicide bombers, hiding belt bombs under 
saris or dresses, as a female Black Tiger combatant did in the 1991 suicide-bomb 
assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Alison 2004: 456). In Sierra 
Leone, women were found smuggling weapons through military checkpoints in bags of 
women‘s underwear or hidden on their own or their children‘s bodies (Coulter 2008: 63-4).10 
As the ‗strategy of motherhood‘ has been seen in various places, Mia Bloom argues that 
‗feigning pregnancy unites women suicide bombers in places as diverse as Turkey and Sri 
Lanka‘ (Bloom 2007: 152). 
To complicate the notions of femininity and motherhood, the 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is often disguised under the 
women‘s clothing to make her appear as if she is pregnant and thus 
beyond suspicion or reproach. The advent of women suicide bombers 
has transformed the revolutionary womb into an exploding one. 
(Bloom 2007: 143) 
                                                             
10 This is nothing new as is illustrated in the film he Battle of Algiers (1966) where women smuggle weapons 
through checkpoints. Interestingly, according to Wikipedia, Battle of Algiers was Andreas Baader‘s favourite 
film. 
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Claudia Brunner uses bodily metaphors that directly refer to the gendered representation of 
suicide bombing in general: Virginity, Pregnancy and Motherhood (Brunner 2005: 35). She 
argues that the question of virginity is prevalent in many media accounts where expressions 
such as ‗daughter of Palestine‘, ‗Palestine‘s bride‘ and the like refer to youth and therefore 
innocence within the martyrdom operations that can just as easily be described as murder. 
Furthermore, the picture of the pregnant woman is both cited in reports to illustrate the 
continuing humiliation of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints, but it also illustrates 
the power over the bodies of women and children as the Palestinian nation is hindered in 
giving birth to itself on a symbolic level (Brunner 2005: 36). Again, this echoes passive 
maternalism (mothers of nations). 
This group of contributions to feminist IR scholarship have problematised ideas regarding 
female agency in political violence through maternalism and highlighted how motherhood has 
been used as a discursive strategy within nationalist ideologies, as well as how individual 
women have faked motherhood as a strategy for political violence. In combination, these 
contributions show that maternalism is not only used in the association of women and peace, 
but is also very much present in discourses of political violence. This is also indicated in the 
title of Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry‘s book published in 2007, Mothers, Monsters, 
Whores, which I discuss further in the following sections. 
 
3.2 Agents of political violence 
The official recognition and acknowledgement of women‘s participation in war is very recent, 
but the presence and participation of women in war is neither unusual nor new (Cooke 1996: 
104; Coulter 2008: 56) as ‗female bellicosity and the feminine warring imagination have a 
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long and distinguished past‘ (Bourke 1999: 311-2).11 As mentioned above, the boundary 
between being a victim and a perpetrator of political violence is often blurred. In addition, 
even though women have traditionally been excluded from war as soldiers, they have been an 
integral part of the killing process in a number of other ways. Prominent examples of women 
who have led their people in war are Joan of Arc, Queen Isabella of Spain, Queen Elizabeth of 
England, Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir and Indira Ghandi (Goldstein 2001). Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, former Rwandan Minister for Family and Women‘s Affairs, was the first 
woman ever to be charged with genocide in an international court (the ICTR). She was 
charged with organising massacres and encouraging sexual violence against Tutsis (Alison 
2007: 89). Lynne Segal (2008) and Joshua Goldstein (2001) have illuminated women‘s roles 
as supporters of the military culture, their devotion to men in uniform and their disrespect for 
those who refuse to fight. According to Segal, the majority of women have supported the wars 
their leaders have waged (Segal 2008: 22). Women have also been participating in the 
genocide in Sudan by singing songs to stir up racial hatred during attacks and celebrate the 
humiliation of their enemies (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 146) and women‘s wings of Hindu 
extremist organisation have urged men to prove their manhood by killing and raping Muslim 
women (Cockburn 2010: 144). Miranda Alison has shown how in Northern Ireland it was 
women who had central responsibility for transporting, moving, hiding, cleaning and storing 
weapons and explosive materials as they were much less likely to be stopped and searched 
(Alison 2004: 457). Bracewell has discussed groups of mothers and widows (first Serbs, later 
Croats) who gathered to block the aid convoys sent to the besieged Bosnian towns of 
Srebrenica and Mostar. Bracewell argues these women used their role as grieving mothers to 
                                                             
11 See Jones (2005) for a history of women warriors. 
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legitimate their protests and acted, consciously or not, in the interests of the nationalist leaders 
(Bracewell 1996: 30).  
These contributions to feminist IR literature on female agency in political violence have 
illuminated how individual women have acted and indirectly contributed to warfare in order 
to critique gendered assumptions of women as ‗naturally‘ passive and peaceful. Women are 
actually actively participating in most current conflicts (Utas 2005: 405). Still, even though 
we know that although they are a minority, many women of diverse cultural backgrounds 
express their personal and political dissatisfaction by violent means (Alison 2007), the 
perception of fighters/rebels/soldiers as male remains, and gendered ideas of war and peace 
continue (Coulter 2008: 69). Moreover, because of such gendered stereotypes, Sjoberg and 
Gentry argue, women who commit acts of violence in defiance of national or international law 
are not seen as criminals, warriors or terrorists, but as women criminals, women warriors or 
women terrorists (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 7). Women‘s violence is often discussed in terms 
of violent women‘s gender: women are not supposed to be violent (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 
2). Similarly, Alison remarks that ‗the mere fact that it is necessary to specify ―female 
combatants‖ indicates their historical rarity and symbolic position as unconventional figures‘ 
and Elshtain argues that ‗the woman fighter is, for us, an identity in extremis, not an 
expectation‘ (Alison 2004: 447; Elshtain 1995: 173). 
In addition, feminist contributions have also argued that female agency in political violence is 
gendered because individual women‘s motivations are explained in gendered terms. Historian 
Joanna Burke argues that when women did kill, their ability to do so was explained under one 
of two mutually exclusive headings: psychosexual confusion or maternal instincts (Bourke 
1999: 318). Other explanations for why women engage in violence in general include: 
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elevated levels of testosterone, traumatic events in childhood and excessive feminism or 
lesbianism (Eager 2008: 3). Hence, because women soldiers either lacked femininity or 
possessed too much of the maternal impulse, they were seen as uncontrollable, more ferocious 
and more deceitful than their male counterparts, beliefs that were endorsed and encouraged in 
popular fiction (Bourke 1999: 340).
12
 Elshtain argues that the violence of female groups is a 
sign that signifies formlessness, dis-order, breakdown, mis-rule and often appears as an out-
of-control mob, a crowd, a food riot, usually of lower-class composition:  
Not being politically constituted, women are not politically 
accountable. Male violence could be moralized as a structured 
activity- war- and thus be depersonalized and idealized. Female 
violence, however, brooked no good. It was overpersonalized and 
vindictive. (Elshtain 1995: 169) 
Another common representation of women‘s violence is that women either are taking more 
pleasure in the bloodshed than male combatants (Bourke 1999: 312), or are more aggressive 
than male soldiers (Eager 2008). For example, stories of the brutality of rebel women became 
a popular theme during and after the war in Sierra Leone (Coulter 2008: 59). Female fighters 
have often been regarded by the civilian population as monsters, barbarians and frequently as 
more cold blooded than male rebels (Coulter 2008: 57). Coulter argues that because notions of 
women‘s and men‘s gendered roles in war and conflict persists, to transcend what is 
considered acceptable feminine or masculine behaviour in times of war and conflict can be 
costly. Men who refuse to fight are often ridiculed, jailed, or even killed for their cowardice or 
lack of manliness, whereas women who oppose female stereotypes in war often are regarded 
as deviant or unnatural (Coulter 2008: 63). Therefore, Coulter argues, the notion of a 
                                                             
12 Throughout the twentieth century, a fascination with female combatants developed as representations in 
popular culture such as novels, short stories, magazine articles and autobiographies increased (the popular press 
highlighted feminine fondness for the gun) (Bourke 1999: 312).  
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militarised masculinity has consequences for how female combatants are interpreted. In this 
way, the idea that female combatants are more evil and vicious than men is often attributed by 
researchers to female fighters‘ transgression of acceptable female behaviour (Coulter 2008: 
63). Similarly, Alison explains that in Sri Lanka, female Tamil Tigers have a fearsome 
reputation, and it is often said that they are more violent and frightening than male members. 
Some suggest this is because female soldiers have to be tougher, more ruthless and macho and 
less sympathetic in order to compete for status and recognition in a traditional patriarchal 
context, while others suggest it may only be representations of violence that differs. Bourke 
points out that there is no evidence that female combatants actually were more liable to play 
dirty (Bourke 1999: 341) and Alison suggests that it is because women‘s involvement in 
violence remains more shocking and disturbing than men‘s involvement that women‘s 
violence is represented as more aggressive (Alison 2004: 457). This indicates an ‗underlying 
discomfort with such a challenge to gendered expectations that may be widely cross-cultural‘ 
(Alison 2004: 462).  
When it comes to motivations for actors‘ involvement in violence, women‘s violence is 
represented differently than men‘s violence even though individuals from both genders are 
motivated by both strategy and personal politicisation. Gentry explains:  
As the studies move away from the general self-martyr (male) into 
analyzing the female self-martyr, reasons behind the person‘s 
(woman‘s) actions begin to change. (Gentry 2009: 241) 
In media representations and some academic literature, women‘s motivations for turning 
violent are explained in personal rather than political terms. Bloom argues that women are 
fulfilling the ultimate patriarchal ideal of motherhood by giving up her body for the collective, 
the nation (Bloom 2007: 165):  
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According to Hindu faith, once a woman is raped she cannot get 
married nor have children. Fighting for Tamil freedom might have 
been the only way for such a woman to redeem herself. The idea of 
sacrifice is ingrained in Tamil culture. Women are taught from an 
early age to subordinate themselves to the needs or desires of men. 
The self-sacrifice of the female bombers is almost an extension of the 
idea of motherhood in the Tamil culture. (Bloom 2007: 160) 
Similarly, journalist Barbara Victor depicts Palestinian female suicide bombers as becoming 
perpetrators of political violence due to feminine shortcomings such as being childless, 
divorced or adulterous (Victor 2004). Eager argues that by portraying female suicide bombers 
as influenced by family members or grief-stricken over the death of a relative or a friend, 
these women fulfil the ultimate maternal-sacrificial code in that they want to give their own 
life on behalf of others‘ pain, grief or suffering (Eager 2008: 187). Thus, even though violent 
men are portrayed as rationally or logically motivated, violent women are usually not depicted 
as rational actors (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 13). This is the case even though females 
committing suicide bombings tend to be older and better educated than males (Toles Parkin 
2004: 84), and even if the perpetrators‘ own video-recorded martyrdom statements focus on 
their political ambitions (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 120). Rarely are these women portrayed 
as committing a suicide attack due to political motivations (Eager 2008: 187). Frances Hasso 
offers a detailed account of how representations by and deployments of the four Palestinian 
women who committed suicide attacks in 2002 functioned to both reproduce and undermine 
gender-sexual norms (Hasso 2005: 44). Alison shows that like male combatants, female 
combatants in nationalist conflicts view themselves as fighting to protect the political, 
cultural, economic and military security of their nation, community or family (Alison 2004: 
458). Jessica West argues that the women referred to as ‗black widows‘ in Chechnya are 
described as desperate and revenge-seeking wives and sisters of Chechen fighters who have 
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been killed. West argues that their actions have been represented as a result of victimisation 
rather than agency (West 2004: 1).  
Terrorism is a political act, yet no one has stopped to ask what 
women‘s political goals are. It is just assumed that they seek personal 
revenge. Practically, by treating women as instruments rather than as 
agents of war, their political goals are likely to be overlooked in any 
future negotiations, when their presence is no longer needed. (West 
2004: 9) 
Gentry argues that when research focuses on women specifically, a relational need to belong 
and the participation of family and friends is emphasised. This is why women‘s participation 
is seen as based solely upon belonging, familial and friendship ties and nurturing, and less 
about her political motivations and beliefs. Gentry argues that this gendering both 
subordinates woman‘s agency and echoes the maternalist position (Gentry 2009: 240). Gentry 
refers to the writing of politically violent women in this way as ‗twisted maternalism‘ since it 
continues to objectify women and deny them any agency (Gentry 2009: 242).   
In 2004, thousands of photos seemingly depicting US soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners were 
made available to the media resulting in what is commonly referred to as the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal. The fact that several of the alleged torturers were women resulted in much 
media debate and later academic publications on female agency in political violence. In 
addition, since two of my empirical cases are stories from this scandal, such feminist 
contributions speak directly to this research project.  
The representation of women soldiers were quite dramatic and most 
people found them utterly shocking. But we might also say that they 
provided the most powerful evidence of what the most interesting 
feminist analyses have tried to explain: that there is a difference 
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between the body gendered as female and the set of discourses and 
ideologies that inform the sex/gender system. (Davies 2007: 25) 
The Abu Ghraib debacle gave new life to doubts not only about 
whether women ought to be performing dangerous military duties, but 
about whether they should be part of the armed forces at all. (Hillman 
2007: 112) 
Melanie Richter-Montpetit argues that the violences shown in the Abu Ghraib pictures follow 
a pre-constructed heterosexed, racialised and gendered script grounded in colonial desires and 
practices constituting the ‗war on terror‘ (Richter-Montpetit 2007: 39). Melisa Brittain argues 
that there is a virgin/whore dichotomy contained within the category of white femininity in 
the West which means that the white woman can signify as either victim-of-rape-in-need-of-
rescue or depraved-villain-in-need-of-reform. Both significations co-opt the category of white 
femininity as a way of relieving white masculinity from the burden of signifying as anything 
but a just and civilising force (Brittain 2006: 92). Discussing Lynndie England‘s agency, 
Brittain suggests that given the abusive conditions under which women in the military must 
operate it is quite possible that England negotiated this treacherous ground by blindly 
following orders, or by acting as just one of the boys. However, the fact that she is not one of 
the boys is what made her particularly useful in the systematic humiliation of Iraqi men. It 
also made her a convenient scapegoat for the Bush administration and facilitated the use of 
her as a symbol of US corruption and depravity (Brittain 2006: 90). Sjoberg argues that 
during her trials England was denied agency when she was not allowed the right to plead 
guilty because a court determined that she ‗could have been so manipulated by her boyfriend 
as to have lost her sense of right and wrong‘ (Sjoberg 2007: 96). Sjoberg and Gentry argue 
that the female soldiers in the Abu Ghraib scandal have committed a triple transgression: 
against the laws of war, against their femininity and against the military‘s prescribed roles for 
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military women (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 23). Alison argues that the much greater public 
shock in reaction to a woman‘s involvement in such a sexual torture of male prisoners than to 
her male comrades‘ involvement indicates the continued naturalisation of men as perpetrators 
of sexual crimes and the naturalisation of women as non-aggressive- even when they are 
soldiers (Alison 2007: 76).  
Both Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) and Eager (2008) argue that women who participate in 
violence that is not endorsed by state governments and is therefore committed outside 
exceptional circumstances are described as aberrant and ‗less than a woman‘ and as less than 
humans (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 22; Eager 2008: 3). Sjoberg and Gentry, whose 
contribution is closest to this research project in content, argue that women engaged in 
proscribed violence are often portrayed either as ‗mothers‘, women who are fulfilling their 
biological destinies; as ‗monsters‘, women who are pathologically damaged and are therefore 
drawn to violence; or as ‗whores‘, women whose violence is inspired by sexual dependence 
and depravity. Each narrative has gendered assumptions about what is appropriate female 
behaviour. The mother narratives describe women‘s violence as a need to belong, a need to 
nurture, and a way of taking care of and being loyal to men; it is motherhood gone awry 
(Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 30-36). The monster narrative eliminates rational behaviour, 
ideological motivation and culpability from women engaged in political violence. Instead, 
here violent women are described as insane, in denial of their femininity, no longer women or 
human (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 36-41). The whore narratives blame women‘s violence on 
the evils of female sexuality at its most intense or its most vulnerable (Sjoberg and Gentry 
2007: 41-49). Sjoberg and Gentry argue that because women who commit violence are most 
often perceived of as having acted outside of a prescribed gender role, their agency as 
perpetrators of violence represent inappropriate femininity. Furthermore, when women‘s 
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violent practices are captured in fantasies which reify gender stereotypes and subordination, 
women‘s agency is denied (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 5). While I welcome the analysis of 
motherhood in both Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) and Gentry (2010), motherhood is limited to 
one, out of three, different narratives used in order to deny women agency in political 
violence. As I explain in greater detail in the conclusion, this research project offers 
something different as it also explores how motherhood enables female agency in political 
violence. 
The contributions discussed in this section have shown how gendered assumptions influence 
the portrayal of female perpetrators of political violence and thereby illustrate how female 
agency in political violence is denied. As such, these contributions do not analyse how female 
agency in political violence is enabled. In addition, in these contributions the actors portrayed 
tend to be non-state actors or women who are perpetrators of proscribed violence. Thus, I 
refer to this literature as engaging with illegitimate agency. However, as mentioned above, 
and in more detail in Chapter 2, I define agency in political violence as the capacity to kill in 
order to capture the idea of killing. As a result, the context is less important and what I refer to 
as legitimate agency also needs to be included. Within a Western culture, legitimate agency in 
political violence is closely linked to the (state) military, thus, I now continue with exploring 
literature on gender, agency and the military.  
 
3.3 Gender, agency and the military 
Women have only been allowed into military service in significant numbers in times of 
extreme need in war (Goldstein 2001: 93). Hence, historically, women who participated in 
combat usually did so disguised as men (Bourke 1999: 311). Elshtain calls women who 
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reverse cultural expectations by serving in militaries ‗the Ferocious Few‘ (Elshtain 1995).  
The arguments against women‘s inclusion have been both physically, that women lacked 
upper body strength and possessed less stamina and endurance, and psychologically, that 
women were said to lack the aggressiveness of men and to have lower fear thresholds (Bourke 
1999: 333). According to Gerhard Kümmel, arguments for the exclusion are that women 
might be defined as weakening or polluting especially in a combat situation; that feminine 
skills or aptitudes for caring and nurturing will be diminished through such participations; and 
that women might not be able to cope with the rigors and deprivations of war and training. 
Other major concerns have been whether men will obey women officers and whether men 
will endanger themselves by protecting women in combat situations (Kümmel 2002: 631). 
Bourke argues that the reason why the military establishment was historically opposed to 
allowing women to carry arms was because they were ‗fearful of the chaos that might result 
from the disruption of traditional gender roles and anxious least the unleashing of female 
bellicosity would morally disenfranchise both sexes‘ (Bourke 1999: 344). It was feared that 
the presence of women at the frontlines would be demoralising for men: it would disrupt 
processes of bonding and destroy a self-consciously ‗masculine‘ warrior ethic. Combat was 
the ultimate signifier of manliness and bringing women in would symbolically castrate the 
armed forces (Bourke 1999: 338). Similarly, Kümmel argues that all these concerns are in fact 
a concern with the overall symbolic order, the apparent loosening of boundaries between 
women and men, and the weakening of the links between nation, the military and gendered 
identities (Kümmel 2002: 631). The Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld has been 
one of the most outspoken critics of women‘s inclusion in the military. He maintains that the 
inclusion of female soldiers feminises and, therefore, weakens the military, which will lead to 
its decline, leaving the armed forces progressively more incapable of doing what they were 
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invented for (Van Creveld 2000). It seems the most concrete danger from the feminisation of 
the military derives from the physical presence of female bodies.  
Historically, the Army has been a masculinist organisation defined in terms of its 
masculinities and in opposition to women and the feminine (Woodward and Winter 2006: 60) 
with the implication that a soldier has to learn to ‗deny all that is feminine and soft in himself‘ 
(Goldstein 2001: 266). Also, with today‘s legislation against discriminating women based on 
their sex, the exemption of women from combat has to be made along the lines of combat 
effectiveness rather than gender. As a result, the debate shifted from the principal question of 
whether or not to include women in the military towards the issue of women in combat forces 
(Kümmel 2002: 621). In spite of the military opening up to women soldiers, women are still 
excluded from certain positions on the basis of their sex. In 2002, no Western armed forces 
allowed women to serve in Special Forces (Kümmel 2002: 624). 
Woodward and Winter have analysed the 2002 Ministry of Defence report published on 
gender in the armed forces and the exclusion of women in direct combat positions. The 
argument made in the report is that women are excluded because of ‗the risks to the cohesion 
of small teams under extreme and violent conditions of close combat‘ (MoD 2002). 
Woodward and Winter argue that women are excluded because of assumptions about their 
qualities as women. They argue that gender difference is constructed as essentialist whereas 
other types of differences for example due to race or ethnicity are constructed as social in 
origin and, thus, ultimately surmountable by the fighting unit (Woodward and Winter 2006: 
57). 
Another ‗event‘ from the ‗war on terror‘ that generated much debate in mass media, as well as 
being a topic for academic publications, was the construction of US soldier Jessica Lynch as 
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the war in Iraq‘s first heroine. Using the discourse of masculinist protection and the myth of 
sacrifice, Véronique Pin-Fat and Maria Stern argue that Lynch, as a female prisoner of war, 
could not be sacrificed while in captivity because she, as a woman, symbolically stands for 
what the military traditionally is protecting. Lynch is that for which the soldier sacrifices and, 
therefore, cannot be sacrificed herself (Pin-Fat and Stern 2005: 42). The US military, they 
argue, required a rescued Jessica Lynch and the notion of femininity she represents in order to 
produce and sustain fighters who are willing to die for their country. Therefore, in this 
context, women like Jessica Lynch cannot be sacrificed; they are the object, not the subject, of 
sacrifice (Pin-Fat and Stern 2005: 42, 44).  
Pin-Fat and Stern argue that the masculinity of the military, indeed the existential identity of 
the military as part of war, relies on its constitutive feminine other. The very existence of 
women‘s bodies within the space of the military thus threatens both the identity of the military 
and its capacity to execute its duties. Furthermore, Pin-Fat and Stern argue that gender 
becomes subsumed under sex and is naturalised as biological in this framework. These 
explanations rest on essentialist arguments about women, where female difference is 
interpreted as disruptive to the cohesion by its very presence (Pin-Fat and Stern 2005: 31). 
Therefore, ‗equality‘ within the military is doomed to fail given that female bodies cannot 
become male (Pin-Fat and Stern 2005: 32). Similarly, Sjolander and Trevenen argue that 
media portraits of Jessica Lynch demonstrate how little the simple inclusion of women in the 
military acts to disrupt sexist systems of power and meaning (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 
158). They argue that two competing constructions of Lynch, as the ‗Rambette‘ and the 
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‗Damsel in Distress‘, supported and reinforced a conception of gender that underlies military, 
imperial and national projects and systems of meaning:
13
  
The ‗Rambette‘ narrative initially portrayed her as a valiant and 
resilient warrior, willing to shoot to the death to defend her country 
and fellow soldiers. The ‗Damsel in Distress‘ narrative exaggerated 
descriptions of her rescue as well as provided evidence of her 
femininity, her heterosexuality, her white Americanness and her 
youthfulness. (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 168) 
Instead of challenging traditional gender norms by serving in the military, Lynch served to re-
order and discipline conceptions of femininity (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 159, 172-3). 
Thus, the re-assimilation of Jessica Lynch into a traditional vision of feminine virtue (as 
opposed to a deviant feminist vision of a female warrior) enabled a situation in which 
‗everyone appears to be performing gender as they should‘, thus alleviating the disruption 
initially provided by a female soldier (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 172). Referring to 
former US soldier, Kayla Williams, Cynthia Cockburn reflects on the inclusion of women in 
the military:
14
 
Aspiring to equality through military service alongside men, Kayla 
Williams emerged from the experience reduced in her own eyes to ‗a 
slut‘- which is how her male comrades had perceived and treated her. 
It is not the same thing to be a woman soldier as a man soldier, nor is 
it seen as one. (Cockburn 2010: 145) 
Regarding the Jessica Lynch story, scholars such as Kumar (2004), Brittain (2006) and 
Sjoberg (2007) have revealed that the focus on Lynch at the time excluded representations of 
                                                             
13 The rescue of Jessica Lynch was made with references to popular culture as it was referred to as an action 
movie. The US special task force filmed the entire rescue (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 164). 
14 See Williams (2006) and Holmstedt (2007) for female soldiers‘ own accounts of serving as soldiers in the 
military. 
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the other two female soldiers involved in the incident, Shoshana Johnson (African-American) 
and Lori Pristewa (Native-American). These untold stories both expose the racial aspect of 
what is appropriate femininity as well as that their agency in the incident is denied. Brittain 
argues that within the discourse of white supremacy, neither Johnson nor Piestewa could 
figure as all-American heroines:  
As ‗women of color‘, they do not fit into the category of femininity 
worth saving. Unlike Jessica Lynch, they cannot signify as vulnerable 
to the threat of inter-racial rape, and they could never be made to stand 
in for the violation of the US by a foreign male threat. (Brittain 2006: 
83) 
Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel argue that that the political purpose of official war stories such as 
the one associated with Jessica Lynch is to camouflage the interests, agendas, policies, and 
politics that underpin the war in order to legitimise and gain consent for the ‗war on terror‘ 
(Hunt and Rygiel 2006: 4). Melisa Brittain argues that the writing of Jessica Lynch as a 
modern-day heroine is an example of how colonial memory and fear of the Other have been 
effectively evoked to rally support for Bush‘s ‗war on terror‘ (Brittain 2006: 74). For 
example, by suggesting Lynch was anally raped, authors reproduce Arab masculinity as not 
only sexually violent, but also ‗unnatural‘ and ‗perverse‘ (Brittain 2006: 83). Brittain notes 
that the Lynch story appeared when rising Iraqi resistance against the occupation became 
impossible for Pentagon to either ignore or hide. This moment of crisis was thus managed by 
creating a narrative of vulnerable white femininity and Arab hypermasculinity to divert 
attention away from their loss of control (Brittain 2006: 81). Kumar, furthermore, suggests 
that Lynch was used by the military to enable a controversial war being talked about in 
emotional rather than rational language, i.e. as war propaganda (Kumar 2004).  
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In addition, Cooke argues that female soldiers threaten to devalue the sacrifice made by their 
male counterparts, soldiers are no longer ‗boys whom we are reluctantly but proudly prepared 
to sacrifice‘, but women and men who are above all parents and spouses who saw the military 
a chance for employment and even for social mobility (Cooke 1996: 33). Attempts at 
sustaining boundaries between the military and civilian life, men and women, war and peace, 
and so on, Pin-Fat and Stern argue, reveal how these boundaries rely on clear coding of 
masculinity and femininity and how the taken for granted identity of military and the 
boundaries upon which it rests are unsettled by the inclusion of the feminine (Pin-Fat and 
Stern 2005: 34). However, they also argue the identity of the military is, by necessity, 
inherently unstable, incomplete, and subject to change (Pin-Fat and Stern 2005: 32, 35).  
Feminist contributions in this section have shown that although women are technically 
included, the inclusion process has paid little attention to the discursive and performative 
elements of gender subordination (Butler 1993; 2006). As a result, the discursive structures of 
gender subordination are preserved even in an increasingly gender-integrated international 
political arena (McNay 2000). With the inclusion of female soldiers and combatants, gender 
stereotypes and subordinations have changed shape and become less visible, but still very 
much exists (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 3). Moreover, while contributions in this section have 
focused on legitimate agency in the form of state-based political violence, they tend to focus 
on how female agency is denied and not how it is enabled. In particular, the way in which 
heroism and heroines, as agents of political violence, are constructed is lacking within 
feminist IR, especially with regards to motherhood.  
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4. CONCLUSION: Filling in the gaps 
In this chapter, I have mapped the feminist IR literature to which this research project aims to 
make a contribution to knowledge. I started by discussing contributions on gender, agency 
and war, broadly defined, focusing on two implications of the gendered nature of war: how 
women have traditionally been seen as victims of war and the association of women with 
nonviolence and peace, in particular through motherhood. I explored standpoint feminist 
literature on an ethics of care and maternalist thinking in order to draw out the links between 
motherhood, agency and peace in gendered peace stories. In the second section, I examined 
literature on female agency in political violence more specifically. I showed how women‘s 
heroism in warfare and indirect participation has been linked to women‘s potential role as 
mothers. I used literature which has highlighted individual women‘s participation and thereby 
agency in warfare and, last, I discussed literature on individual soldiers‘ agency within the 
military as well as gendered implications of the military system in general. In this concluding 
section, I highlight five main ways in which this research project differs from, and therefore 
aims to fill a gap within, the existing feminist IR literature on gender, agency and political 
violence. Combined, these contributions constitute a poststructuralist account of female 
agency in political violence. Independently, this relates to questions regarding what to analyse 
(visual and textual representations in mass culture), what level to analyse (the domestic level), 
as well as how agency in political violence is defined.  
First, within a ‗war on terror‘ context, much feminist IR literature has dealt with how 
gendered systems of meaning and representation have enabled, justified or promoted the wars 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, I argue it is equally relevant to ask how 
representations of the ‗war on terror‘ have reinforced certain gender norms at the domestic 
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level, within our societies. Caron Gentry argues that ‗the manufacturing of women‘s political 
activism as part of their biological function as mothers tells the reader more about the story-
teller (the one who manufactures the narrative about women‘s proscribed violence) and less 
about women‘s agency‘ (Gentry 2009: 247). In contrast, I argue that the two are intimately 
linked. In order to answer how gender norms have been reinforced during the ‗war on terror‘ 
and think differently about gender, agency and political violence, I argue that it is crucial to 
look to the story-teller(s) and in that way trace how knowledge-making institutions and 
practices construct meanings, subjectivities and knowledges (Zalewski 2000: 123). By this I 
mean we need to focus on representations of female agency in political violence. This is 
because representations of agency tell us something about how female agency in political 
violence is understood in our societies. This research project is not about how individual 
female perpetrators of political violence act and whether their material agency is denied or 
not. I do not analyse political subjectivity. Instead, this project explores the workings of 
power inherent in the way in which female agents of political violence are written as 
subjects/objects within various discursive practices. Hence, this research makes an original 
contribution to the existing literature by exploring how representations of female agency in 
political violence have reinforced certain gendered norms within a Western cultural context.  
Following my theoretical and methodological framework, there is also no need to distinguish 
between different forms of representations. Most of the existing literature, excludes visual 
imagery in representations of gender, agency and violence.
15
 Sjoberg and Gentry (2007), for 
example, only discuss narratives. In comparison, my contribution has a more complex, less 
static, understanding of representations. Also, whilst their argument about three different 
narratives (mother, monster, whore) in representations of female agency in political violence, 
                                                             
15 An exemption is Hasso (2005) who includes Palestinian suicide bombers‘ video messages in her analysis. 
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can help us to understand how female perpetrators of violence are being portrayed, this 
research aims to tackle underlying ideas about gender, agency and violence supporting such 
representations. As such, this research project does not only explore how female agency in 
political violence is denied through motherhood but also how female agency in political 
violence is enabled through motherhood. This research project is about implications and 
meanings of certain representations and since, according to Barthes, anything that has 
meaning has the potential to become mythical, popular culture has just as much to tell us 
about understandings of female agency in political violence as do more traditional sources of 
data. Following scholars such as Rob Walker (1992), Cynthia Weber (2005), Jutta Weldes 
(1999; 2003) and Roland Bleiker (2001), this research project makes an original contribution 
to the existing literature on gender, agency and political violence by including empirical cases 
from popular culture and by analysing visual representations.  
In addition, when I discuss agency in political violence, I use a broader definition of both 
agency and political violence. As mentioned above, due to my theoretical framework, I 
analyse representations of agency held by subject positions in discursive structures. I do not 
analyse whether or not individuals have ‗real‘ agency through the idea of political 
subjectivity. This is an important distinction that a poststructuralist account of female agency 
in political violence offers. Moreover, valuable contributions such as, for example, Sjoberg 
and Gentry are limiting female agency to women‘s proscribed violence by which they mean 
‗violence that is denounced, condemned or prohibited by the laws of states or the laws 
between states‘ (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 11). In contrast, I define political violence as 
‗capacity to kill‘ because with this definition both female soldiers‘ and female ―terrorists‘‖ 
agency, both legitimate and illegitimate agency, are included. The reason for this theoretical 
move is not only that it is a capacity to kill that unites these two types of actors, but it is also 
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the only way in which it is possible to capture the idea of women killing. I argue it is the idea 
of women killing, the capacity to kill, not the context, that is most provoking, shocking and, in 
the end, at odds and clashing with the Myth of Motherhood which captures the capacity to 
give life. I argue that because of women‘s assumed capacity to give life, they cannot 
‗naturally‘ take life. Seemingly, femininity, with which women are ‗naturally‘ associated, and 
killing are juxtaposed. This creates not only a tension in representations of female agency in 
political violence, but also establishes the boundary between ‗natural‘/appropriate and 
‗unnatural‘/inappropriate femininity. In this sense, killing is the ultimate ‗unnatural‘ feminine 
behaviour. Hence, I use a broader definition of agency in political violence to facilitate 
making the Myth of Motherhood visible/conscious.  
To sum up, this research project offers a nuanced understanding of gender, agency and 
political violence by analysing the meaning of representations of female agency in political 
violence in a domestic ‗war on terror‘ culture; by analysing visual representations; by 
including popular culture as data for analysis; by analysing representations of agency rather 
than ‗real‘ agency held by individuals; and last, by defining agency in political violence as the 
capacity to kill in order to capture the idea of killing. Combined, these contributions constitute 
a poststructuralist account of female agency in political violence.  
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PLOT SYNOPSIS: Overview empirical cases 
 
FAYE TURNEY  
Case description Faye Turney was one of 15 British sailors and marines who were 
held hostage in Iran for two weeks in 2007. When the Sun revealed 
that the only woman involved was also a mother, both British 
media and the Iranian government focused their attention on 
Turney. In the UK, a debate regarding women‘s roles in the 
military service was ignited. The captives were shown on Iranian 
television eating and spending time together. After two weeks, the 
captive were dressed in suits, taken to see the President, pardoned 
and released. They arrived in the UK with ‗goody-bags‘ from the 
Iranian President. The Ministry of Defence allowed the members 
of the group to sell their story to the media. Most of the media 
focus during and after the hostage crisis was on Turney who 
subsequently was offered £100,000 for an interview with the Sun 
and ITV news. 
Timeline April and May 2007 
 
LYNNDIE ENGLAND  
Case description Lynndie England was one of three female army personnel in a 
small group of US military police officers who were punished for 
the Abu Ghraib scandal. England is the most well-known of the 
people involved and the most published and written about. England 
was a desk-clerk whose job was to log prisoners arriving at Abu 
Ghraib but because of her relationship with Charles Graner, one of 
the MP‘s tasked with ‗preparing‘ prisoners for interrogations by 
military intelligence officers during the night shifts, England was 
present too. At the time of the revealing of the abuse and during 
her trials, England was pregnant with Graner‘s child. England 
pleaded guilty in her first trial but the deal was thrown out after 
Graner stated that she was only following orders by superiors. In 
her second trial, England was sentenced to three years in prison for 
‗posing‘ in photos, the third highest sentence. 
Timeline 2004-2005 
Key events The initial media coverage when the first photos became public, 
England‘s two trials, as well as her pregnancy. 
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JANIS KARPINSKI  
Case description Janis Karpinski was in charge of all military police officers, 
charged with the task of guarding prisoners all over Iraq. Various 
military investigations have shown that the chain of command was 
blurred as Abu Ghraib prison itself was transferred to Military 
Intelligence because it was the only prison where interrogations 
were taking place. In effect, it meant that Janis Karpinski was no 
longer in charge of Abu Ghraib, but at the same time her soldiers 
were working in that facility. In the media representations, Janis 
Karpinski is referred to as the highest officer to be punished for the 
scandal. However, she was not punished for involvement in any 
abuse, but for weak leadership and a false shoplifting charge that 
she failed to mention before she was promoted to General. She 
remains the only General ever to have been demoted in the US 
Army (Karpinski, Signal City, 13/11/2005).  
Timeline 2004 
 
BAADER-MEINHOF COMPLEX 2008 (Based on a book by Stefan Aust that was re-
launched in 2006). 
Main characters  Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader. 
Case description The Baader-Meinhof Complex is a German film about 
the German terrorist organisation Red Army Faction 
(RAF) and their activities in the 1970s. The narrative 
of the film particularly follows Meinhof‘s 
transformation from an outspoken journalist to a 
perpetrator and instigator of political violence. The 
group‘s aim is to defeat US imperialism and many of 
their attacks are, thus, targeting US interests. After 
West Germany declared a ‗war on terror‘, most RAF 
members were either killed or arrested within a couple 
of years. The trials of Meinhof, Baader and Ensslin 
went on for several years and during this time the 
prisoners were mostly held in isolation. The 
relationship between Meinhof on the one hand and 
Baader and Ensslin on the other was estranged and 
Meinhof, who never saw the end of the trials, 
committed suicide in prison. Some time after, when a 
new group of members failed a hijacking operation, 
Baader, Ensslin and two other RAF members also 
chose to commit suicide (one woman survived).  
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BRITZ 2007 
Main characters Nasima, Sohail, Jude, Sabia 
Case description Britz is a two-part television drama shown in 2007 on 
Channel 4 about a brother and a sister, Sohail and 
Nasima, and their different personal experiences as 
British Muslims during increasing tensions between 
counter-terrorism laws and civil liberties in a post-
‗9/11‘ and ‗7/7‘ ‗war on terror‘ society. In the UK, 
Nasima becomes radicalised after her best friend, 
Sabia, commits suicide after being mistreated by 
police, and because she is not allowed to be with her 
secret boyfriend. Nasima becomes a suicide bomber 
while Sohail works for MI5 and counter-terrorism. In 
the last part, ‗Nasima‘s story‘, we follow the lead 
female character, Nasima, and her transformation into 
a suicide bomber. She travels to Pakistan to train as a 
fighter before she returns to London and makes the last 
preparations. Just before Nasima is about to push the 
button and ignite her bomb, which she is wearing 
under a maternity suit, Sohail reaches for her, hugs her 
and asks her not to do it. Nasima pushes the button and 
the screen goes white.   
 
FEMALE AGENTS 2008 
Main characters Louise, Jeanne, Suzy, Gaelle, Pierre, Heindrich, Buckmaster. 
Case description Female Agents is a French film inspired by the women who fought 
as agents during the Second World War when France was occupied 
by Germany. The film follows a group of four female agents who 
are put together by the British Special Operations Executive 
(SOE): Louise, Jeanne, Gaelle and Suzy. Louise‘s brother Pierre 
leads to group in their mission to rescue a British geologist from a 
hospital in Normandy who had taken samples from the beaches in 
preparation for D-day. After their first successful mission, Pierre 
orders the agents to Paris in order to kill an influential Nazi officer, 
Heindrich. In Paris, all agents but Jeanne are soon arrested or 
killed. Gaelle commits suicide in prison, Suzy is shot and killed by 
Heindrich, her former fiancé, and Louise is tortured while in 
captivity. Louise is, however, rescued by Jeanne. Louise finally 
manages to kill Heindrich thanks to Jeanne who diverts attention to 
herself and subsequently is arrested and hanged. Louise is the only 
one amongst the group of female agents who survives the war. 
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CAST: Alphabetical list of characters 
 
Adam- Adam is Faye Turney‘s husband. 
Andreas Baader- Baader is one of the main characters in The Baader-Meinhof Complex. He 
is in a relationship with Gudrun Ensslin. 
Arthur Batchelor- Batchelor is the youngest of the sailors and marines held hostage in Iran 
in 2007. He was the only other member of the group besides Faye Turney to sell his story to 
the newspapers.  
Buckmaster- Buckmaster is a character in Female Agents, the head of the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) set up by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. 
Dutschke- Rudi Dutschke is a character in the Baader-Meinhof Complex. He is a union leader 
and friend of Ulrike Meinhof‘s who gets shot. The shooting of Dutschke triggers Ulrike 
Meinhof‘s radicalisation.   
Faye- Faye Turney is one of my ‗real‘ cases. She was one of 15 sailors and marines who were 
captured and held hostage for two weeks in Iran in 2007. Faye Turney was the only woman 
amongst the group and she was also a mother.   
Gaelle- Gaelle is one of the agents in Female Agents. She is an explosive expert. 
Gudrun- Gudrun Ensslin is one of the main characters in the Baader-Meinhof Complex. She 
is represented as the real leader of the group. Gudrun Ensslin is in a relationship with Andreas 
Baader. 
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Heindrich- Heindrich is one of the main characters in Female Agents. He is the film‘s ‗bad 
guy‘, a Nazi Officer who is close to finding out about plans regarding the British D-Day 
invasion. He was also engaged with Suzy before war broke out. (The characters of Andreas 
Baader in The Baader-Meinhof Complex and Heindrich in Female Agents are played by the 
same actor.)   
Janis- Janis Karpinski is one of the ‗real‘ cases. She was in charge of the 800th Military Police 
Battalion tasked with conducting prisoner of war operations in Iraq in 2003. Initially, 
Karpinski was the highest ranking officer to be punished, although she was cleared from 
involvement in abuse. She is the first general in US history to have been demoted.  
Jeanne- Jeanne is a character in Female Agents. She is a prostitute and in jail for having 
killed a man when Louise and Pierre approach her. Jeanne is portrayed as the real heroine of 
the film. 
Jude- Jude is a character in Britz. He is Nasima‘s secret boyfriend. 
Louise- Louise is the main character in Female Agents. She is Pierre‘s sister and the leader of 
the group of female agents. Early in the film she discovers she is pregnant with her late 
husband‘s child. 
Lynndie- Lynndie England is one of the ‗real‘ cases. She was depicted in the photos from the 
Abu Ghraib scandal. She was the most published and written about even though she was just a 
desk clerk and not even a military police officer. She received the third longest penalty, three 
years, for ‗posing‘ in pictures. 
Molly- Molly is Faye Turney‘s daughter. The focus on Faye Turney‘s motherhood meant that 
there was also much media focus on Molly, three years old at the time.  
115 
 
Nasima- Nasima is one of the main characters in Britz. She is a politically minded young 
British female Muslim who becomes radicalised in the post-9/11 and post-7/7 UK. She 
becomes a suicide bomber and hides the bomb with a maternity suit.    
Pierre- Pierre is a character in Female Agents. He is the Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
agent who gets the mission of putting together a group of female agents tasked with rescuing 
a British geologist from a German military hospital in Normandy. Pierre is Louise‘s brother.   
Sabia- Sabia is a character in Britz. She is Nasima‘s best friend who is imprisoned under 
terrorism laws and subsequently commits suicide. 
Sohail- Sohail is a main character in Britz and Nasima‘s brother. ‗Sohail‘s story‘ is the first 
episode in the two-part drama. While his sister Nasima becomes radicalised, Sohail starts 
working for the British intelligence service, MI5, and is working to prevent the attack his 
sister is part of. 
Suzy- Suzy is one of the agents in Female Agents. She was chosen for the mission in France 
because she had had a relationship with Heindrich, the Nazi Officer Pierre want to 
assassinate.  
Trevor McDonald- McDonald is the journalist who interviews Faye Turney for ITV. 
Ulrike- Ulrike Meinhof is a main character in the Baader-Meinhof Complex. She is a 
journalist who decides to join other radically minded left-activists in the Red Army Faction 
(RAF) which legitimises violence in pursuit of political goals.  
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Chapter 5 
HEROINES: Versions of Motherhood 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I explore the way in which subjects are written as heroines in representations 
of female agency in political violence. I argue that motherhood is central to the process of 
enabling agency and I subsequently discuss stories of heroines as versions of motherhood. In 
the first section, I theorise stories of heroines by discussing three different discourses that 
organise representations of female agency in political violence and constitute the Myth of 
Motherhood: the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother and the Non-Mother. I argue that 
heroine stories are constructed as the female subject is written either in maternal language or 
as lacking the ‗maternal essence‘. In the case of the latter, this takes place in two ways: as an 
empty womb or as a masculine subject who can ‗do-it-as-a-man‘. First, a Vacant Womb is 
more likely to be a heroine than a once occupied womb. This is because a Vacant Womb not 
yet has utilised her life-giving capacity and there is, therefore, no tension between life-giving 
(Myth of Motherhood) and life-taking (agency in political violence). However, in a heroine 
story, the subject‘s actions can also be explained through a maternal relationship to others. 
Then, the subject is performing ‗natural‘ femininity in line with the Myth of Motherhood. In 
other discursive practices, the heroine subject is different to the ‗normal‘ woman. For 
example, the female subject might be positioned as masculine, which communicates that this 
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subject is not a ‗real‘ woman anyway. Here, the heroine is not performing ‗natural‘ 
femininity, but is in fact acting outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. However, 
crucially, in these discursive contexts, the heroine is allowed agency as a perpetrator of 
political violence because she is a cultural exception. I refer to this discourse as the Non-
Mother. This heroine is part of a minority and, therefore, does not challenge ‗natural‘ 
femininity and the Myth of Motherhood. In the following section, I discuss the empirical 
cases through the discourses and show how female subjects are written as heroines in various 
discursive settings by performing the discourses mentioned. For example, I demonstrate how 
Faye Turney is written as a heroine through the Protective Mother discourse and how in 
Female Agents, the female subjects are written as heroines through the discourses of the 
Vacant Womb and the Non-Mother. In the conclusion, I argue that in representations of 
female agency in political violence told as stories of heroines, agency is either negotiated 
through motherhood or through an absence of motherhood. As such, I argue, heroine stories 
are versions of motherhood as ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised and, subsequently, the Myth 
of Motherhood is reinforced. 
 
 
2. THEORISING HEROINES 
  2.1 The Vacant Womb 
In both monster- and heroine stories, I argue, discourses of ‗empty wombs‘ signifying the 
opposite of motherhood are used to discipline interpretations along essentialist understandings 
of gender and agency. However, there is a difference between these ‗empty wombs‘. In stories 
118 
 
about female heroines, the empty womb often signifies ‗vacant‘/‗free‘, ready to be filled, in 
other words it signifies norms of heterosexuality and a potential for fullness. This is the story 
about the Vacant Womb, the empty yet fertile womb. The Vacant Womb performs ‗natural‘ 
femininity because the subject does not transgress boundaries of appropriate gender 
behaviour. In fact, it is precisely because the subject has not utilised her life-giving capacity, 
yet, that it/she does not challenge essentialist understandings of gender, agency and violence 
and as such risk disrupting the content of the Myth of Motherhood. Moreover, the discourse 
of the Vacant Womb also links the subject to virginity which is demonstrated with the fact that 
female heroines historically have been portrayed as childless and, in addition, preferably 
virgins. Examples such as Joan of Arc and Queen Elizabeth I
16
 can be mentioned here, but I 
would also extend this argument to situations where women‘s life-giving identity is prioritised 
over their life-taking identity. For example, in Israel, women are drafted for military service, 
but only to age 24 or motherhood, whichever comes first, whereas it is life-long for men 
(Goldstein 2001: 86). As wives or mothers they are not suited for military service, for risking 
their life. Instead, their role is to give life.  
A contemporary example of a construction of a heroine through the discourse of the Vacant 
Womb is the mass media representation of US soldier Jessica Lynch as the first heroine of the 
war in Iraq in 2003 which I mentioned in Chapter 4. Lynch was involved in an incident that 
left eleven US soldiers killed and seven captured. Lynch was injured, captured and then 
rescued by Special Forces from the Iraqi hospital where she had been treated. Lynch was 
immediately constructed as a heroine: a ‗maintenance clerk turned woman-warrior‘ (Priest et. 
                                                             
16 Interestingly, in stories of female heroines they are not necessarily part of the killing process. Although Joan of 
Arc was leading armies, she refused to kill personally (Goldstein 2001: 117). Similarly, Queen Elizabeth did not 
take an active part in the wars she led. Other examples of female heroines have been described in relation to 
sexual activities: Queen Zenobia and Matilda of Tuscany both led armies on the battlefield. Zenobia was 
‗incredibly beautiful [but] only had sex for purposes of procreation‘ and Matilda was described as ‗largely 
chaste‘ (Goldstein 2001: 120). 
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al. 2003: 1). However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, there were in fact three American women 
involved in the incident and, consequently, there were three potential heroines: Private Jessica 
Lynch, Private Lori Ann Piestewa and Specialist Shoshana Johnson. Pietstewa died from her 
injuries. Like Lynch, Johnson was taken hostage. Like Lynch, Johnson was also rescued. 
Even though Johnson was held hostage much longer than Lynch and even though she had 
been fighting back, it was Lynch who was constructed as a ‗Rambette‘ even though she had 
actually been hiding for cover as her weapon jammed (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 159; 
Kampfner 2003).  
Various scholars have critiqued gendered and racial aspects of the Jessica Lynch story and 
argued that Lynch‘s whiteness was crucial to the heroine/victim narrative as the other two 
women involved were non-white.
17
 Sjoberg (2007) argues that the exclusion of Lori Piestewa, 
who was Native American, and Shoshana Johnson, who is African American, expose the 
racial aspect of what is considered appropriate femininity as well as that their agency in the 
incident is removed. In addition, I suggest that in comparison to Piestewa and Johnson, Lynch 
was better suited as the heroine because she did not have children. Piestewa was a single 
mother of two who left her four-year-old son and three-year-old daughter with her parents 
while she went to Iraq (Younge 2003). Shoshana Johnson has a daughter. Both Johnson and 
Piestewa were described in the media as ‗single mothers‘ (Prividera and Howard 2006: 33). I 
do not wish to refute claims regarding race, I am not providing a counter-argument. I argue, 
however, that the Myth of Motherhood is present in the Jessica Lynch story in the form of the 
discourse of the Vacant Womb and, thus, that race is intersected with ideas about motherhood 
and the boundaries of ‗natural‘ femininity in the construction of heroines. 
                                                             
17 See for example Prividera and Howard (2006), Pin-Fat and Stern (2005), Hunt and Rygiel (2006). 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the potential agency that women are traditionally associated with 
in war tends to be of a caring, nurturing or supportive character. Therefore, I argue that 
Piestewa and Johnson, having rejected their ‗natural‘ caring and nurturing roles as mothers by 
leaving their children behind, were less compatible with conventional constructions of female 
heroism. Their heroism did not fit traditional stories of female heroism as their actions 
challenged essentialist understandings of gender, agency and violence. Thus, I argue that the 
construction of Lynch as the female heroine was made possible due to the Myth of 
Motherhood because an empty yet Vacant Womb fits the heroine story better than a once 
occupied womb. Through the discourse of the Vacant Womb, the subject is allowed agency in 
political violence and the tension between life-giving and life-taking is ‗removed‘. This is 
how Lynch‘s empty womb enables her being written as a heroine, while in the cases of 
Piestewa and Johnson the tension could not be removed and, as a result, their agency is 
denied. In addition, Lynch‘s faith in God was presented again and again as evidence of her 
position as an exemplar of American values and bravery (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010: 168-
9). This association to faith also emphasises virginity and strengthens the writing of Lynch as 
the Vacant Womb.  
The central positioning of the empty, Vacant Womb in stories about female heroism is also 
echoed in popular culture. According to Sherrie Inness, the stereotypical female heroine in 
popular culture is likely to be muscular but not too muscular, independent, but not as tough as 
the males around her, and she is typically childless (Inness 2004: 12). Moreover, in her 
discussion of Lara Croft, the virtual heroine in the computer game Tomb Raider, Claudia 
Herbst argues that Lara Croft‘s body is designed to trigger sexual impulses leading up to 
reproduction. For example, Lara Croft‘s tiny waist is considered seductive because it indicates 
she is not pregnant and thus ‗available‘ for the act of procreation. However, Herbst argues, 
121 
 
Lara Croft‘s presence denies everything related to reproduction; the question of menstruation, 
pregnancy and potential for motherhood. Biologically, Lara Croft is not capable of 
reproducing (Herbst 2004: 28-35). If the female heroine does have a child, her aggression is 
shown as a manifestation of her desire to save him or her (Inness 2004: 12). I refer to this 
discourse as the Protective Mother.  
 
2.2 The Protective Mother  
Most often, women are portrayed as unable to kill because they are, or could be, mothers. 
This is how the capacity to kill (agency in political violence) is juxtaposed with the capacity 
to give life (Myth of Motherhood). Importantly, however, what is considered appropriate or 
‗natural‘ female behaviour for women or mothers can shift dramatically within relatively 
short periods of time and by geographical location. As an example, historian Joanna Bourke 
mentions the American frontier where hand-to-hand combat with Indians was considered to 
be appropriate behaviour for the good American wife and mother (Bourke 1999: 311). 
Furthermore, femininity has also been claimed as the reason for women‘s participation in 
violence. According to this logic, women kill because they are super-feminine. Miriam Cooke 
argues that although such female combatants are sometimes caricatured and often feared, they 
command a much higher social prestige (Cooke 1996: 36). Explanations for why women kill 
have also been linked to their maternal nature. According to this narrative, maternal passions, 
biological urges, transform women into fearsome killers. The argument is that women would 
have little difficulty killing in the defence of their husbands, lovers and children (Bourke 
1999: 318, 321). This is how the discourse of the Protective Mother works to explain 
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women‘s participation in violence as performances of ‗natural‘ femininity, supporting 
women‘s roles as caring, nurturing, protecting their children, husband or lover.  
The discourse of the Protective Mother organises stories of heroines where the subject 
performs ‗natural‘ femininity along a maternal role. However, the maternal relationship does 
not have to be biological. As an example, Sigourney Weaver as ‗Ripley‘ in Aliens is a fierce 
protector of a young girl called Newt, ‗promising her own death if need be to save the girl 
from the Alien Mama‘ (Bundtzen 2000: 105; Cooke 1996: 36). Thus, the discourse of the 
Protective Mother influences stories where female agency in political violence as heroism is 
explained in their maternal relationship to others. 
 
2.3 The Non-Mother 
Contrary to the discourses organising stories of heroines mentioned above where the subject 
performs ‗natural‘ femininity, the discourse of the Non-Mother influences stories of heroines 
where the subject does not perform ‗natural‘ femininity. Instead, this type of heroine is 
different or deviant in some way. Here, the subject departs from the norm and boundary of 
‗natural‘ femininity by being, for example, childless, masculine, gay or a prostitute. The 
common denominator is that this heroine is already acting outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ 
femininity and is, therefore, not considered a ‗normal‘ or ‗real‘ woman anyway. I refer to this 
discourse as the Non-Mother because the subject, while being represented as having agency 
rather than being acted upon, is not using its capacity to give life, but is in fact ‗unable‘ to 
perform motherhood. Stereotypically, the gay woman is not interested in the act of [natural] 
reproduction, the masculine woman can ‗do-it-as-a-man‘ and the prostitute is not using her 
womb for the act of procreation but is using her body for economic gains and is in this sense 
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empowered. Examples include the popular film G.I. Jane (1997) about the first woman 
(fictional) to undergo training with the US Naval Special Warfare Group. G.I Jane 
demonstrates the masculinisation of the female body because in order to turn G.I Jane‘s soft, 
feminine body into a hard machine, it needs to be militarised and this means masculinised:  
O‘Neil has to train hard, and she loses her period (the female 
physician describes this as ‗normal‘ for female athletes). In the end 
she does well enough humping a very large man off a battlefield, 
albeit with buddy-assistance, and well enough to pass all the other 
physical hurdles, including pain endurance and psychological 
resilience. When she shouts ‗Suck my dick!‘, context and metaphor 
triumph over all, and she‘s in. (Carver 2007: 314) 
However, as I argue in Chapter 6, there is a limit to this masculinisation and if the subject 
transgresses that limit, it will be constructed as monstrous rather than heroic. The discourse of 
the Non-Mother still communicates that the subject is a heroine but at the same time she is not 
a ‗real‘ woman because she is not using her body in the ‗natural‘ way. The Non-Mother can 
‗do-it-like-a-man‘, her agency in political violence is accepted and she is not written as 
monstrous. Hence, the discourse of the Non-Mother allows the subject to be a perpetrator of 
political violence, a heroine with agency, precisely because she is already acting outside the 
boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. The reason for writing the subject who is performing the 
discourse of the Non-Mother as a heroine rather than a monster, I argue, is because the Non-
Mother represents the inversion of the feminine and is therefore in a minority. In other words, 
these subjects are cultural exceptions. As a minority, these heroines do not disrupt the Myth of 
Motherhood even though they have transgressed the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. This is 
how the performing subjects‘ agency is limited. In the end, the writing of the Non-Mother is 
still reaffirming masculine power because such subjects are only allowed agency if they are 
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isolated cases in a minority. If there is a critical mass of female perpetrators of political 
violence acting outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity, they could instead be represented 
as monsters. In isolation, however, they are allowed to be heroines. In this sense, the female 
subjects are acting out the masculinised norm. 
To conclude, the discourse of the Non-Mother influence heroine stories where the subject is 
lacking ‗natural‘ femininity as in being caring, maternal or using their womb for procreation. 
Instead, the discourse of the Non-Mother constructs the subject as unable to use their life-
giving identity. Yet, because the subject constitutes a minority, it does not threaten the Myth 
of Motherhood and is subsequently allowed to be different. What is communicated in 
representations of female agency in political violence where the subject is produced through 
the discourse of the Non-Mother is that the subject is not a ‗real‘ woman. Thus, through 
interpellation we are called upon not to identify with the Non-Mother subject, but in 
opposition to it/her. As a result, ‗natural‘ femininity is still produced as that which is different 
from the Non-Mother subject. Thus, even though a limited version of female agency of 
political violence is allowed in heroine stories in this way, such agency is different from 
‗natural‘ femininity and, therefore, what is communicated is that the heroine subject hold 
agency on the expense of its potential life-giving identity.  
 
 
3. HEROINE STORIES: Versions of Motherhood 
In this section, I show how female subjects within various discursive practices perform the 
discourses of the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother and the Non-Mother. As such, these 
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subjects hold agency within those discursive practices, which, I argue, in different ways 
function to reinforce ‗natural‘ femininity. This takes place either through the subject‘s 
(potential) maternal performance of ‗natural‘ femininity or by the subject being allowed 
agency because of its difference from ‗natural‘ femininity.  
 
3.1 Performing the Vacant Womb 
Louise 
Louise is the main character in Female Agents and initially portrayed as the leader of the 
group. As an empty womb, she is tough and capable of killing enemies. However, on a train 
to Paris, Louise finds out that she is pregnant. She goes to the toilet and looks at herself in the 
mirror. She feels her breasts, wondering if they have become larger. She looks down on her 
belly in the mirror. She takes a step back and moves her hands from her breasts to her belly. 
She takes a deep breath and gives an uncomfortable facial expression. In cinema studies, 
mirrors can function to signify ambiguity or duplicity (Hayward 1996: 4). Hence, I argue that 
this scene communicates that Louise is no longer performing the discourse of the Vacant 
Womb. She is no longer the given heroine. The representation of Louise also changes from 
this moment onwards. After this, Louise is often represented as a passive and emotional 
victim rather than a heroine and her pregnancy is used to construct her as such. The following 
conversation takes place when Louise and Jeanne have found out that Suzy has had a child 
but given it up for adoption: 
[Jeanne:] Suzy‘s cut up about what she did.  
[Louise:] Why? Maybe she would have been a terrible mother.  
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[Jeanne:] How can you say that? Except dying, nothing worse can 
happen to a kid. 
[Louise:] There is always worse. 
[Jeanne:] Pity is not your strongest point. Try to be a little bit human 
for once. 
[Louise:] In the train, I found out that I was three months pregnant. I 
can‘t be more human. My husband and I had been trying for kids for 
years.  
When Louise has been captured, she is bravely enduring torture. Although these scenes 
communicate heroism, we learn that she lost her unborn baby as a consequence. The 
following conversation takes place when Jeanne has rescued Louise from the transport which 
was taking her to her execution:  
[Jeanne:] What about Gaelle?  
Louise shakes her head. Jeanne reaches for Louise‘s belly, Louise embraces her and we 
understand that Louise has lost the baby. At the end of the film, Louise goes to a church to 
light candles for the other girls. As she walks out of church the following text is shown on the 
screen: 
In 1949, Louise returned to France and married an architect. She was 
awarded the Croix de Guerre and the Legion d‘Honneur. She died in 
2004 at the age of 98, childless. 
I argue that Louise‘s heroism is valued in relation to her sacrifice of motherhood. The 
sacrifice seems even greater due to the fact that Louise and her deceased husband had ‗been 
trying for years‘ to get pregnant. In this sense, Louise‘s heroism is measured by the fact that 
she sacrificed her unborn child by her dead husband. At the end, ‗childless‘ functions to 
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remind the audience of Louise‘s sacrifice but it also signifies that all heroines portrayed in the 
film are empty wombs, even though some of them had actually been pregnant. As such, what 
is communicated in this discursive practice is heroism‘s association with childlessness. This is 
how heroism is associated with empty wombs and heroines constructed through the discourse 
of the Vacant Womb where the tension between life-giving and life-taking has been 
‗removed‘. 
 
Gaelle 
In Female Agents, one way in which Gaelle performs the discourse of the Vacant Womb is 
with references to her faith. She is religious and due to her Christian beliefs, she initially 
refuses to take part in killing. In preparation for their mission, the women receive, in addition 
to some money and new identities, a cyanide pill which they are meant to use as a last resort if 
they are captured. When Gaelle boards the plane which will take them to France, she drops 
the cyanide pill on purpose. On the plane, Pierre approaches Gaelle: 
[Pierre:] You lost this. 
[Gaelle:] It does not matter. I would never use it. It is against my 
religion. 
[Louise:] God does not care what goes on down here. 
[Gaelle:] Do you say that because of your husband? (Louise looks at 
Pierre assuming he must have told Gaelle that Louise‘s husband had 
been killed.) 
[Gaelle:] My brother was shot on his 20
th
 birthday, but I never lost 
my faith. 
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At the military hospital in Normandy where the group rescues a British geologist, Gaelle does 
not use violence herself, however, she enables Pierre to shoot a soldier. After their successful 
mission in which the agents killed several German soldiers, Gaelle reflects on the use of 
force:  
[Gaelle:] When the war is over I will light a candle for you in church. 
Promise me you will do the same. 
Although not executing violence herself in line with her faith and moral codes, Gaelle is 
initially positioned as very brave and heroic. For example, on their way to Paris after their 
first successful mission in Normandy, the agents stop at a safe house. Gaelle finds herself in 
an argument with Jeanne, the prostitute: 
[Gaelle:] You are used to humiliation. I am not! I refuse to crawl to 
the Germans! (She grabs Jeanne by the neck and pushes her to a wall.) 
[Gaelle:] Pierre has been arrested, Rene is dead. It is our duty to take 
their place. 
Soon afterwards, the agents hear cars stopping outside the safe house and ensuing shooting. 
Louise walks up from the safety of the cellar whereupon she is attacked by a German officer, 
however, just as the German officer is about to stab her, Gaelle appears, shoots and kills him. 
Gaelle has rescued Louise. In tension with her religious beliefs, Gaelle too has now killed. 
She does not move and takes a long look at her victim. Gaelle seems shocked by what she has 
done. 
The writing of Gaelle as a heroine with references to her faith continues: When the group of 
agents are on the train to Paris, Jeanne ceases an opportunity and gets off the train with the 
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suitcase which is full of money. It is Gaelle who notices, catches up with her and forces her to 
get back on the train: 
[Gaelle:] Jeanne! 
[Jeanne:] Louise is with a Kraut. We are fucked. Come with me. 
[Gaelle:] Running won‘t win over your mum. 
[Jeanne:] Or save my dad from Verdun. Don‘t get preachy with me. 
(Gaelle blocks Jeanne‘s way and points a gun at her from underneath 
coat.) 
[Jeanne:] What is that? “Thou shall not kill?” 
[Gaelle:] Who is getting preachy now? 
Here, Gaelle‘s loyalty to Louise and the mission makes her a strong and brave heroine. I 
argue that although Gaelle initially is signifying that it is not natural for women, or for good 
Christians, to kill, it is still through the many religious references that Gaelle is written as a 
heroine. Her empty womb in combination with the religious references emphasise virginity. 
This is how Gaelle is performing the discourse of the Vacant Womb.  
 
Suzy 
Another of the female agents, Suzy, was chosen by Pierre because she had had a relationship 
with Heindrich, the German Nazi officer that the group is trying to assassinate. We learn that 
she left him because ‗she didn‘t want to belong to a man‘. We also learn, however, that she 
was pregnant at the time she left him but that he was unaware of it.  
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[Suzy:] He never knew I was pregnant. (sobbing). 
[Jeanne:] You have got a kid? (Suzy shakes her head). 
[Jeanne:] You gave it up? 
[Suzy:] A family in Liverpool. No more Nazi dad and collaborator 
mum. (Louise is listening in). 
[Suzy:] For him, the slate is clean. (Jeanne puts her hand on Suzy‘s 
shoulder to comfort her. Louise sighs.) 
Suzy claimed that she would have made a bad mother so she gave the baby up for adoption. I 
argue that it is the fact that Suzy is unsuited for a life-giving role that enables her to be written 
as a heroine. What is communicated is that the two identities of life-giving and life-taking 
cannot co-exist ‗naturally‘. In this case, Suzy‘s identity of life-giving has been ‗removed‘ in 
order for her to hold agency in political violence and being written as a heroine. Suzy is 
performing the discourse of the Vacant Womb despite having been pregnant and given birth. 
Being unsuited for a life-giving role enables her to perform a life-taking role as a female 
agent. Moreover, because Suzy signifies heterosexuality, and still a potential for fullness, she 
does not indicate difference in the same way as subjects performing the discourse of the Non-
Mother discussed below. 
 
3.2 Performing the Protective Mother 
Faye 
Faye Turney‘s heroism was constructed with reference to her motherhood. Front pages were 
headlined as ‗Faye knew the risks when she left Molly to serve in Iraq: courage of sailor held 
131 
 
captive in Iran‘ and ‗Bravery: Faye holds daughter Molly‘ (Lyons, Daily Record, 
28/03/2007). It was reported that she ‗loves being a mum and her greatest concern right now 
will be for her little girl and how badly she is being affected by this‘ (Newton Dunn and 
Parker, Sun, 27/03/2007; Beeston and Kennedy, Times, 27/03/2007). In the Sun she is the 
‗Hero Mum‘ pictured cuddling her daughter. The photo of Turney holding her daughter, 
however, is of a new-born baby, not depicting the fact that Turney‘s daughter was three years 
old at the time. I argue that this photo not only implies inappropriateness because her daughter 
is so young, but the photo of Turney and her new-born daughter also signify the icon of 
motherhood, the natural bond between mother and child and the association of ‗natural‘ 
femininity and motherhood as explained in Chapter 3. Even in the Independent, whose 
journalist Terri Judd interviewed Faye Turney days before the hostage taking, the focus is on 
her heroism as a mother as one title reads: ‗A mother undaunted by 17-hour shifts and a 
macho world‘ (Judd, Independent, 28/03/07).  
Moreover, as mentioned above, maternal relationships do not have to be biological. The 
discourse of the Protective Mother also influences the representation of Faye Turney‘s agency 
in political violence through her relationship with her fellow soldiers. Arthur Batchelor was 
the only sailor except Turney who sold their story to the media. Interestingly, even in his 
story, which was published in the Mirror, most focus is on Turney. The article is titled: ‗Faye 
saved me: Brave colleague got me through my kidnap horror‘. Batchelor describes how 
Turney was comforting him when they had just been arrested and were transported to Iranian 
mainland:  
Topsy [Turney] kept on whispering to make sure I was okay, she just 
reassured me that we were all together. The guards got really 
aggressive whenever they heard us communicating. Topsy really put 
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her neck on the line to make sure I was holding up. (Hughes and 
Stansfield, Mirror, 09/04/2007) 
Then, speaking of the moment when they were reunited Batchelor said: 
I missed Topsy [Turney] most of all. I really love her, as a mum and 
a big sister and I can‘t describe how that felt…just every emotion 
rolled into one. I ran up to her, threw my arms round her and cried 
like a baby... When I‘d calmed down, she asked, ‗Do you need 
another hug, a mother hug?‘ and I said ‗damn right‘... Topsy said 
she‘d always be there for me, to protect me and look after me. 
(Hughes and Stansfield, Mirror, 09/04/2007) 
Faye Turney‘s maternal role in their relationship was portrayed in the Sun as: ‗Touchingly, 
Arthur, the youngest Brit, said: Faye was like a big sister or a mum to me, she gave me hugs 
when I needed them‘ (Moult, Newton Dunn and Lazzeri, Sun, 07/04/2007) and echoed by 
Turney in the ITV interview:  
My boat crew had the youngest member, Arthur Batchelor, and I 
remember I put my arms around him and told him that if you ever 
need a mum or a sister or a hug, he was to find me and I would be 
there for him. (ITV 2007) 
At this stage, Trevor McDonald, the interviewer, says: ‗I think he has since said that you were 
like a mother to him.‘ Faye Turney responds: ‗yeah, he was my main concern. He was the 
youngest of the group, he was the baby‘ (ITV 2007). 
The writing of Faye Turney‘s agency as a soldier in a maternal language means that Turney is 
performing ‗natural‘ femininity in these discursive practices. As a woman and also a mother 
she is expected to be caring and nurturing and her heroism as a soldier is, therefore, 
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dominated by such traits. By being represented in this way and by giving herself such a 
maternal role, Turney is acting within the boundaries of ‗natural‘ femininity.  
During and after Faye Turney‘s captivity, voices were raised that she was perhaps a bit too 
willing to collaborate with the Iranians. In her defence, Turney used her identity as a mother 
to justify her actions:  
If I confessed to being in Iranian waters and wrote letters to my 
family, the British people and the Iranian people, I‘d be free within 
two weeks. If I didn‘t, they‘d put me on trial for espionage and I‘d go 
to prison for ‗several years‘. I had just an hour to think about it. If I 
did it, I feared everyone in Britain would hate me. But I knew it was 
my one chance of fulfilling a promise to Molly that I‘d be home for 
her birthday on May 8. (Newton Dunn and Moult, Sun, 09/04/2007) 
When Turney accepted a huge sum of money to sell her story to the media she was perceived 
as a greedy monster. However, again, the action was justified in the name of motherhood: In 
the Daily Star, the headline reads ‗I sold my story for Molly; Hostage Faye fights back as 
fury grows over her decision to cash in‘ (Lawton, Daily Star, 09/04/2007). 
Faye is a working-class, low-ranking sailor who has to worry about 
paying off her mortgage and securing a future for her daughter. 
(Sharp and Judd, Independent, 15/04/2007) 
Adam and I never intended to spend the money on ourselves. It‘s for 
Molly. It will be for her education and anything else we can do to give 
her the best start in life. (Moult and Newton Dunn, Sun, 10/04/2007) 
The representation of Faye Turney‘s maternal relationship to her fellow soldiers is a result of 
essentialist ideas about gender as traits such as emotionality, care and nurture are traditionally 
associated with women. In this sense, Turney‘s value as a fellow soldier is related to her role 
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as a woman and a mother, not in her capabilities as a soldier. I argue that Turney‘s response 
with reference to her motherhood repositions her within the discourse of the Protective 
Mother performing ‗natural‘ femininity. Through these discursive practices, the Myth of 
Motherhood is reconstructed because Faye Turney‘s life-giving identity is emphasised.  
 
Janis 
In the initial media coverage of Janis Karpinski it is often mentioned that she is childless. In 
Chapter 6, I argue that such information writes Karpinski as monstrous/different through the 
discourse of the Deviant Womb. Despite, or because of, Karpinski‘s childlessness, however, 
she was still also written in maternal language. Here, I argue that maternal language is used in 
representations of Karpinski in order to write her as a competent leader.  
First, being the only female general in Iraq, Janis Karpinski was interviewed and written as a 
‗caring commander‘ months before the Abu Ghraib scandal emerged: 
‗She‘s really caring,‘ says Sgt. 1st Class Philip J. May of Pinellas 
Park. ‗She doesn‘t just talk the talk, she walks the walk.‘ She sends 
personal letters to the families [of lost ones] and tries to attend all 
memorial services in Iraq. ‗I love my soldiers, she says. ‗When I ask 
if there‘s a problem or I hear of a problem, I make every effort to 
resolve it, and if I can‘t, I tell them why I can‘t or why the system 
can‘t, there is no lip service.‘ (Taylor Martin, St. Petersburg Times, 
14/12/2003) 
When the initial coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal begun and Janis Karpinski was 
mentioned as in charge of the soldiers shown in the photos, it was stories of the caring 
commander that were used in her defence:  
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A captain and a lieutenant colonel from the Army Reserve, both of 
whom served with Karpinski during her stint as commander, praised 
her leadership. They described her as caring and in charge. ‗She is 
very personable and she‘s very soldier-oriented,‘ says Lt. Col. Dennis 
McGlone, commander of the 744th MP Battalion, one of the 
subordinate units to the 800th MP Brigade. (Copeland, Washington 
Post, 10/05/2004) 
I love my soldiers, she said. When I ask if there‘s a problem or I hear 
of a problem, I make every effort to resolve it, and if I can‘t, I tell 
them why I can‘t or why the system can‘t. (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 
30/04/2004) 
Answering to criticism, one of Karpinski‘s attorneys said Army investigators had ignored 
statements by officers in her brigade ‗replete with praise and admiration of her clear guidance, 
firm, fair and common-sense enforcement of standards, [and] her caring for the soldiers‘ 
(Smith, Washington Post, 24/05/2004). Similarly, when Karpinski was described as 
‗extremely emotional during much of the interview‘ in General Taguba‘s investigation, the 
response was made with reference to her maternal caring role as an expression of good 
leadership:  
And if I‘m emotional about my troops, then that‘s a credit to my 
leadership abilities and my leadership skills and my compassion for 
my soldiers. But, I did what I needed to do as a leader. And I know 
how to lead, and I know how to take care of soldiers. (Karpinski, 
Signal City, 04/07/2004) 
Karpinski says she gets passionate when speaking of her soldiers, and 
rightly so. It is not only her reputation she is defending, she says, but 
the reputations of the thousands of good soldiers serving at the prisons 
who were not involved in wrongdoing. ‗If you don‘t get emotional 
when you‘re talking about your soldiers who served with you for a 
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year, there‘s something wrong with you,‘ she says. (Copeland, 
Washington Post, 10/05/2004) 
The discourse of the Protective Mother not only framed Karpinski‘s identity as the caring 
commander in maternal language, but it also organised the story of Karpinski as a strong 
leader defending her soldiers:  
He made it sound like I was blubbering and crying the whole time I 
was being interviewed, like I was an out-of-control, emotionally 
distraught woman. Well, I can tell you this: that the only time there 
were tears in my eyes, and I did get emotional, was when I was 
defending my soldiers. And I would do it again today, I would do it 
again next week, I will always do it. Because they deserve it. And I 
felt like all of their accomplishments were being pulled away from 
them, by design, for something that they didn‘t do or have any 
participation in, with the exception of the six or seven who were so 
vividly photographed. (Karpinski, Signal City, 04/07/2004) 
However, Karpinski also defended the soldiers being depicted and punished for the scandal:  
Well, they‘ve been accused of being responsible for the photographs. 
But if we take it down to the very basics, Lynndie England did not 
deploy to Iraq with a dog collar and a dog leash. So obviously 
somebody gave her those props that we see in those photographs that 
are now seen around the world. (Karpinski, Signal City, 13/11/2005) 
I think the MI people were in this all the way. I think they were up to 
their ears in it...  I don‘t believe that the MPs, two weeks onto the job, 
would have been such willing participants, even with instructions, 
unless someone had told them it was all okay. (Higham, Stephens and 
White, Washington Post, 23/05/2004) 
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Refusing to single-handedly take the blame for what happened at Abu Ghraib, Karpinski also 
spoke out on behalf of reservists in general:  
We‘re disposable, she said of the military‘s attitude toward reservists. 
Why would they want the active-duty people to take the blame? They 
want to put this on the M.P.‘s [Military Police] and hope that this 
thing goes away. Well, it‘s not going to go away. (Shenon, New York 
Times, 02/05/2004) 
In addition, Karpinski‘s childlessness was compensated as she was written in maternal 
language in her relationship to a parrot: 
She and George have no children, but they have kept an African gray 
parrot named Casey for 26 years, and she delights in telling of him. He 
can bark and meow; he can say ‗hello‘ when the phone rings. He is so 
used to flying with Karpinski on her various assignments, he can even 
say ‗Delta is my airline.‘ On Saturday, Karpinski pulls from her bag a 
rather large framed photograph. It is of Casey. She says she brought it 
with her because she hasn‘t been able to spend much time with him 
lately, and this way, he‘s with her all day. (Copeland, Washington 
Post, 10/05/2004) 
I argue that the focus on Karpinski‘s maternal relationship to her soldiers and to her parrot18 
attempts to compensate the fact that she and her husband decided not to have children. By 
showing Karpinski as the caring, nurturing mother, even though she is an empty womb, 
Karpinski is still performing ‗natural‘ femininity and the Myth of Motherhood is 
communicated. The representation of Janis Karpinski as the caring commander, both by 
media and by Karpinski herself is a result of essentialist ideas about gender, agency and 
violence as traits such as emotionality, care and nurture are traditionally associated with 
                                                             
18 Karpinski even dedicates her book One Woman’s Army to ‗Casey, my African Grey parrot‘.  
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women. When Karpinski was constructed a bad leader through accusations of being emotional 
it was in gendered language. Similarly, when Karpinski responded to such claims, it was in 
gendered language. Karpinski‘s defence was influenced by the discourse of the Protective 
Mother which enables agency within the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. By protecting and 
defending her soldiers, Karpinski was performing ‗natural‘ femininity according to traditional 
ideas about gender, agency and violence. Her leadership skills were measured in their 
maternal value and her ‗natural‘ emotionality was a valuable asset in a female commander. 
This is how the discourse of the Protective Mother is constructing heroines holding agency in 
political violence within the boundaries of ‗natural‘ femininity and how such stories function 
to emphasise identities of life-giving and the Myth of Motherhood.  
 
3.3 Performing the Non-Mother 
Above, the Myth of Motherhood has been communicated as the subject has performed 
‗natural‘ femininity through the discourses of the Vacant Womb and the Protective Mother 
producing heroine stories. However, heroines are also produced through the discourse of the 
Non-Mother when the heroine/subject is not performing ‗natural‘ femininity. In these 
discursive practices, however, ‗natural‘ femininity is still communicated in opposition to these 
heroines, who for various reasons are not seen as ‗real‘ women. In my empirical cases, the 
Non-Mother materialises in three different ways: as a prostitute, as masculine, and by a 
heterosexual identity which is denying its life-giving role. This is how the Myth of 
Motherhood is constituted by the Non-Mother discourse. 
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Jeanne 
In Female Agents, Jeanne is the strongest heroine. She is the one who rescues Louise from 
prison; she is the one who sacrifices herself for the mission by drawing attention to herself as 
armed in order for Louise to assassinate Heindrich, the German Nazi Officer who is their 
target. At the end, we learn that due to such an act of heroism, Jeanne was arrested and taken 
to a concentration camp where she was hanged. Jeanne paid the ultimate price for being 
heroic. I argue that there are two things in particular that enable the writing of Jeanne as a 
heroine with agency in political violence: the fact that she is a childless prostitute and her 
demonstrated capability in killing. The two are intimately linked because it is her trait as a 
childless prostitute that enables the writing of her as capable of killing.  
Jeanne is the first person Louise and Pierre approach when they are setting up the team of 
agents. The following conversation takes place when Louise and Pierre approach Jeanne who 
is in prison in London for killing a man. 
[Louise:] Your sentence has been put on hold. 
[Jeanne:] It‘s not a mistake? I killed a man. 
[Louise:] Your pimp? I don‘t call that a man. 
[Jeanne:] Nobody forced me into anything. 
[Pierre:] Stop being silly. If not for us, you would have been hanged. 
That‘s your only alternative to our proposition. 
[Jeanne:] I knew there would be a catch. What is this? 
[Louise:] We need you for a mission in France. 
[Jeanne:] Who do I have to fuck?  
140 
 
[Pierre:] We are reliably informed that you used to perform nude in 
Soho. 
[Jeanne:] You need a girl who will get her leg over, so here I am? You 
must be desperate. 
[Louise:] We also need a girl who can kill. 
[Jeanne:] What do I get out of this? ... I‘m not the type who works for 
nothing. Thanks anyway. (Jeanne walks away. Louise approaches 
again.) 
[Louise:] You will die like a whore who never had a chance. Is that 
what you want? If the mission is a success, you will be pardoned. 
(Jeanne stops and turns around, now clearly interested.) 
In the next scene, Louise and Pierre are discussing Jeanne:  
[Louise:] I am sure she is the right choice.  
[Pierre:] We can‘t trust her, she is a nutcase. 
[Louise:] A rope round her neck and she still said no. That takes hell 
of a nerve.  
What is communicated in these scenes is that Jeanne, being a prostitute, has already 
transgressed the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity and is therefore not a ‗real‘ woman. Acting 
outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity, her agency in killing is allowed, and, in fact, 
expected. Because her victim was a pimp who probably was using her, Louise (and the 
audience) understands Jeanne‘s motivations. In addition, not only is Jeanne ‗using‘ her womb 
outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity which is focused on giving birth, but she is also 
using her body as a commodity in order to make money. Traditionally, female bodies have 
things done to them, but prostitutes do it themselves which means they are written as subjects. 
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Thus, the writing of Jeanne as a heroine is influenced by the discourse of the Non-Mother in 
particular by her masculinised ‗thirst‘ for money as a prostitute.  
Her role as a prostitute is, moreover, often juxtaposed with Gaelle‘s religious identity. In the 
first safe house the agents stay in, Jeanne‘s identity as a prostitute and her obsession with 
money surfaces in an argument with Gaelle: 
[Jeanne:] A freezing cellar and rotten apples when we have millions in 
cash. What better time to spend our cash? 
[Gaelle:] How can you think of money now? 
[Jeanne:] It is the way I am. I am a whore, not a choirboy. Never 
forget it. 
When the agents are walking to the aircraft which will take them to France, Suzy asks Jeanne 
if she has ever got blessed. Jeanne responds: ‗Never. If I get down on my knees it is not to 
pray‘. When the agents are on the train to Paris, it stops abruptly, whereupon a man puts his 
hands on Jeanne‘s breasts.  
[Jeanne:] Who do you think you are? 
[Man:] Don‘t play hard to get. 
[Jeanne:] Call me a slut, why don‘t you. 
I argue that the writing of Jeanne as a prostitute facilitates the writing of her as capable of 
killing. Later, during a conversation with Louise in a safe house in Paris, Jeanne expresses her 
willingness to kill: 
[Jeanne:] In the metro, I sat next to a Jerry. His holster was open and 
he hadn‘t even noticed. But nothing happened. 
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[Louise:] What should have happened? 
[Jeanne:] Nothing. But it gives you ideas. We should kill all the 
Krauts!  
I argue that the writing of Jeanne as a heroine is intimately linked with her identity as a 
prostitute. As a prostitute, Jeanne does not represent the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity. This is 
what enables the representation of Jeanne as the true heroine, as capable of killing. As an 
isolated case, Jeanne is allowed agency in political violence because it does not challenge a 
‗real‘ woman‘s life-giving identity and the Myth of Motherhood. In fact, emphasising 
Jeanne‘s identity as life-taking (agency in political violence) in order to write her as a heroine 
also means that her identity as a life-giver is denied: When Louise and Jeanne are preparing 
the shooting of Heinrich, Jeanne asks Louise if she is ok, looking at and touching Louise‘s 
belly. 
[Louise:] I am fine, I am not ill. 
[Jeanne:] I just wish I was in your shoes.  
I argue that because Jeanne is a prostitute she is already acting outside the realm of ‗natural‘ 
femininity and ‗real‘ womanhood. As such, she is allowed to be a masculinised subject. 
Crucially, however, this also means that she is denied an identity of life-giving. This is how 
the discourse of the Non-Mother influences the writing of Jeanne as the true heroine; a 
heroine who is capable of killing but who ‗cannot‘ have children. This is also how the tension 
between a life-giving and a life-taking identity is ‗removed‘. 
 
Gudrun 
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Similarly, in The Baader-Meinhof Complex, the discourse of the Non-Mother influences the 
writing of Gudrun as a strong leader of the group in two main ways. First, Gudrun is written 
as masculinised in contrast to Ulrike who is the emotional victim. This is demonstrated in 
their first meeting, which takes place as Ulrike visits Gudrun in prison in her role as a 
journalist.  
[Gudrun:] This time we won‘t sit idly as Fascism spreads like under 
Hitler. This time we will put up resistance. We have a historical 
responsibility... I‘ll never resign myself to do nothing. Never. If they 
shoot our people like Ohnesorg and Dutschke then we are going to 
shoot back. That is the logical consequence. 
[Ulrike:] You are not serious? 
[Gudrun:] All over the world armed comrades are fighting. We must 
show our solidarity. 
[Ulrike:] But we do. 
[Gudrun:] Even if the Fascists throw you in jail? Such sacrifices have 
to be made. Or do you think that your theoretical masturbation will 
change anything? 
Here, a violence/non-violence dichotomy is used in order to position the two women against 
each other. Being the masculinised subject, action and the use of force is ‗natural‘ to Gudrun, 
whereas for Ulrike, who in this scene represents ‗natural‘ femininity and non-violence, it is 
not. To emphasise this divide, Ulrike is dressed in light, beige clothes and Gudrun is wearing 
dark clothes. Gudrun is looking Ulrike straight in the eyes, argues very powerfully with much 
conviction, whereas Ulrike is mostly looking downwards, communicating passivity. Another 
way in which the two women‘s general appearance is contrasted is through the use of make-
up. Gudrun is most often portrayed with very dark make-up which creates a harsh and more 
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masculine impression in contrast to Ulrike who is not wearing make-up at all and, thereby 
gives a softer, more feminine, appearance. What is communicated is that to the feminine 
subject (Ulrike) violence is not natural, whereas to the masculine subject (Gudrun) it is. 
As mentioned above, the characters in Female Agents, are written as heroines be being empty 
wombs, even though some agents have been pregnant. The writing of Gudrun as a Non-
Mother and masculinised subject also means her identity as a life-giver is removed. This 
happens as Gudrun is leaving her infant son and her role as a mother in order to pursue her 
political ambitions. The first time we meet Gudrun she is sitting with her parents, fiancé and 
son, watching a TV debate in which Ulrike Meinhof is one of the panellists. Gudrun‘s father 
critiques Ulrike‘s viewpoints but Gudrun defends her. Gudrun‘s father leaves and says: 
‗Sorry, I have to go to church‘ (he is a priest) whereupon Gudrun says: 
[Gudrun:] Well, why don‘t you preach that over half the world‘s 
population are starving while others bathe in luxury! That there‘s no 
use in just praying for a better world! That they have to fight back, 
damn it!  
Gudrun gets angry and leaves the room. Her father tells her fiancé: ‗You two should get 
married soon!‘ What is communicated here is that Gudrun‘s political views are not 
appropriate for a woman and by getting married Gudrun should be able to return to ‗natural‘ 
femininity. The next time we see Gudrun, we realise that she has left both her fiancé and her 
son. Hence, Gudrun‘s sacrifice of motherhood is not made visible and, thus, not 
problematised. For Gudrun, this sacrifice is ‗natural‘:  
[Gudrun:] What we need is a new morality. You have to draw a clear 
line between yourself and your enemies. Free yourself from the 
system and burn all bridges behind you. 
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[Ulrike:] What about your son? 
[Gudrun:] If you are serious, you have to be able to make such 
sacrifices. Andreas has a little girl as well. 
I argue that in order for Gudrun to be written as the masculine Non-Mother subject, she had to 
have sacrificed motherhood; the life-giving identity had to be removed. The way in which 
Gudrun and Ulrike are positioned against each other, through dichotomies of being 
active/passive, rational/emotional, dark/light, hard/soft and violent/non-violent, emphasises 
the tension between the identity of life-giving (Myth of Motherhood), which Ulrike 
represents, and the identity of life-taking (agency in political violence) which Gudrun 
represents. I continue this argument in Chapter 7 when I discuss the writing of Ulrike as a 
victim. The juxtaposition between Gudrun and Ulrike also implies that Gudrun is an 
exception from the norm. Gudrun is different to the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity; instead, she 
shows us what we are not. This is how Gudrun is allowed agency in political violence by 
performing the discourse of the Non-Mother.  
 
Faye 
As mentioned above, a Vacant Womb is better suited for the role of the heroine, than a once 
occupied womb. Therefore, when Faye Turney‘s identity, as a woman and a mother, was 
revealed on 27 March 2007 when the Sun‘s front page news read ‗Let Mummy Go‘ written in 
a childish handwriting as if it was a message from her daughter, there was confusion (Newton 
Dunn and Parker, Sun, 27/03/2007). Faye Turney did not fit the stereotype of a heroine. As a 
result, the representation of Turney split into two identities: the soldier and the mother. The 
tension between the life-giving and the life-taking identities dominated the media coverage: ‗I 
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really do love my job -but I love my daughter also‘ (Coles, Sun, 28/03/2007). ‗ACTION 
WOMAN: Faye on guard duty in Sierra Leone in 2000, far right; In the middle of an 
inflatable during training prior to being sent to the Middle East; With Adam and Molly as a 
new mum‘ (Lyons, Daily Record, 28/03/2007). Here, the tension inherent in the two Faye 
Turneys is demonstrated by the choice of images and their composition. On the one hand, 
there is the ‗action woman‘ and on the other hand, there is the ‗new mum‘. In another article, 
the caption to the two photos reads: ‗GUN GIRL: A young Faye, then named Faye Boswell, 
on guard duty at Lungi beach, Sierra Leone‘ and ‗PROUD PARENTS: Faye and Adam 
Turney with daughter Molly, now a three-year-old‘. The ‗Gun girl‘ represents her identity as a 
soldier and ‗proud parents‘ represents her identity as a mother.  
Being a mother, Faye Turney clearly did not fit with the discourse of the Vacant Womb. 
Instead, she was described as a brave heroine who could ‗do-it-as-a-man‘, a masculinised 
subject: 
You can‘t sit back just because you‘re a girl. I love the satisfaction of 
being able to walk away from a job and know that I‘ve coped and 
completed the task just as well as a man would have done it. 
(Kennedy, Times, 28/03/2007) 
I argue that even though Faye Turney is a mother, the representation of her agency is 
organised by the discourse of the Non-Mother. This is because, in order for Faye Turney to be 
a soldier, she has to temporarily give up her role as a mother. As mentioned above, subjects 
performing the discourse of the Non-Mother do not disrupt the Myth of Motherhood as long 
as they are seen as cultural exceptions. Thus, the media also reported on that Turney was a 
minority:  
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The world has watched in horror as the brave mum has been paraded 
in front of the cameras by her Iranian captors. Faye‘s courage has 
shone through during her ordeal, but she remains one of only a small 
minority of women in the military. (Smith and Jackson, Mirror, 
03/04/2007)  
The headline ‗Mother set her heart on life in the Royal Navy‘ was accompanied with ‗Leading 
Seaman Faye Turney is one of a small number of mothers who are serving in the war 
against terror‘ (Payne and Britten, Daily Telegraph, 28/03/2007). While the quote from the 
Daily Telegraph communicates a message of reassurance to the public that there are not many 
mothers serving in the war against terror, in the text, we learn how many women are serving 
in the Army, the Navy and the Royal Air Force, in what roles, where they can serve and 
where they are excluded, and how many that has been killed. Thus, as a soldier and a war 
heroine, Faye Turney is an exception to the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity but because she is in 
a minority, she is allowed agency. 
At the same time, however, Faye Turney‘s ‗natural‘ feelings as a mother, including guilt, 
were also used to emphasise her ‗real‘ identity:  
But it was Molly, her three-year-old daughter, that she spoke of most. 
She described the guilt of leaving behind her ‗bubbly, headstrong‘ 
little girl to be looked after by her husband, Adam, also serving in the 
Navy but based in Plymouth. But she believed emphatically that this 
sacrifice would give her daughter every opportunity in life. The 25-
year old mother, one of 15 sailors and marines captured, said: ‗I know 
by doing this job I can give my daughter everything she wants in life 
and hopefully by seeing me doing what I do, she‘ll grow up knowing 
that a woman can have a family and have a career at the same time.‘ 
(Judd, Independent, 28/03/2007) 
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A front page headline in the Independent with the photo of Faye Turney as a soldier in Sierra 
Leone in 2000 is ‗My little girl is growing up every day. I‟m missing that‘ (Judd, 
Independent, 28/03/07). One commentator expressed the tension between these identities 
specifically: 
Faye Turney should not receive any criticism for having the natural 
feelings of a mother - or for expressing them; but they were clearly in 
conflict with what she knew was her duty as a member of the armed 
forces in an extraordinarily stressful situation. (Lawson, Independent, 
10/04/2007) 
In addition, the representation of the group of British Navy personnel‘s return to the UK was 
above all a story of a mother returning to her daughter. Turney, the soldier, was returning to 
her ‗natural‘ [proper] role as a mother. The return was described as emotional:  
IT was the moment she had prayed for during her darkest hours in 
captivity. Yesterday Faye Turney the young mother who became the 
face of the hostage crisis was finally reunited with her three-year-old 
daughter. The ecstatic 26-year-old wrapped her arms around little 
Molly, who had spent the last fortnight oblivious to the trauma that 
her mother was enduring thousands of miles from home. Cradling her 
delighted daughter, Leading Seaman Turney was also reunited with 
her husband Adam, who could barely contain his relief that the 
ordeal of the previous 14 days was over. (Kelly, Daily Mail, 
06/04/2007)  
One of the images portraying this news story is a photo of Turney holding her daughter. The 
caption to this image in the Times reads: ‗Faye Turney hugs daughter Molly‘ (Foster and 
Kennedy, Times, 06/04/2007). What is interesting here is that this photo originally also 
includes Faye Turney‘s husband Adam, but in the Times‘ representation he is cut out. Again, 
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this emphasises that this story is about a mother returning to her daughter and it also signifies 
the icon of motherhood: the association of ‗natural‘ femininity and motherhood.19 In 
particular, much of the coverage of the homecoming was of an apologetic Faye Turney and a 
mother‘s guilt. One of the Sun‘s front page headlines‘ reads ‗MUMMY MUMMY‘ and 
depicts Turney kissing her daughter. Inside the paper, the article headline is ‗I burst into tears 
and told family I'M SORRY‟. ‗I‘m sorry‘ is printed in capital letters in contrast to the rest of 
the text. It has much larger font and is located on the middle of the page. There are also two 
smaller photos of Faye Turney, her husband and their daughter on the page. The article starts 
with: ‗BRAVE Navy hostage Faye Turney told yesterday how she burst into tears and 
APOLOGISED to her family for being a captive in Iran‘ (Moult and Newton Dunn, Sun, 
10/04/2007). Faye Turney is quoted saying: 
Adam had hold of Molly and we ran to each other. We all hugged and 
I said, „I‟m sorry, I love you‘. I felt guilty for what I‘d put them 
through. (Moult and Newton Dunn, Sun, 10/04/2007) 
In addition to portraying Turney‘s apologies to her family and her feelings of guilt as a 
mother, the representation of Turney was also of a woman who through her ordeal had 
realised what her true role was, that of a mother: 
MUM Faye Turney said last night she had cashed in on her hostage 
ordeal in Iran for the sake of the daughter she feared she would 
never see again… now [she was] considering quitting the forces to be 
a full-time mum. (Lawton, Daily Star, 09/04/2007) 
In the article, an anonymous friend of Turney‘s is quoted saying:  
                                                             
19 The original photo was printed elsewhere in the media coverage and is also available on Google images at 
http://img.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2007/03_03/turney_468x423.jpg.    
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This has shaken her to the core. She had a long time to think about her 
life and what is really important. She‘s just a mum who loves her 
daughter and her job. But she has to think of Molly and the future… 
The way she feels right now, she can‟t see herself going back to the 
frontline. She loves the Navy, but after what has happened she has to 
consider giving it up and just being a mum. (Lawton, Daily Star, 
09/04/2007) 
One of the captions of the photos reads ‗LOVE OF HER LIFE: Faye holds on tight to Molly, 
the precious daughter she thought she would never see again‘ (Lawton, Daily Star, 
09/04/2007). Similarly, the Sunday Star‘s headline reads ‗Faye: I‘m back to being mum‘ 
(Chandler, Sunday Star, 08/04/2007). The focus on Turney‘s return to her daughter 
communicates that Turney is finally back in her ‗proper‘ element, as a mother, and that her 
temporary session as an agent of political violence is over. This is how the Myth of 
Motherhood is limiting Turney‘s agency in political violence constituted by the discourse of 
the Non-Mother. 
Turney was, however, not ready to compromise her role as a soldier. In an article titled ‗Yes, 
I‘m a mum with a career‘, ‗Furious Faye hit back at critics who said that mums like her 
should not serve in the Gulf‘:  
Faye said: ‗I have no regrets at all. Molly is the light of my life and of 
course it was difficult to leave her. But I believe a dad is just as 
important as a mum and as long as one of us is at home with her then I 
think it‘s fine. While away, I spoke to Molly every other day. Me not 
being around all the time is normal. My girl will grow up to be strong 
and independent and know women and mothers have a right to a 
career if that is what they want.‘ (Moult, Sun, 09/04/2007) 
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The article is accompanied by a photo of Turney in her black cap with the title ‗Hard 
decision…Faye‘. On the page there is also a photo of Turney with Molly from the soldiers‘ 
reunion with their families. The text reads: ‗Mummy‘s girl…Faye with Molly‘ (Moult, Sun, 
09/04/2007). The focus of the images on Turney‘s role as a mother, depicting her and Molly, 
suggests that this is where she should be, this is what Molly wants. Implied is also that if she 
does continue her military career, she should feel guilty about leaving her daughter behind. In 
other words, despite communicating Turney‘s viewpoint, the paper also implies the 
inappropriateness of this, or at least that it is controversial, it is a ‗hard decision‘. Thus, the 
overall message communicated in this article is the inappropriateness of such an action. In the 
Sun, the readers are asked to give their viewpoints on ‗Should Faye return? Have your say at 
mysun.co.uk‘, which also functions to devalue Turney‘s decision (Newton Dunn and Moult, 
Sun, 11/04/2007). I suggest that the debate over whether or not Faye Turney should return to 
her role as a soldier is ultimately about ‗natural‘ and ‗unnatural‘ femininity. By ‗learning from 
her mistakes‘, not to go back to her role as a soldier but instead stay at home with her 
daughter, Faye Turney can exercise ‗natural‘ femininity. Nonetheless, Faye Turney returned 
to her ship.
20
 In these discursive practices, Turney tries to resist the Myth of Motherhood, 
however, by writing her actions as inappropriate, ‗natural‘ femininity is still communicated in 
the overall coverage as that which is different from the Non-Mother. Thus, on a meta-level, 
the Myth of Motherhood is still communicated. This is how Faye Turney‘s agency as a soldier 
and a masculine subject is limited. She is only temporarily allowed agency, she is only 
temporarily a Non-Mother. Instead, the focus on her return to her daughter and her proper role 
as a mother overall function to reproduce the Myth of Motherhood. In Chapter 6, I discuss 
boundaries of ‗natural‘ femininity and agency in political violence in more detail.  
                                                             
20 However, in February the following year Faye Turney quit the Navy after crewmates turned against her for 
selling her story. Turney reportedly ‗found life so difficult on frigate HMS Cornwall she is now stationed ashore‘ 
(Unattributed, Sunday Mirror, 03/02/2008). 
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 4. CONCLUSION: Emphasising ‗natural‘ femininity 
In this chapter, I have not only shown how stories of heroines are constructed through 
discourses of the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother and the Non-Mother, but also how 
these discourses constitute the Myth of Motherhood. To recap, I argue that the Vacant Womb 
is more suited for female heroism because the life-taking identity does not clash with a life-
giving identity. In my empirical cases, the Vacant Womb influences the stories of female 
heroism in Female Agents as all women involved are childless. More specifically, I have 
shown how Gaelle performs the Vacant Womb due to references to her faith, moral codes and 
virginity, and I have shown how both Louise and Suzy perform the Vacant Womb by 
sacrificing either their pregnancy or newly born child. In other words, by ‗removing‘ their 
life-giving identities, the tension between life-giving and life-taking is hidden and the subject 
is written as a heroine.  
The Protective Mother discourse, I argue, constructs female heroines who are performing 
‗natural‘ femininity as they are acting out a caring and maternal role. Through this discourse, 
Faye Turney was written as a heroine as her actions were represented in a maternal 
relationship to her fellow soldiers, in particular Batchelor who was the youngest. The 
representation of Karpinski was also influenced by the Protective Mother when she 
(emotionally) defended her soldiers. Moreover, the discourse of the Non-Mother organises 
stories of female heroines who are unable to perform their life-giving role, permanently or 
temporarily. By being allowed agency in political violence, these heroines‘ life-giving identity 
is denied or removed. This is why the representation of Janis Karpinski, Gudrun and Faye 
Turney is focusing on their sacrifice of motherhood, albeit temporary as in the case of Turney. 
As masculine subjects, these heroines are not ‗real‘ women and, therefore, ‗natural‘ 
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femininity is not challenged. In fact, Faye Turney is expected to return to ‗natural‘ femininity 
as she comes home. Moreover, the discourse of the Non-Mother also organises the writing of 
Jeanne as the masculine subject and ‗real‘ heroine of Female Agents by writing her as a 
childless prostitute already acting outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. As a 
masculine subject, Jeanne is not only allowed a capacity to kill (agency in political violence), 
but her identity of life-giving (Myth of Motherhood) is also denied. 
To conclude, heroism can be communicated through the subject‘s maternal role, before, 
during or in absence of motherhood. In this sense, motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ in stories of 
heroines and such stories are, therefore, versions of motherhood. Moreover, because of the 
centrality of motherhood in heroine stories, such stories function to emphasise females‘ life-
giving rather than life-taking identity and, thereby, reinforce the Myth of Motherhood. This is 
how representations of female agency in political violence are written as heroine stories and 
how heroine stories fulfil the purpose of reconstructing the Myth of Motherhood. 
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Chapter 6 
MONSTERS: Perversions of Motherhood 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For some reason the media chose to depict only photos of me. It didn‘t 
matter if there were worse things happening in some of the others. It 
had to be me for some reason. I have no idea why. (BBC Radio 4, 
30/05/2009) 
Because the photographs showing Private England were especially 
shocking and numerous, she became the face of the scandal, even 
more so than Private Graner, who was convicted in January of helping 
to orchestrate the abuse and who admitted during testimony in this 
case that he had struck a detainee. (Cloud, New York Times, 
27/09/2005) 
In this chapter, I engage with how stories of monsters are constructed and how they function 
to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity. I show how stories of monsters are constructed through 
transgressions of gender boundaries constituting the Myth of Motherhood. Because there is a 
close link between ‗natural‘ femininity and motherhood and because monsters transgress 
boundaries of appropriate gender behaviour, I argue that these are stories of ‗unnatural‘ 
femininity. As such, monster stories are told as perversions of motherhood.  
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By building on literature on cyborgs as well as contributions to feminist film theory, in the 
first section, I discuss how monsters are constructed through three different discourses: the 
Monstrous-Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme Castratrice. In the second section, I 
show how subjects of monster stories in my empirical cases are performing the discourses 
mentioned. In the concluding section, I show how ‗natural‘ femininity is communicated in 
monster stories even though the monster itself signifies ‗unnatural‘ femininity. I argue that 
monster stories are used in order to emphasise the boundary between ‗natural‘ and ‗unnatural‘ 
femininity and to show what happens when that border is crossed. In this process, not only is 
appropriate gender behaviour ‗policed‘, but ‗natural‘ femininity is also emphasised as that 
which the monster is not. This is how the ‗othering‘ of the monster is deeply intertwined with 
our understanding of ourselves. Thus, even though the monster signifies ‗unnatural‘ 
femininity and in that sense disrupts the Myth of Motherhood, ‗natural‘ femininity and the 
Myth of Motherhood is still communicated as the boundary of ‗natural‘/appropriate 
femininity is emphasised.  
  
 
2. THEORISING MONSTERS 
2.1 The Monstrous-Feminine 
In some horror films the monstrous is produced at the border between 
human and inhuman, man and beast… in others the border is between 
the normal and the supernatural, good and evil; or the monstrous is 
produced at the border which separates those who take up their proper 
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gender roles from those who do not; or the border is between normal 
and abnormal sexual desire. (Creed 1999: 253) 
In different disciplinary contexts, Barbara Creed and Richard Devetak have developed Julia 
Kristeva‘s notion of the abject in order to discuss monsters and monstrosity. Devetak uses the 
concept in order to show how ‗the other‘ is featured in thinking about international politics, in 
particular constructions of ‗good‘ and ‗evil‘ in the ‗war on terror‘ (Devetak 2005). Creed 
focuses on the horror film‘s figuration of woman-as-monster. Creed argues that all human 
societies have a conception of the monstrous-feminine: ‗of what it is about woman that is 
shocking, terrifying, horrific, abject‘ (Creed 1999: 251). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
abject is defined as that which ‗disturbs identity, system, order‘ and ‗does not respect borders, 
positions, rules‘ (Kristeva 1982: 4). Ultimately, the abject is part of ourselves. We reject it, 
identifying it as that which we are not. Because of this, the abject may reveal as much about 
ourselves as it does about external reality. The abject both fascinates and horrifies because it 
reveals our own conceptions of the world and our normative disposition: 
Monsters offer a negative definition of civility, virtue, and the good. 
Monsters help to reinforce boundaries between self and other, 
civilisation and barbarism, good and evil. (Devetak 2005:642) 
Hence, the designation of others as monsters always serves a moral function. It thrives on 
ambiguity and the transgression of taboos and boundaries. Monsters, Devetak argues, 
symbolise deviance, madness, depravity, brutality, violence, and are through to threaten 
civilisation and social order (Devetak 2005: 633). Monsters, Creed argues, are what ‗crosses 
or threatens to cross the ―border‖, for example the border between… normal and abnormal 
gender behaviour‘ (Creed 2001: 11). 
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Creed also makes the point that our attitude to the monster is frequently ambivalent: although 
society teaches us to be morally appalled by its terrible deeds, rarely is the monster presented 
as wholly unsympathetic. Indeed, part of us takes delight in its actions and identifies with 
them. The abject terrifies us but fascinates us all the same. According to Creed, horror films 
attest to the audience‘s desire to confront ‗sickening, horrific images‘, to witness the taboo, 
that which provokes shock and terror; then, once we have taken our fill, ‗to throw up, throw 
out, eject the abject‘ (Creed 2001: 10). Thus, comments such as ‗that made me feel sick‘ 
touch on this function of abjection in a literal sense. The depiction of the abject allows 
spectators to indulge in taboo forms of behaviour without having to act themselves, before 
order is finally restored. According to Creed, this is the horror film‘s central appeal. Similarly, 
I suggest that the depiction of the abject in its various disguises is also the central appeal of 
how mass media and popular culture construct gendered stories as it reformulates boundaries 
of appropriateness as well as what is considered natural. While the discourse of the 
Monstrous-Feminine concerns monstrosity in broad terms, there are two more specific 
discourses influencing representations of female agency in political violence and the writing 
of monsters: the Deviant Womb and the Femme Castratrice.   
 
2.2 The Deviant Womb 
Here, I build on literature regarding empty wombs as well as the literature on cyborgs in order 
to conceptualise the discourse of the Deviant Womb as one way in which monstrous-
femininity is constructed. First, the association between femininity and sexual reproduction is 
one of the dominant notions of gender identity. In this sense, maternity is usually recognised 
as ‗natural‘, at the core of women‘s experience of themselves as gendered beings. Indeed, 
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Myra Hird argues, the ‗naturalness‘ of motherhood is so stubborn as to render women‘s actual 
experiences of childbirth and childrearing often immaterial (Hird 2003: 6). Because gendered 
bodies are homogenised, the link between femininity and sexual reproduction is ‗natural‘ and 
childless women who deny their definitional gendered ‗essence‘ are rendered deviant and/or 
denied adult status (Hird 2003: 8). I return to the denial of adult status in Chapter 7, here, I 
focus on the othering of the female subject.  
In the horror film, female monstrosity is almost always discussed in terms of the Freudian 
idea of woman as man‘s castrated other and nearly always depicted in relation to mothering 
and reproductive functions (Creed 2001).  
Because the maternal body plays a key role in the construction of the 
abject, it has become the underlying image of all that is monstrous in 
the horror film, signifying that which threatens the stability of the 
Symbolic Order. (Chaudhuri 2006: 94) 
But, as Creed emphasises, ‗woman is not, by her very nature, an abject being‘. Rather, 
patriarchal ideology constructs her as such (Creed 2001: 83). Judith Butler argues that the 
foundation of sexual difference as maternal reproduction is no more than the truth effect of a 
‗tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as 
cultural fictions (Butler 2006: 140). The maternal body is an effect of a discourse and 
performance that requires the ‗female body…to assume maternity as the essence of its self 
and the law of its desire‘ (Butler 2006: 125). I refer to this discourse as the Deviant Womb and 
it encompasses female subjects who are written as monstrous because of a denial of their 
gendered ‗essence‘. Thus, it can be women who choose not to have children, women who 
cannot have children or any subject who for some reason does not fit in with and, therefore, 
threaten the heteronormative way of life. 
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Monstrosity has also been discussed in relation to cyborgs, the boundary between what is 
considered human and what is considered non-human. In her ‗Manifesto for Cyborgs‘, first 
published in the 1980s, Donna J. Haraway defines a cyborg as a ‗cybernetic organism, a 
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction‘ 
(Haraway 2000: 50). Haraway argues that in the traditions of western science and politics, the 
relation between organism and machine has been a border war. The stakes in the border war 
have been the territories of production, reproduction and imagination (Haraway 2000: 51). 
Moreover, according to Jennifer Gonzalez, the image of the cyborg body functions as a site of 
condensations and displacement: ‗It contains on its surface and in its fundamental structure 
the multiple fears and desires of a culture caught in the process of transformation‘ (Gonzalez 
2000: 58). Gonzalez makes a distinction between organic and mechanical cyborgs: An 
organic cyborg can be defined as a monster of multiple species, whereas a mechanical cyborg 
can be considered a techno-human mixture or fusion (Gonzalez 2000: 58): 
The body of the woman is not merely hidden inside the machine..., nor 
is the organic body itself a mechanical replica, rather the body and the 
machine are a singular entity. (Gonzalez 2000: 59-60) 
Anne Balsamo argues that cyborgs, as simultaneously human and mechanical, disrupt notions 
of otherness as the notion of the human relies upon an understanding of the non-human 
(Balsamo 2000: 150). In this sense, cyborgs function to challenge the stability of human 
identity.  
They fascinate us because they are not like us, and yet just like us. 
Formed through a radical disruption of other-ness, cyborg identity 
foregrounds the constructedness of otherness. Cyborgs alert us to the 
ways culture and discourse depend upon notions of ‗the other‘ that are 
arbitrary and binary, and also shifting and unstable. Who or what gets 
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constructed as other becomes a site for the cultural contestation of 
meaning within feminist politics. (Balsamo 2000: 155) 
The metaphor of cyborgs is about transgressions of boundaries and in this respect it is similar 
to the abject. I use the concept of the cyborg as the point of intersection, merger and boundary 
between human and machine. I discuss female monstrosity by using the concept of the 
(mechanical) cyborg body which can pass as human. As I demonstrate below, this is one way 
in which the discourse of the Deviant Womb produces stories of monsters.  
 
2.3 The Femme Castratrice 
According to Cerwyn Moore, the concept of cruelty is under-theorised in global politics. In 
particular, this involves the relationship between cruelty, entertainment and amusement and 
the pleasurable aspect of killing (Moore 2010: 323). In this sub-section, I borrow another 
concept from Creed, the femme castratrice, in order to conceptualise a discourse which 
produces a particular type of monster in representations of female agency in political 
violence: a monster that enjoys and takes pleasure from participating in acts of political 
violence. Creed, whose work is psycho-analytic, discusses the idea of woman as man‘s 
castrated other. However, she also discusses the castrated woman‘s nemesis: the Femme 
Castratrice, who is the castrating woman. In films featuring the Femme Castratrice, it is the 
male body, not the female body, which bears the burden of castration. Here, the spectator is 
invited to identify with the avenging female castrator. It is the Femme Castratrice who 
controls the sadistic gaze and the male victim is her object (Creed 2001: 153). The castrating 
woman is not passive like the castrated woman. Instead, she represents an active monster. The 
Femme Castratrice is an all-powerful, all-destructive figure, who ‗arouses a fear of castration 
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and death while simultaneously playing on a masochistic desire for death, pleasure and 
oblivion [in men]‘ (Creed 2001: 130). Thus, female subjects produced by the discourse of the 
Femme Castratrice do not only challenge traditional views of women as passive victims, but 
the Myth of Motherhood is also challenged as female perpetrators of violence, whose victims 
are male, takes pleasure in such violence. The Femme Castratrice is the subject and controls 
the gaze, whereas the males are the objects of her violence. Furthermore, crucially, this 
discourse encompasses elements of sadomasochism and therefore gives the discourse sexual 
undertones of domination. Hence, it is through ideas about sex, power and domination that 
monstrosity is produced within the discourse of the Femme Castratrice.  
 
 
3. MONSTER STORIES: Perversions of Motherhood  
In this section, I show how subjects in my empirical cases are positioned within, as well as 
performing, discourses of the Monstrous-Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme 
Castratrice. Through such discourses, the subject hold agency, however, the subject is 
‗othered‘ and as such its agency is associated with ‗unnatural‘ femininity. By writing the 
female subject with agency but as performing ‗unnatural‘ femininity, these discursive 
practices instead function to reinforce ‗natural‘ femininity by establishing a boundary between 
‗us‘/‗them‘ and ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ femininity. 
 
3.1 Performing the Monstrous-Feminine 
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 Lynndie 
We need to ask why, out of the thousands of photos that surfaced (and 
were made available to Congress), only the few highly sexualized 
photos were released to the public. (Marshall 2007: 52) 
Lynndie England was constructed as a monster through sexual narratives. The initial reports 
usually mentioned that she was thought to be pregnant which reflected badly on her because 
in order to get pregnant England must have broken the rules: 
Getting pregnant in combat theater is forbidden; soldiers are not 
deployed to such areas if they are pregnant. ‗That right there makes 
women look bad‘ Carney says of the pregnancy. ‗Male soldiers do it, 
too, it‘s just that they don‘t get caught ‗cause they don‘t get pregnant.‘  
(Duke, Washington Post, 19/09/04) 
DEPRAVED US soldier Lynndie England disobeyed orders to sneak 
off for sex with her lover at the Iraq jail where they tortured 
prisoners... Private England, 21, was banned from leaving her quarters 
unescorted after being caught in bed four times with Specialist 
Charles Graner, 35... She is now seven months pregnant with his 
child. (Unattributed, Sun, 06/08/2004) 
England was reprimanded three times for disobeying direct orders not to sleep with Graner, 
her boyfriend at the time (Zernike, New York Times, 27/05/2004). Her own alleged 
promiscuity, ‗proven‘ by her pregnancy, was used to construct her as a monster. This was also 
emphasised during the two trials as England was heavily pregnant, a reminder of her indecent 
behaviour. In addition, the military prosecutors used footage of England engaging in sexual 
acts in order to construct her as a monster. The footage did not show her torturing prisoners: 
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Private England, wearing a maternity version of military camouflage, 
appeared to suppress a smile as investigators described a videotape 
that showed her having sex with Cpl. Charles Graner, who 
prosecutors say was a ringleader of the abuse and Private England 
says is the father of the child she is carrying. Her mother sat stern-
faced in the observation gallery, her eyes darting from the witness 
stand to her daughter as an investigator described photographs of 
Private England topless and engaged in what he called oral sex. 
(Zernike, New York Times, 04/08/2004)  
THE pregnant soldier accused of humiliating Iraqi prisoners was 
photographed performing lewd acts with fellow troops, a military 
hearing was told. Lynndie England was pictured naked by a pool, 
waving her breasts in front of a sleeping solider and performing a sex 
act with a colleague. (Gardner, Daily Mail, 05/08/2004) 
However, Lynndie England‘s alleged promiscuity was not only portrayed as directed towards 
her boyfriend at the time:  
US senators who have viewed unpublished pictures from the prison 
say they show Lynndie England in sex acts with numerous fellow 
soldiers. ‗Almost everybody was naked all the time,‘ a senator said. 
(Churcher, Daily Mail, 16/05/2004)  
In the UK, headlines such as ‗Baghdad jail orgies: Shamed GI Lynndie had sex in front of 
Iraqi prisoners‘, ‗Lynndie‘s jail orgies‘ (Harwood, Daily Mirror, 14/05/2004) and ‗Lynndie 
filmed a sex orgy‘ (Flynn, Sun, 14/05/2004) dominated the media coverage. England was 
portrayed as ‗naked and eagerly engaging in romps with soldier pals‘ (Flynn, Sun, 
14/05/2004) and a senator claimed that ‗sex with numerous partners seemed to be 
consensual‘ (Harwood, Daily Mirror, 14/05/2004). England‘s promiscuity was not even 
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limited to fellow male soldiers. She was also represented as a beast preying on the prisoners in 
her care:  
Investigators are now probing claims that her unborn child was 
fathered when she forced an Iraqi detainee at Baghdad‘s notorious 
Abu Ghraib prison into sex… Insiders are now doubting that Cpl 
Graner is the father of her child… There were also questions of 
whether England was having sex with an Iraqi prisoner who could be 
the father of the child she‘s carrying. ‗She definitely had an eye for 
some of the better-looking guys being led around naked.‘ (Nicks, 
Daily Star, 19/05/2004) 
In the end, the charges of indecency bore a higher penalty than the charges for abuse (Zernike, 
New York Times, 07/08/2004). England‘s defence team argued that the charges regarding 
sexually explicit photographs were designed to distract attention from the real issue of 
widespread prisoner abuse by US forces in Iraq:  
‗They are intimate photographs of a young girl with her boyfriend at 
the time,‘ Mr Hernandez said. ‗They are not something that had 
anything to do with prisoner abuse.‘ (Monaghan, Times, 04/08/2004) 
Still, the existence of photos depicting England in sexual acts, or implying sexual acts, made 
her easy to frame as a whore, a monster of ‗unnatural‘ femininity. She was even likened to a 
porn star:  
In those pictures that have been printed, her facial expression is very 
often, as you might expect, a sneer, but the eyes are dark pools that 
don‘t even reflect the camera‘s flash. The eyes of Private England, the 
woman tugging the leash around the neck of a naked Iraqi 
prisoner, appear empty of emotion. The soldier smiles sadistically 
but her eyes, dark and devoid of empathy, emit as much emotion as a 
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hardened actress in a porn film. (Crichton, Sunday Herald, 
09/05/2004) 
I argue that Lynndie England was constructed as performing ‗unnatural‘ femininity due to her 
alleged sexual promiscuity and activities. Because photos of a sexual nature already existed, 
England was easy to frame as a whore, a woman who had transgressed boundaries of 
appropriate behaviour. In turn, as a whore, England was easy to frame as a monster guilty of 
the prison abuse scandal.  
The monster can also be created with regards to what it is not. As such, Lynndie England was 
often represented in relation to Jessica Lynch (mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5): 
After all, the much-hailed Pfc. Jessica Lynch, that other iconic face 
from Iraq, also is from West Virginia, from a tiny place on the other 
side of the state called Palestine. But one became a heroine; the 
other, a source of shame, part of a crew of soldiers who somehow 
went over the edge and engaged in abuse like ‗something out of 
sport,‘ as one witness described it during England‘s hearings. (Duke, 
Washington Post, 19/09/04) 
It‘s almost too perfect. Two young working-class women from 
opposite ends of West Virginia go off to war. One is blond and has 
aspirations to be a schoolteacher. The other is dark, a smoker, 
divorced and now carrying an out-of-wedlock baby. One becomes 
the heroic poster child for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the subject of a 
hagiographic book and TV movie; the other becomes the hideous, 
leering face of American wartime criminality, Exhibit A in the 
indictment of our country‘s descent into the gulag. In the words of 
Time magazine, Pfc. Lynndie England is ‗a Jessica Lynch gone 
wrong.‘ (Rich, New York Times, 16/05/2004)  
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England‘s friends and family say she is similar to Jessica Lynch, 
another young woman from rural West Virginia who joined the 
military to broaden her horizons. When Lynch‘s Army unit was 
attacked during the war‘s early days, England‘s family says, the 
military and the news media inaccurately created a heroine. In 
England‘s case, they say, the same parties are creating a villainess. 
(Cauchon, Howlett and Hampson, USA Today, 07/05/2004) 
Moreover, the fact that England was pregnant when the scandal broke also meant that the 
tension between identities of life-giving (Myth of Motherhood) and life-taking (agency in 
political violence) was highly visible: ‗Pictures of the pregnant 21-year-old US Army 
reservist in Iraq‘s notorious Abu Ghraib jail have shocked the world‘ (Chandler, Daily Star, 
09/05/2004). The pregnancy highlighted England‘s role as a life-giver, a woman, and this was 
in stark contrast to the activities depicted in the photos from Abu Ghraib:  
England remains a mystery. Is she a torturer? A pawn? Another 
victim of the Iraq war? While the world weighed in, England said very 
little. (McKelvey, Marie Claire, 2006) 
The images were as notorious as they were shocking: the young 
woman grinning and giving a thumbs-up sign beside a naked Iraqi 
detainee and leading another around on a dog leash. (Unattributed, 
Times, 04/05/2005) 
SMIRKING out of the vile photographs of the bludgeoned and 
humiliated Iraqi prisoners is Private Lynndie England. Her presence 
adds a peculiar horror to the scenes of suffering and inhumanity she 
helped to orchestrate at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. Her wanton 
sadism denies the natural virtues of womanhood: compassion, 
gentleness and the capacity to conciliate. What then, in the theatre of 
conflict in Iraq, could have so corrupted a young American woman 
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that she was willing to indulge in such savagery? (James, Daily Mail, 
07/05/2004) 
In the last example, the author asks ‗What turns a woman into a savage?‘ and tries to 
understand how a woman, who is ‗naturally‘ peaceful, could participate in such torture. How 
can ‗the brutality that Lynndie England seemed so eager to indulge in‘ be explained? The 
author suggests that:  
To prove their worth, many female soldiers, police officers or prison 
warders too easily shed the distinctions of their sex in a drive to be 
tougher, more aggressive, less forgiving than any of their male 
colleagues. To do otherwise, they imagine, is to appear weak and 
inferior. (James, Daily Mail, 07/05/2004) 
The next day, the headline ‗The making of an all-American monster‘ is accompanied with 
an article and two photos of Lynndie England illustrating the tension between Lynndie- the 
woman and Lynndie- the monster; the tension between ‗natural‘ and ‗unnatural‘ femininity 
(Knight, Daily Mail, 08/05/2004). Again, the confusion concerns how a woman as England 
could end up as a torturer: 
The enigma is how a tomboyish, possibly stubborn, but by all 
accounts sweet-natured girl could have become involved in such 
atrocities? (Knight, Daily Mail, 08/05/2004) 
Similarly, a commentary in the Times asks: 
What awful transgression has occurred to make a woman do this? 
In wars, as in civilian life, the overwhelming majority of sexual 
violence is committed by men against women. So that England, with 
her arm around her lover Charles Graner, thumbs up beside bodies 
kicked into obscene poses, is all the more shocking: a traitor, a 
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collaborator, Rose West to his Fred. Just how culpable was England, a 
booking-in clerk with no reason to be there except to visit Graner? 
Was she participating in the fun and games to please him, a man 
violent enough to stalk his ex-wife? (Turner, Times, 08/05/2004) 
Many other faces have emerged, but England‘s remains iconic—and 
tragically so, considering that a child is coming into Lynndie 
England‘s embattled world, and considering that the new mother 
could end up in jail in a case that has polarized the nation. (Duke, 
Washington Post, 19/09/2004) 
After England had given birth to her son, the media representations changed. England was 
now ‗the mum‘: ‗Pictures of the mum and other troops posing with naked Iraqis sparked a 
storm in 2003‘ (Unattributed, Sun, 03/05/2005); ‗But Private Charles Graner, the 22-year-old 
mum‟s former boyfriend, said HE placed the dog leash around the prisoner‘s neck and asked 
England to lead him out of his cell‘ (Smith, Sun, 05/05/2005); ‗The mother of one was 
convicted by a military jury on six of seven charges, including committing an indecent act and 
maltreatment of prisoners at Baghdad‘s Abu Ghraib jail‘ (Thompson, Sun, 27/09/2005). The 
headline in the Sun regarding the fact that Lynndie England had given birth to her son was: 
‗Torturer‟s Baby‘ (Unattributed, Sun, 14/10/2004). Then again, on 29 October, 2004, 
another article titled ‗Torturer‟s tot‘ was published both in the Sun and the Daily Mirror 
(Flynn, Sun; Daily Mirror, 29/10/2004). It seems England‘s identity as a mother was used in 
order to add drama to the representations. However, at the same time, the representations 
emphasise that England‘s performance of ‗unnatural‘ femininity is an exception to the norm. 
Thus, the fascination with England‘s part in torture in combination with her motherhood, not 
only establishes the boundary between ‗natural‘ and ‗unnatural‘ femininity, but also function 
to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity in opposition to England‘ actions as the norm. 
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Ulrike 
Initially, Ulrike Meinhof publically argues against the use of force, but as The Baader-
Meinhof Complex develops, she transforms into a perpetrator of political violence. She 
transgresses the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity by encouraging and participating in violent 
actions. Two scenes in particular show Ulrike transgressing that boundary. First, at the freeing 
of Baader, which is the first time Ulrike takes an active part as a member of the RAF, 
members of the group enter the building, fighting erupts and a policeman is shot. The music is 
fast, powerful and intense and increases both in volume and in keys leading to a climax 
whereupon Ulrike, who according to the plan was to act surprised and stay behind in order not 
to reveal her cover, follows the others and jumps out the window. Here, the window 
symbolises Ulrike‘s new life. With the jump, she is now officially associated with the RAF 
and becomes the writer of the group‘s political statements. She has chosen violence as a 
method for the struggle. The window in this sense symbolises the boundary of violence. By 
jumping out of the window she has transgressed the boundary. In the first political statement 
for the RAF, published in Der Spiegel, she motivates the use of force: 
We say, the man in uniform is a pig, not a human being. That‘s how 
we have to deal with him. This means we don‘t talk to him and it‘s 
wrong to talk to these people at all. And of course it‟s ok to shoot. 
What we‘re doing, and what we want to show is that armed struggle is 
possible, and it is possible to take action and win, and the other side 
does not win. So it‘s important that they do not catch us. That is 
essential to our success. 
In another statement, Ulrike writes:  
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We demand a stop of the bombing in Vietnam. We demand the 
withdrawal of American troops from Indochina. We demand the 
lifting of the mine blockade against North Vietnam. 
Images of bombings at US military headquarters and police departments are shown as the 
statement is read out. Ulrike‘s voice continues:  
We will continue to carry out bombings against judges and 
prosecutors until they cease violating the rights of political prisoners. 
Our demands on the justice system are not unreasonable. We have no 
other means to force them to comply. 
Ulrike‘s transformation into a monster promoting political violence is also signified by her 
relationship to a man called Peter. When he hears about Ulrike‘s plan to take an active part in 
the freeing of Baader he protests: ‗This is crazy!‘ Ulrike says: ‗I have to do it‘. I argue that the 
character of Peter is present in order to emphasise Ulrike‘s position at the crossroads and to 
highlight her transformation and subsequent transgression of the boundary. Peter represents 
Ulrike before she joins the RAF, politically active but against the use of force to achieve 
political goals. Another scene in which this is highlighted is during the RAF members training 
camp in Jordan. When the RAF members arrive, Ulrike is sitting next to Peter on the back of 
a truck. Soon afterwards, a fight between Andreas and Peter erupts and it seems that Ulrike 
must make a choice between which ‗camp‘ to belong to, Andreas‘ or Peter‘s. The following 
conversation between Ulrike and Peter takes place in Jordan: 
[Ulrike:] You want to go back, don‘t you? 
[Peter:] (nods.)  
[Ulrike:] So you‘re giving up?  
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[Peter:] These people are at war. What‘s that got to do with our 
situation in West Germany? You think you can start a revolution in 
Germany with a Kalashnikov?  
[Ulrike:] West Germany is just one front. We fight oppression and 
injustice with our comrades around the world. I thought you knew 
that. 
[Peter:] Then why not start with your kids? You‘ve gone 
underground. What is to become of them? 
[Ulrike:] (silence.) 
Peter offers to take care of the children when he returns to Germany but Ulrike thinks it 
‗sounds a lot like betrayal‘. Ulrike stands up and says: ‗Take care of yourself‘ and walks off. 
This scene communicates that Ulrike‘s transformation is complete. She has left Peter and the 
‗old Ulrike‘ who believed in non-violent solutions behind. In addition, again it is Ulrike‘s 
motherhood that functions as the boundary between violence and non-violence, the ultimate 
sacrifice of abandoning one‘s own children is juxtaposed with agency in political violence. By 
choosing violence, Ulrike‘s life-giving role as a mother is questioned and later sacrificed. 
Ultimately, what is communicated is that the identities of life-giving and life-taking cannot 
co-exist.   
 
Faye 
Faye Turney was written as a monster through the discourse of the Monstrous-Feminine in 
three main ways: by having left her daughter behind, by selling her story to the media and by 
being ridiculed in relation to the experience and sacrifice of ‗true heroines‘. First, the capture 
of Turney led to a debate in British media regarding whether or not mothers, or indeed 
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women, should be allowed to serve in the military, in particular in combat roles. The Times 
asked ‗Should a mother join the Navy? Whatever your thoughts, post them below.‘ The article 
discussed a blog called ‗Alpha Mummy‘: ‗―Alpha Mummy‖ is furious that the sailor has not 
put her child ahead of her own career and ambitions‘ (Unattributed, Times, 29/03/2007). 
Simply by being a woman and a mother, Faye Turney was considered selfish and, thus, a 
deviant mother: 
What in God‘s name was Faye Turney doing in those God-forsaken 
waters in the first place? Why was a 25-year-old mother with a three-
year-old daughter putting her life and her freedom at risk? Was it in 
the name of equality? Because if it was, it‘s a pretty hollow cause 
when a child‘s future is at stake. Was she being selfish in doing a 
potentially dangerous job to satisfy her own personal needs? And if 
her career is so important, why have a baby at 22 when both she and 
husband, Adam, are both in the Navy. If, as some feminists have 
raged, it‘s because 21st Century woman has the right to do whatever 
job she chooses - then, I‘m sorry, I disagree. (Malone, Sunday Mirror, 
01/04/2007) 
I have to wonder what was she doing there, risking not just her own 
life but the motherhood of an infant child. Amid the relief that we 
will feel when she eventually returns, it still has to be asked why we 
are sending young mothers to a war zone of our own creation. Britain 
cannot be so short of military personnel that such women should be 
permitted - nay, encouraged - to go gadding around the world‘s most 
dangerous and volatile waterway. Call me old-fashioned but I think it 
is wholly wrong to separate a young mother from her child, put a gun 
in her hands and send her off to the Gulf … The strain on this young 
woman must be intolerable. And she should not be under such strain, 
because she should not have been there in the first place. The person 
I feel sorry for in this appalling situation is little Molly, the wean that 
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Mrs Turney left behind ... A diplomatic solution to this fiasco must 
swiftly be found. A solution to the moral issue of mother-and-child 
relationships in the armed services will take rather longer. (Routledge, 
Daily Mirror, 30/03/2007) 
Similar arguments were printed in the Times (‗A mother‘s place isn‘t in the war zone‘ by Jill 
Kirby, 01/04/2007) and in the Daily Mail (‗Isn‘t a mother‘s first duty to her children?‘ by Jill 
Parkin, 30/03/2007). Parkin argues:  
No matter how we dress it up, men are always going to be better in 
battle and, if we‘re being honest, less vital to the children than 
mothers... It may be politically incorrect to say so but for young 
children, the loss of a mother is likely to be worse than the loss of a 
father. In the end, that‘s what we‘re thinking about when we look at 
those pictures of Faye Turney at home before her capture, cuddling 
her baby. We‘re talking about the possibility of a motherless child. 
All this in the name of what is called ‗equality‘ but which is actually a 
misguided belief that men and women are the same. But we are not. 
(Parkin, Daily Mail, 30/03/2007) 
Routledge writes that ‗the strain on this woman must be intolerable‘ implying that Faye 
Turney, because she is a mother, is more deeply affected than men in a similar situation 
(Routledge, Daily Mirror, 30/03/2007). Captain Anthea Burdus gave the following counter-
argument:    
We join the armed forces with our eyes open. The fact you are a mum 
makes no difference. There are a lot of fathers doing the same job. 
People always ask the same question ‗How do you cope?‘ And I think 
‗Do you ask the men?‘ I have seen a lot of men away from their 
children for the first time who find it terribly, terribly hard. (Judd, 
Independent, 01/04/2007) 
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Similarly, Sue Carroll argued:  
Anyone who wonders how a 25-year-old married mother of a three-
year-old daughter could contemplate serving on the front line should 
ask the same of her male colleagues, many of them married with 
children. (Carroll, Daily Mirror, 04/04/2007) 
Interviewed in the Daily Mirror, Britain‘s first female fighter pilot Jo Salter tried to explain 
why women want to be on the front line, even if they are mothers: 
If there was ever a national emergency, and all the reserves were 
called up to fight, I wouldn‘t hesitate to sign up again even though it 
would mean leaving my children behind. Serving your country is 
more than a job – it‘s a life, a belief system of honour and loyalty. 
(McCaffrey, Daily Mirror, 07/04/2007) 
What is interesting about the fact that the capture of Faye Turney ignited a debate whether or 
not women should be allowed in combat roles is how quickly the debate turned from a 
mother‘s role to a woman‘s role. Although temporarily, Turney had given up her role as a 
mother in order to serve as a soldier. She was represented as having left her daughter behind 
as this caption to an image of Faye and her daughter shows:  
Left behind: Faye Turney in 2003 with daughter Molly, who is at 
home with Faye‘s husband Adam. (Salkeld, Daily Mail, 28/03/07) 
Faye Turney was also compared to a British climber who died scaling K2: 
Faye Turney risks being put in the same category as Alison 
Hargreaves, the British climber. Accused of selfishly putting her 
career before her family, Hargreaves died scaling K2 and left behind 
two young children. (Thomson, Daily Telegraph, 29/03/2007) 
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Being a mother, Turney was portrayed as selfish for wanting a career, for risking her own life 
and careless for risking her daughter becoming motherless. In these discursive practices, 
Turney had transgressed the boundary of appropriate femininity and was, thereby, disrupting 
the Myth of Motherhood. 
In addition, Faye Turney was also written as a monster in comparison to other female British 
soldiers. At the time of the hostages‘ release, two female British soldiers were killed in Basra, 
Iraq. As a result, Faye Turney was represented in relation to them. Having paid the ultimate 
price, being killed, the two women were portrayed as ‗HEROINES‘ as a front page of the 
Daily Mail picturing the two women read (Seamark and English, Daily Mail, 07/04/2007).  
Turney‘s experience and heroism paled in comparison. In addition, in a rare attempt to control 
the media, the Ministry of Defence allowed the sailors and marines involved in the hostage 
taking to sell their stories to the news media. Turney was offered close to £100,000 to tell 
about ‗her ordeal‘ in the Sun and in a television interview with ITV‘s Trevor McDonald. 
However, as she accepted the deal, she was turned into a monster of a different kind, a greedy 
monster:  
The two sailors [Turney and Barchelor], pawns in a military, political 
and media game, were vilified for dishonouring their uniforms. The 
welcome home had suddenly turned nasty. (Judd, Independent, 
14/04/2007) 
In comparison to what other soldiers were going through, Faye Turney‘s experience was 
ridiculed as she had been treated fairly well (the captives even received ‗goody bags‘ from the 
Iranians). One commentary in the Daily Telegraph was titled: ‗Faye a heroine? That‘s an 
insult to our dead soldiers‘ (Moir, Daily Telegraph, 11/04/2007). In addition, families of 
soldiers who had died in Iraq expressed that their sons or daughters were the true heroes and 
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heroines; they were true patriots serving their country who never would have accepted any 
money for their story (Chapman, Greenhill and Koster, Daily Mail, 10/04/2007). This is how 
Faye Turney was written as a monster through the discourse of the Monstrous-Feminine.  
 
Janis 
When the images of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal became public, Janis Karpinski was the 
only higher ranking officer to be named and pictured, whereas other higher ranking officials 
were anonymous:  
The military is considering action against Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, 
the senior officer at the prison when the abuse occurred against 20 
detainees in November and December. Pentagon officials said Friday 
that no final action had been determined. General Karpinski and 
other officers who are the subjects of the inquiry are now in a stage of 
the military legal process where they are allowed to write responses to 
the investigators‘ findings. (Shanker and Steinberg, New York Times, 
01/05/2004)  
The highest-ranking officer to be suspended was Army Reserve Brig. 
Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, commander of the 800th Military Police 
Brigade. (Chan and Spinner, Washington Post, 30/04/2004) 
Karpinski was in charge of all U.S. military prisons in Iraq last 
October when prison guards began abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib prison near Baghdad. Top Army officials have criticized 
Karpinski‘s performance in the wake of a scandal that has resulted in 
criminal charges against seven guards, one of whom has pleaded 
guilty. Seven more soldiers have received career-threatening 
reprimands. (Moniz and Morrison, USA Today, 25/05/2004) 
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The article in USA Today is also accompanied with a photo of Karpinski with the caption: 
‗Under scrutiny: Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski commanded the 800th Military Police Brigade in 
Iraq until Monday‘. Again, Karpinski is named whereas ‗Top Army officials‘ are not (Moniz 
and Morrison, USA Today, 25/05/2004). The Daily Mail reported on the ‗Torture jail General‘ 
who ‗may be kicked out of the Army‘: 
THE U.S. general at the centre of the Iraqi PoW torture scandal faces 
being thrown out of the army in disgrace. General Karpinski, who was 
the only U.S. female commander in Iraq, has denied knowing 
anything about the torture and claims she is being made a scapegoat to 
cover up for intelligence chiefs who ordered soldiers to ‗soften up‘ the 
Iraqis prior to interrogation. (Shears, Daily Mail, 04/05/2004) 
This article is accompanied with a photo of Karpinski and the caption: ‗Carpeted: General 
Janis Karpinski says the US commander in Iraq should also bear responsibility‘ (Shears, Daily 
Mail, 04/05/2004). In an interview with the Times, Karpinski describes the moment news 
about the images were released:  
There were the photographs and there, too, was footage of herself. A 
general was saying: ‗This is Janis Karpinski the commander, and these 
are her soldiers.‘ (de Bertodano, Times, 13/08/2004) 
The media subsequently reported on her failure as a leader as outlined in the Taguba report:  
Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, author of the internal Pentagon report on 
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison by Army Reserve military police, 
said it was a ‗failure in leadership‘ from Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski on 
down. He said there was ‗no training, no supervision.‘ (Moniz, USA 
Today, 12/05/2004) 
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I argue that by naming Karpinski only, as well as informing the readers about that she is 
female, her identity as a woman became associated with the images of abuse, whereas other 
officials, the majority of which were men, remained anonymous and, thereby, avoided 
responsibility. Simply by being female, Karpinski differed from the stereotypical military 
General and was, consequently, easier to frame as a scapegoat. The fact that a woman was in 
charge of those soldiers pictured in photos of sexual abuse added to the shock factor of the 
Abu Ghraib scandal.  
 
3.2 Performing the Deviant Womb 
Nasima 
In Britz, Nasima is constructed as a monster through the discourse of the Deviant Womb; as a 
cyborg body faking motherhood. Nasima is faking motherhood because the explosives that 
are strapped on her belly in the final scenes make her look pregnant. In addition, she wears a 
maternity suit which functions to hide the explosives. The suit not only covers the explosives 
on her belly but also her breasts; it makes them larger, more realistic of a pregnant woman. 
This gives Nasima a softer appearance, as human and womanly as possible. The maternity 
suit makes Nasima look heavily pregnant. It makes her look like an occupied womb 
symbolising life-giving. However, Nasima is deceptive. Her identity of life-giving is an 
illusion. Instead, her identity is one of life-taking. Nasima is using motherhood as a political 
strategy in order to achieve her political goal of life-taking. Discussing ‗Kiddy‘, a 1990s 
comic series character, Jennifer Gonzales states:  
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She is an ‗exotic‘ and vindicative cyborg who passes-as simply 
human. It is when she removes her skin that she becomes the 
quintessential cyborg body. For in the Western imagery, this body is 
all about revealing its internal mechanism…Her ‗real‘ identity lies 
beneath the camouflage of her dark skin-rather than on its surface. 
(Gonzalez 2000: 70)  
Similarly, Nasima passes as ‗simply human‘. Instead, it is what is hidden beneath, not her skin 
in this case, but her clothing, that reveals her true identity as a cyborg, a monster, part human, 
part machine, a woman yet a bomb, a female perpetrator of violence. 
While Nasima is constructed as a monster and a cyborg body, the Myth of Motherhood is 
communicated in a more subtle way in the scene where Nasima puts the bomb and the 
maternity suit on. From cinema studies we learn that how a shot is composed and framed is its 
mise-en-scène. How the shot is cut together into a sequence or scene is known as a montage 
(Rowley 2009: 316). As Nasima straps the explosives on, there are many short close-ups of 
her belly. In these shots, Nasima‘s head is cut off. According to Jean Mitry:  
The object presented in close-up inevitably draws attention to its 
perceptible qualities, to everything which makes it different. It appeals 
to the emotions but these can only be felt, experienced by seeing it... 
The close-up thereby presents a tactile, sensual impression of objects. 
It concentrates on the object, on its forms, all the recognitive and 
dynamogenic operations relating to the knowledge we have of it; and 
this before it makes any appeal to the intellect... Of all shots, it is the 
most concrete, most objective through what it shows, the most 
abstract, most subjective through what it signifies. (Mitry 2000: 67, 
68) 
The close-ups on the bomb as Nasima straps it on, therefore, denote depersonification. The 
bomb is the object which is magnified, appears relatively large and fills the entire frame to 
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focus attention and emphasise its importance. The bomb is the main character, Nasima has 
transformed into the mechanical cyborg. As a cyborg, the body and the machine have become 
a singular entity. 
The tension is also played out when Nasima is performing motherhood during the walk 
towards the place for her attack. She is holding her hands on her ‗pregnant‘ belly, appearing 
to be protecting life. However, this performance of motherhood is deceitful and part of the 
strategy. Instead, it is Nasima‘s performance of motherhood when she has successfully 
strapped the bomb on that more powerfully communicates the Myth of Motherhood. Nasima 
touches her ‗belly‘ as a pregnant woman would do and looks at herself in the mirror. She puts 
the maternity suit on and looks in the mirror again. In cinema studies, the affective 
relationships between audience and film have often been invoked by referring to Jacques 
Lacan and the ‗mirror stage‘ (Mitry 2000: 193). To Lacan, the primary distinction between 
self and other is founded on identification with an image. According to Mitry, the mirror state 
makes it easier to be conscious of the self, but it is not essential (Mitry 2000: 196). Thus, the 
portrayal of Nasima looking at herself in a mirror is a way of showing the audience that 
Nasima identifies with herself as a life-taker, she is conscious of the self she has become. 
However, the inclusion of the mirror also means that her feelings are reflected out to the 
audience. In cinema studies, mirrors can function to signify ambiguity or duplicity (Hayward 
1996: 4). I argue that the construction of Nasima as a monster is ordered by the discourse of 
the Deviant Womb because Nasima has not taken up her proper gender role as a mother. 
Nasima‘s female body has failed to assume maternity; it has failed in its identity of life-giving 
and, therefore, departs from norms about ‗natural‘ femininity. The inclusion of the mirror in 
the scene where Nasima is faking motherhood, therefore, emphasises the inherent ambiguity 
or tension in representations of female agency in political violence. It emphasises Nasima as 
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both (seemingly) life-giving and life-taking and it illuminates the boundary of ‗natural‘ and 
‗unnatural‘ femininity. In this scene, the background music intensifies slightly when Nasima 
is looking at herself in the mirror which enhances the emotional communication of the scene. 
To sum up, in these discursive practices, Nasima, the subject, performs the discourse of the 
Deviant Womb and as such disrupts notions about ‗natural‘ femininity. This is how the subject 
becomes the abject and is written as monstrous. 
 
Janis 
In the initial media coverage of Janis Karpinski it is often mentioned that she has a husband of 
29 years, but that they have no children:  
Karpinksi understands the trials of separation. She has no children, 
but her husband of 29 years, a lieutenant colonel, works with the US 
embassy in Oman. [She] has not seen him in recent months. Her blond 
hair is braided and coiled in a tight bun; her ice blue eyes, devoid of 
makeup, fix listeners with a friendly, if unflinching gaze. (Taylor 
Martin, St. Petersburg Times, 14/12/2003) 
The information regarding her childlessness immediately puts focus on that Karpinski is 
different. The fact that she is married signifies heterosexuality, but ‗childless‘ separates her 
from ‗normal‘ women. I argue that the discourse of the Deviant Womb writes Karpinski as, if 
not monstrous, at least different or deviant. By choosing not to have children, Karpinski has 
denied herself a life-giving identity. Countering the representation of herself as deviant 
because of her childlessness, Karpinski defends her choice not to have children in her 
autobiography:  
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Choosing a military life did require sacrifices. My husband and I 
decided we would not have children. As career Army people, we 
were always on the move and often flying off to different assignments. 
Even when we were based together, as a Special Forces officer 
George spent most of his life in the field. If we had kids, I knew I 
would have to take most of the responsibility for raising them. But I 
could not do that and also meet the responsibilities of a full-time 
officer in the Army. I also needed George‘s calmer temperament to 
make me a better person; his parenting skills would have exceeded 
mine…but I couldn‘t ask him to become my househusband. 
(Karpinski with Strassner 2005: 82) 
The discourse of the Deviant Womb constructs Karpinski as acting outside the boundary of 
‗natural‘ femininity as she has not taken up a woman‘s ‗natural‘ role of as a life-giver. The 
focus on Karpinski as childless constructs her as different and the fact that she defends her 
decision not to have children in her autobiography highlights the break with ‗natural‘ 
femininity. However, at the same time, the focus on Karpinski‘s childlessness emphasises the 
tension between life-giving and life-taking identities. Karpinski has sacrificed motherhood for 
her career. She has sacrificed her life-giving identity for her life-taking identity. Similarly as 
shown in Chapter 5, the message that is communicated is that these two identities are not 
compatible. This is how Janis Karpinski is written as monstrous or different. 
 
3.3 Performing the Femme Castratrice 
Lynndie 
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When photos from the Abu Ghraib prison first became public, images of Lynndie England 
were prominent.
21
 Among the first photos to be released was one in which England is pointing 
at the genitals of a naked Iraqi prisoner with a cigarette in her mouth. When more photos were 
released, it was one in which England is holding a leash attached to an Iraqi prisoner‘s neck 
while he is lying on the floor that dominated the media coverage (Marks, Scotsman, 
07/05/2004). The ‗leash-photo‘ made it onto newspapers‘ front pages with titles such as 
‗Treated like a dog‘ (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 07/05/2004) and ‗Witch: Evil soldier Lynndie 
in new torture photo‘ (Flynn, Sun, 07/05/2004). Moreover, it was the fact that England 
seemed to be smiling in the photos that created much fury:  
[T]he same smiling face is splashed across newspapers and on 
television screens around the world and that patriotic scene at the 
family home in Fort Ashby, West Virginia, has been substituted by 
one of stunned shame... one of the most reviled faces in recent 
history… In one, sporting the same impish grin, she aims a make-
believe rifle at the genitals of naked and hooded Iraqi detainees. 
(Knight, Daily Mail, 08/05/2004) 
In others, she grinned and gave a thumbs-up sign next to humiliated 
naked and hooded Iraqi men. (Chandler, Daily Star, 09/05/2004)  
Lynndie England, ‗the grinning face in the graphic images of abuse from Abu Ghraib prison‘ 
(Goldenberg, Guardian, 03/05/2005), became a symbol of everything that was wrong with the 
war in Iraq. Her ‗grin‘ became ‗the symbol of sadistic practices at Abu Ghraib prison‘ 
(Goldenberg, Guardian, 08/05/2004). Morley Safer, correspondent for 60 Minutes said: ‗We 
now have the new symbol of this war. It is no longer the picture of Saddam‘s statue tipping 
over – it‘s a girl with an Iraqi on a leash‘ (Horovitz, Grossman and Johnson, USA Today, 
                                                             
21 According to the Sunday Herald, Lynndie England was depicted in five of fourteen initial images. The title of 
the article discussing Lynndie England‘s visibility is ‗the picture that lost the war‘ (Mackay, Sunday Herald, 
02/05/2004). 
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10/05/2004). She was ‗A new monster in chief‘ and ‗the latest hate figure to help obscure 
the bigger picture‘ (Riddell, Observer, 09/05/2004). According to BBC News, the photos of 
England were ‗images that will haunt America‘s occupation of Iraq‘ and ‗it is Lynndie 
England‟s face most linked to the horror‘ (Myrie, BBC news, 08/05/2004). 
The initial representations of Lynndie England segmented and in the continuous coverage she 
was commonly referred to as ‗the woman with the leash‘; ‗the pointer‘; and ‗the grinning-
face‘ (Zernike, New York Times, 04/08/2004). She was also referred to as ‗the Iraq abuse girl‘ 
even though there were more women involved (Unattributed, Daily Mirror, 30/04/2005) and 
‗Dog lead Lynndie‘ (Boffey, Daily Mirror, 03/05/2005). I argue that England was constructed 
as a monster through the discourse of the Femme Castratrice; a sadist who takes pleasure in 
torturing her male victims. Because of the smiles, England was depicted as having an ‗evident 
taste for cruelty‘ (Goldenberg, Guardian, 08/05/2004): 
It is England‘s smile, beaming as she holds a humiliated Iraqi prisoner 
on a leash or points an imaginary gun at the genitals of naked 
detainees, that has provided the most shocking images from the 
album of horrors at Abu Ghraib. (Watson and Farrell, Times, 
08/05/2004) 
In the Times, one commentary reflected on what made Lynndie England participate, asking 
whether she was forced into it. The conclusion was that she was not: ‗England‘s face - 
enthusiastic, amused, triumphant - does not, however, reflect someone dragged into 
sadistic sex play‘ (Turner, Times, 08/05/2004).22 England seemed to be participating freely. 
She is the Femme Castratrice. Later, when details of what England first told investigators 
were published, it was the fact that she ‗was having fun‘ that was most upsetting:  
                                                             
22 The author also reflected over whether or not it was England‘s underwear that was draped over an Iraqi's face 
in another photo. 
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In a sworn statement to investigators, Pfc. Lynndie England explained 
the mystery of why soldiers at Abu Ghraib took pictures of detainees 
masturbating and piled naked with plastic sandbags over their heads 
by saying, ‘We thought it looked funny so pictures were taken.‘ 
(Zernike, New York Times, 16/05/2004) 
Private Lynndie England told investigators that the pictures were 
taken ‗while they were joking around, having some fun, working the 
nightshift.‘ (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 04/08/2004) 
In the Sun, one headline read ‗Torture fun‘:  
CRUEL American soldier Lynndie England has told how Iraqi 
inmates were forced to wear women‘s panty pads and crawl through 
broken glass… Pregnant England- sent home in disgrace after being 
pictured torturing Iraqis- also admitted the cruelty was carried out for 
FUN. Asked by army investigators in North Carolina who knew of the 
abuse, she said: ‗Everyone in the company, from the commander 
down. We thought it looked funny, so pictures were taken.‘ She 
described the horrific abuse as ‗basically us fooling around‘. 
(Unattributed, Sun, 19/05/2004) 
Most news coverage regarding Lynndie England‘s ‗fun‘ at Abu Ghraib mentioned that she 
was smiling in the photos, that her victims were male and depicted naked and that she was 
pregnant with the child of the alleged ring-leader (Monaghan, Times, 31/08/2004; Harwood, 
Daily Mirror, 07/05/2004). That England was torturing ‗for fun‘ was also the military 
prosecutors‘ main argument during her trials months later. As a result, the representation of 
England as the Femme Castratrice, enjoying, laughing and smiling while torturing her male 
victims, continued: 
They [the military prosecutors] argued that since England did not 
work at the cellblock where most of the prisoner abuse occurred and 
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visited it despite orders to stay away, ‗It‘s clear Pfc. England was not 
an MP. She was not recruited into a secret military mission as the 
defence would have you believe. She was there to have some fun.‘ 
(Parker, USA Today, 01/09/2004) 
‗The accused knew what she was doing,‘ said Capt. Chris Graveline, 
the lead prosecutor. ‗She was laughing and joking. ... She is 
enjoying, she is participating, all for her own sick humour.‘ 
(Unattributed, USA Today, 26/09/2005)  
A military prosecutor said England humiliated prisoners because she 
enjoyed it and had a sick sense of humour. (Thompson, Sun, 
27/09/2005) 
By focusing on her smile in the photos, the fact that her victims were naked males and the use 
of the leash, I argue, Lynndie England was constructed a monster through the discourse of the 
Femme Castratrice both when the photos became public, during investigations and during her 
trials. Because of the smiles, England seemed to take pleasure in torture. The sexual 
sadomasochistic undertones of the discourse of the Femme Castratrice were, furthermore, 
made visible with references to the leash and the fact that her victims were naked males. 
Lynndie England became the ‗sex sadist of Baghdad‘ (Brittain 2006: 86). 
In order to counter representations of England as a monster and to re-write England as a 
‗normal‘ woman, England‘s defence team used her pregnancy and emotions of maternal guilt: 
Appealing to the jury as a mother, Private England described her fear 
after the photos of the mistreatment became public. She said she was 
scared she would be sent to prison, separated from her young son, 
whose father is Private Graner. ‗I was scared I‟d have to leave him 
and he wouldn‘t know me when I returned, and he wouldn‟t view me 
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as his mother, he‘d view me as a stranger,‘ she said. (Cloud, New 
York Times, 28/09/2005) 
England, a reservist in the US Army, talked at length about how the 
child, who bears a striking resemblance to Graner, had changed her 
life. (Unattributed, Times, 28/09/2005) 
In this sense, Lynndie England‘s experience of being a mother has changed her life, the 
argument goes. She is not a monster capable of torture and abuse. Instead, through her 
‗natural‘ maternal insights she has realised her right priorities. The maternal insights are also 
prominent in the Vanity Fair article: ‗Lynndie England: a Soldier, a Mother - and a Court-
Martial‘. The sub-heading reads: ‗With a 7-month-old boy to care for, the Abu Ghraib Private 
admits her guilt‘ (Rockey Fleming, People, 16/05/2005). The article suggests that because 
England is a mother she realises and admits her guilt in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The 
association of a mother‘s feeling and guilt communicates that even for England, the monster, 
participation in what happened at Abu Ghraib was ‗unnatural‘. Becoming a mother has made 
England explore her ‗natural‘ femininity and, as a result, she feels emotions of guilt.  
Furthermore, even though Lynndie England finished serving her punishment years ago, it 
seems we are still obsessed to hear her story. In 2009, five years after the images became 
public, the BBC radio conducted two separate lengthy interviews with her and an interview in 
the Guardian was introduced as:  
In 2004, photographs of abuses at Abu Ghraib shocked the world. 
Seven people were charged, but the face of the scandal will always 
be Lynndie England, the 21-year-old private grinning at the camera. 
(Brockes, Guardian, 03/01/09) 
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Despite the fact that investigations and most recently, the documentary Standard Operating 
Procedure (2008), has shown that England‘s role in the abuse was minor in comparison to 
what actually took place during interrogations which was not captured on camera, and that 
blame should have been shared amongst a larger group of people, higher ranking officers as 
well as military intelligence officers, we are still obsessed with Lynndie England. In 
particular, we are still obsessed with her smile as this remark in an interview with BBC radio 
4 highlights: ‗You look happy in the photographs…‘, the reporter asks. England replies: ‗It is 
just like smile for the camera, it is for the person holding the camera‘ (BBC Radio 4, 
30/05/2009). The obsession with England also concerns the emotions of guilt and regret: 
In her first interview in three years Lynndie England talks about Abu 
Ghraib, about Charles Graner, about guilt, her current life - and the 
role of the Bush administration. (Unattributed, Stern, 19/03/2008) 
Mrs. England, we‘ve listened to you for hours. And the whole time 
we‘ve been asking ourselves: Where is your feeling of regret? 
(Unattributed, Stern, 19/03/2008) 
In a radio interview for Special edition of Outlook with the BBC world service, Lynndie 
England is asked: ‗Do you feel sorry for the prisoners?‘ England does not want to answer the 
question. The journalist continues: ‗But you do have regrets?‘ England responds: ‗I can‘t 
change what happened. I believe everything happens for a reason. To me the reason that I was 
there with Graner was that I would have my son‘ (BBC Outlook, 04/02/2009). In yet another 
radio interview with the BBC during 2009, England is asked: ‗Do you accept that what you 
did was wrong?‘ England replies:  
Still, five years later, I believe that we were told to do this. Yes, the 
acts themselves were wrong, but in the military you do what you are 
being told to do. Yes, we could have said something. Graner actually 
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told both his Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Leader, but they said, just 
do whatever they say. (BBC Radio 4, 30/05/2009) 
After the interview, the radio hostess and the studio guest discussed what Lynndie England 
had said. The hostess found ‗the complete lack of remorse‘ the most disturbing whereas the 
guest highlighted that England did not see the prisoners as individuals. Next, I discuss what 
purpose such an obsession with monsters fulfils; how ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised even 
in monster stories portraying ‗unnatural‘ femininity. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: Emphasising ‗natural‘ femininity 
In this concluding section, I show how stories of monsters serve the purpose of emphasising 
‗natural‘ femininity even though the monster itself disrupts notions of ‗natural‘ femininity and  
the Myth of Motherhood. As mentioned in Chapter 5, female agency in political violence can 
be allowed if the subject is acting out of a minority and cultural exception. In this chapter, 
however, the subject has not only transgressed boundaries of ‗natural‘ femininity but has 
disrupted ideas about what ‗natural‘ means. This is why the subject is written as abject and a 
monster. As shown above, the creation of monsters through the discourses of the Monstrous-
Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme Castratrice is intimately linked with 
motherhood. Due to the close connection between ‗natural‘ femininity and motherhood, there 
is also a link between ‗unnatural‘ femininity and monstrosity and this is why I argue that 
monster stories are told as perversions of motherhood.  
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The discourse of the Monstrous-Feminine organises stories of monsters in a broad way as 
female subjects are different to the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity. This is how Faye Turney was 
constructed as monstrous for having, albeit temporarily, given up her role as a mother. In this 
discursive context, Turney is monstrous because she has selfishly left her daughter behind. At 
the same time, anonymous male soldiers who temporarily leave their children behind in order 
to serve their country tend not to be written as monsters because they are not doing anything 
‗unnatural‘. In this sense, motherhood is made visible whereas fatherhood is not. Similarly, 
the positioning of Gudrun and Ulrike in The Baader-Meinhof Complex was negotiated 
through motherhood where sacrificing/abandoning motherhood was linked to agency in 
violence. While Gudrun‘s abandonment of her son is unproblematic due to the fact that she is 
written as the masculinised subject, Ulrike‘s transformation into someone capable of 
committing violent acts takes place through her sacrifice of motherhood. Thus, again, 
motherhood is made visible whereas fatherhood, in this case through Andreas Baader‘s 
fatherhood, is not. Furthermore, when Janis Karpinski was named and pictured and, thereby, 
identified as female in the initial coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal, she was written as a 
monster because she was associated with the content of the images, which in itself was in 
tension with ‗natural‘ and appropriate femininity. Moreover, the discourse of the Monstrous-
Feminine organises stories of Lynndie England in two ways: through sexual narratives and 
maternal narratives. By writing her as sexually deviant she was associated with inappropriate 
femininity and by being pregnant during her trials, the ‗unnaturalness‘ of England‘s agency 
became apparent resulting in that the tension between life-giving (Myth of Motherhood) and 
life-taking (agency in political violence) identities captured much of the media focus. More 
specifically, England was also written as a monster through the discourse of the Femme 
Castratrice. This is shown by the emphasis on that she was taking part in acts of torture ‗for 
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fun‘, but also demonstrated by the obsession with her smile in the photos. England was also 
written as a monster through the Femme Castratrice because her victims were naked, male 
and because one naked male was seemingly dragged on a leash. This all plays into the 
sadomasochistic undertones of sex, power and domination present in the discourse of the 
Femme Castratrice.  
Both Janis Karpinski and Nasima are written as monstrous through the discourse of the 
Deviant Womb by not taking up their roles as mothers. In addition, Nasima is performing the 
discourse of the Deviant Womb because she is faking motherhood in order to achieve her 
political goal. Through the idea of the cyborg body Nasima is part human part machine. She is 
seemingly both life-giving and life-taking.  
I argue that, in line with the theorisation of the monster and the abject discussed above, the 
obsession with the monster has more to do with how we view ourselves than the monster 
itself. Feinman argues that ‗when we only ask questions about women, when we are only 
appalled and confused by women soldiers‘ acts of brutality, we continue to cast women as 
victims and men as brutes‘ (Feinman 2007: 66). In contrast, I argue that the writing of the 
monster fulfils the purpose of defining what we are not. Because the ‗othering‘ of the monster 
is deeply intertwined with our understanding of ourselves, as the monster shows us what we 
are not, I argue that representations of monsters are used as a way of identifying what we, as a 
larger collective, are not. Through interpellation, unconscious ideologies call upon us not to 
identify with the monster, but at the same time, we need the monster to exist because it is 
intimately linked with what we are. The monster shows us what we are not and where the 
boundary is drawn. By being defined in relation to an ‗other‘ representing ‗unnatural‘ 
femininity, ‗natural‘ femininity is also communicated. This is how, on a meta-level, ‗natural‘ 
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femininity is emphasised by our obsession with monsters. The ‗othering‘ of the monster 
shows us what we are not and where the boundary of ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ femininity lies. In 
this sense, the monster story functions to police ‗natural‘ femininity. Hence, even though the 
monster itself seems to challenge gendered binaries constituted by the Myth of Motherhood 
and seems to resist or disrupt notions of ‗natural‘ femininity, stories of monsters overall still 
function to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity as that which is different from the monster. This is 
how the Myth of Motherhood is communicated in monster stories.    
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Chapter 7 
VICTIMS: Inversions of Motherhood 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to constructions of monsters and heroines, representations of female agency in 
political violence are also presented in the form of victim stories. Crucially, however, in these 
stories the female subjects are actually denied agency. In this chapter, I explore the way in 
which subjects are denied agency and argue that motherhood is central to this process. In the 
first section, I theorise victims by discussing two discourses that influence representations of 
female agency in political violence: Vulnerability and Emotionality. I argue that there are two 
main ways in which female subjects are represented as victims through the Vulnerability 
discourse: either by being the passive object of the story rather than the active subject or by 
being portrayed as less than adult with a lack of authority. Because of this, I argue that stories 
of victims are inversions of motherhood. The Emotionality discourse writes the female subject 
as emotional which in these discursive structures of meaning is associated with weakness as 
explained in Chapter 4. Here, personal relationships are emphasised and/or the female subject 
is written as a victim of her own emotions. In the following section, I discuss how characters 
in my empirical cases are written as victims through the discourses mentioned. In the 
concluding section, I argue that the writing of female subjects as victims functions to 
emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity because victimhood is an appropriate ‗space‘ for females 
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according to traditional ideas about gender, agency and political violence. Thus, by writing 
the female subject as a victim, its life-taking identity is ‗removed‘ and agency in political 
violence is denied. Consequently, instead, the Myth of Motherhood is communicated. 
 
 
2. THEORISING VICTIMS 
2.1 Vulnerability 
As explained in Chapter 4, in traditional narratives of war, men make war and women keep 
the peace; men go to the front and women stay at home; men fight and women are fought for 
(Cooke 1996: 80). In this war story, man is constructed as violent and aggressive and woman 
as nonviolent and pacifist. Because of these categorisations, women are seen as incapable of 
protecting themselves, and this subsequently serve as the grounds on which to persuade men 
to exercise their masculinity and defeat the enemy; they are the reason why men fight (Kumar 
2004: 298). Women become at once the victims of war and the causes for war. Jean Bethke 
Elshtain termed this relationship the myth of protection (Elshtain 1995: 4), I use this 
conceptualisation to formulate the discourse of Vulnerability. 
According to the discourse of Vulnerability, the most prominent role that women can play is 
that of the victim. Women can suffer rape, torture or death during war, giving the male soldier 
the special duty to protect her from such consequences (Kumar 2006: 297). The binary 
constructions of war stories in this way proclaim that the sex segregation is justified for 
biological reasons: the men are strong, therefore, they must protect the women who are weak. 
It is written in their genes that men shall be active and women passive; men are the subjects 
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and women are the objects represented as being acted upon (Cooke 1996: 16; Young 2003: 8). 
The writing of female subjects as, in fact, objects in need of protection is the first way in 
which the discourse of Vulnerability produces victims. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the link between femininity and sexual reproduction is often seen 
as ‗natural‘ and childless women who deny their definitional gendered ‗essence‘ are, 
therefore, rendered deviant and/or denied adult status (Hird 2003: 8). However, women‘s 
gendered bodies are also denied adult status by being constructed as belonging to the same 
category as children, which, for example, has been the case in language in UN documents, 
resolutions and peace agreements. Here, the unit of ‗women-and-children‘ (Puechguirbal 
2010; Enloe 2000) is written as vulnerable victims in need of protection. Claudia Brunner 
offers another example by showing how female suicide bombers are infantilised in Palestine. 
Brunner argues that women are being treated as equivalent to children, both having the status 
of victims, which means that women are removed from being seen as active political agents 
(Brunner 2005: 36). While male martyrs are mostly named by their full name and treated as 
grown-ups, even if they are only 16 years old, in the media coverage, female suicide bombers 
are mostly cited by their first names and treated as little girls which underlines their young 
age and supports an interpretation of innocence (Brunner 2005: 43). The writing of female 
subjects as lacking authority by being associated with children or childhood is the second way 
in which the discourse of Vulnerability influences victim stories.  
 
2.2 Emotionality 
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While women engage in political violence for all types of reasons […] 
it is perplexing why the so-called ‗personal reasons‘ consume much of 
the public‘s and media‘s fascination. (Eager 2008: 4)  
In this sub-section, I address the fact that female perpetrators of political violence often are 
viewed as engaging in such actions due to personal connections and grievances rather than to 
focus on their political ambitions (Brunner 2005; Eager 2008). I argue that a discourse of 
Emotionality defines female subjects through personal relationships or individual feelings. For 
example, in media representations of female suicide bombers in Israel/Palestine, where the 
use of political martyrdom statements is common, the coverage and analysis of their 
behaviour often still focuses on their personal lives and feminine shortcomings such as a 
divorce or a miscarriage, rather than their agency in a political cause (Sjoberg and Gentry 
2007: 120). This is particularly the case if we take into account that men too are motivated to 
engage in political violence and terrorism through a combination of ideological and personal 
motivations (Eager 2008: 4). The personal motivation aspect in representation of female 
agency in political violence is nothing new however. For example, in the story of the Celtic 
queen Boudicca who led a rebellion against the Romans around 60 AD it is mentioned that 
she did so after her husband had been killed and her daughters raped (Goldstein 2001: 118). A 
recent example is Wafa Idris, the first female Palestinian suicide bomber who killed herself in 
2002. The media representation focus on that she was single, living with her mother after a 
compulsory divorce due to her infertility. Wafa Idris was a ‗tainted woman‘, a 28-year-old 
sterile divorcee (BBC News, 30/01/2002) who seemed to fit the picture of a desperate woman, 
a social outlaw, who might have thought of committing suicide anyway (Brunner 2005: 32).  
Another way in which the subject is written as a victim through the discourse of Emotionality 
is by emphasising the subject‘s maternal feelings. Caron Gentry argues that when women‘s 
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own political rationale is ignored, their agency is subordinated and their politicisation 
objectified. In this way, Gentry argues, a ‗twisted‘ maternalism is used to make a woman‘s 
political decision not about strategy or politics but about emotions and relationship (Gentry 
2009: 247). In addition, the discourse of Emotionality also constitutes the Myth of 
Motherhood because by demonstrating the female subject‘s maternal feelings, ‗natural‘ 
femininity is emphasised. I use the discourse of Emotionality in order to show how female 
subjects are in fact positioned as victims with the purpose not only to deny those subjects 
agency, but also to rescue ‗natural‘ femininity. In these discursive practices, emotional is 
defined in opposition to rational as explained in Chapter 4. As a result, by writing female 
agents of political violence as emotional acting out personal grievances, such subjects are 
associated with weakness and a lack of agency rather than being strong and rational. 
 
 
3. VICTIM STORIES: Inversions of Motherhood 
In this section, I show how female subjects positioned within various discursive practices in 
my empirical cases are performing the discourses of Vulnerability and Emotionality. Written 
as victims the female subjects are in fact positioned as objects, rather than subjects, and in 
need of protection, and/or associated with a lack of authority and/or described in emotional 
and personal terms. By being written as victims in this way, all subjects are denied agency in 
political violence. As victims without agency, the tension between life-giving and life-taking 
is removed, which in turn emphasises ‗natural‘ femininity and the Myth of Motherhood 
through the subject/object‘s life-giving identity. 
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3.1 Performing Vulnerability 
Faye 
Faye Turney was written as a victim through the discourse of Vulnerability in three main 
ways: through her life-giving identity as a woman; through an emphasis on her fear and fear 
of rape in particular; and by being written and depicted in passive tense. First, the immediate 
focus on her identity as a mother with headlines such as ‗Topsy, the mum who went to war‘ 
(Ingham and Flanagan, Express, 28/03/2007); ‗Iran mum hostage‘ (Hughes, Mirror, 
27/03/2007); ‗LOVING MOTHER‘ (Linge, Daily Star, 28/03/2007); ‗The Mother held 
captive in Teheran‘ (Unattributed, Times, 28/03/2007); ‗A mother on parade in Iran‘s 
propaganda war‘ (Kennedy, Webster and Sanderson, Times, 29/03/2007) automatically 
emphasised her identity as a woman. Soon, a debate whether or not mothers should be 
allowed to serve in the military services was intersected with discussions regarding women‘s 
roles in the military all together: ‗Should women in the armed forces be allowed to serve on 
the front line?‘ (Sengupta, Independent, 30/03/2007), ‗Frontline women: The great debate‘ 
(Hickley, Daily Mail, 30/03/2007), ‗Woman at war in numbers‘ (Unattributed, Mirror, 
03/04/2007) and ‗Should women serve on the front line?‘ (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 
04/04/2007). A former Commander in the Gulf War discussed mothers in relation to men, not 
fathers: 
I feel there is a problem with mothers in the frontline. Just imagine if 
Faye Turney had been mistreated like the Tornado pilots in the first 
Gulf War. There would be an eruption, and it would not be the same 
if a man had been mistreated. (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 
06/04/2007)  
Another commentary was simply titled: ‗Faye should not be in the frontline‘: 
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The plain fact is that women are physically vulnerable in a way 
men are not. I may be old-fashioned, but I feel ashamed that Faye 
Turney has been put in this peril to fight on my behalf. A woman‘s 
place may no longer be in the home, but neither is it at the sharp end 
of an AK-47. (Heffer, Daily Telegraph, 31/03/2007)  
Besides focusing on how women are more vulnerable than men, the debate also centred on 
how the inclusion of women would impact negatively both upon the armed forces but also 
society in general:  
[A] mother‘s love is one of the strongest of human forces. To deny it 
when we recruit men and women to our armed forces is to make our 
society as a whole vulnerable. (Parkin, Daily Mail, 30/03/2007) 
Leaving aside questions as to how any woman could voluntarily leave 
her young child for such tours of duty, Faye‘s capture highlights the 
real risk of women in the front line, not just to themselves but to their 
comrades in arms. They put their male combatants at greater risk 
of harm, not because they are weaker than them, but because they 
are a far more valuable trophy of war, a prize to be used as 
blackmail against her comrades and her country. (Platell, Daily Mail, 
31/03/2007)  
[W]e are the more compassionate sex; instinctively more nurturing 
and lacking the thirst for aggression that drives our male 
counterparts… [T]he strong emotional ties of motherhood cannot be 
underestimated. All this makes women less effective than the men 
with whom they stand on the battlefield. And the consequences to a 
fighting unit which must be tightly focused are potentially 
catastrophic. (Webb, Daily Mail, 07/04/2007)  
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Faye Turney‘s capture highlighted women‘s alleged vulnerability, but the issue of women on 
the frontline was most often about the impact upon male soldiers, arguments that emphasised 
men as active subjects and women as passive objects:  
Men put women in a „special‟ category. That is why, perhaps, when 
two women died under my command I found myself deeply upset. On 
one occasion it rendered me incapable of coherent thought for some 
time. (Colonel Bob Stewart quoted in Unattributed, Daily Mail, 
06/04/2007) 
When I was Chief of Defence Staff, I always thought it was a risky 
business because I felt they could be used as propaganda trophies and 
that there was a danger that if women started getting hurt and killed 
it might have a greater effect on the men fighting. (General Charles 
Guthrie quoted in Hickley, Daily Mail, 30/03/2007)  
 [T]he presence of women in risky situations was a distraction, 
because many servicemen were still inclined to protect women and 
would be more distressed by the death of a woman. Such distress 
can only be heightened where the woman is a mother. (Kirby, Times, 
01/04/2007) 
[J]ust how effective are women in the Armed Forces? We still don‘t 
really know the truth about how men feel alongside women in the 
front line. Is there some part of them which isn‟t concentrating on 
winning and surviving but on protecting a female colleague? 
These instincts go much deeper than politically-correct legislation, 
right into the chemistry of the body and the structure of society, and 
my guess is they are not so easily suppressed. (Parkin, Daily Mail, 
30/03/2007)  
The mere presence of women also has a dramatic effect on the ability 
of men to be combat soldiers, as has been proved in those situations 
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around the world where female soldiers serve on the front line. For 
example, when a soldier sees a female colleague lying injured, he 
immediately feels his first duty must be to protect her rather than 
to stick to the military plan. (Webb, Daily Mail, 07/04/2007)
23
 
The arguments regarding women‘s impact on male soldiers are similar to arguments made in 
the latest Ministry of Defence report on gender in the armed forces. Here, the exclusion of 
women in combat roles is not motivated by differences in physical strength or levels of 
aggression. Instead, the exclusion is motivated with the argument that adding women could 
impact negatively on men and because there is not enough experience and research into this 
area, it is too risky to include them (MoD 2002; Woodward and Winter 2006). Not only is this 
argument only focused on men‘s behaviour but heteronormativity is also reconstructed as 
both male and female soldiers are thought to be heterosexual. 
Initially, the Iranians made assurances that Faye Turney as the only woman received proper 
treatment by being held separate from the male hostages. In fact, the Iranian foreign minister 
suggested that Turney would be ‗released as soon as possible‘ (Borger and Wintour, 
Guardian, 29/03/2007). In other words, what is communicated is that because Turney is a 
woman, she should be released before the others. However, a few days later the Iranians 
changed their mind and, again, Turney‘s female identity was highlighted: 
As a result of Britain‘s ‗wrong behaviour‘ the release of the woman 
sailor had been ‗suspended‘... A No 10 source said: ‗It is cold and 
callous to be doing this to a woman at a time when she is being 
detained in this way.‘ (Borger and Wintour, Guardian, 30/03/2007) 
                                                             
23 Parkin‘s and Webb‘s commentaries in the Daily Mail published a week apart are very similar. Not only are the 
arguments echoing the discourse of Vulnerability similar, but they also use the same examples. For example, 
both articles quote (without referencing) an Israeli medical study that highlights women‘s physical limitations 
and both articles emphasise that the inclusion of women in combat roles will make our society weaker and more 
vulnerable as a whole. 
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Faye Turney‘s vulnerability was also directly addressed in the ITV interview: Trevor 
McDonald asks: ‗How vulnerable did you feel?‘ Faye replies: ‗Initially, very vulnerable... It 
wasn‘t until like a four days into it that I started to become strong and I can and I will get 
through this‘ (ITV 2007). To illustrate Turney‘s vulnerability as a mother, McDonald at one 
point interrupts her to clarify his point: ‗They actually said that to you, do you wanna see your 
daughter again?‘ McDonald then asks: ‗It made you angry?‘ Turney replies: ‗Yes.‘ Another 
way her vulnerability was portrayed was her reliance on the other male sailors and marines:  
As the only woman in the group, Faye heaped praise on her fellow 
hostages. She said: ‗I could never have got through this without them‘. 
(Newton Dunn, Sun, 10/04/2007) 
‗The lads on my boat were fantastic. Every time I looked at them they were winking at me, 
just to like give me...‘ At this point, McDonald fills in the gap: ‗Trying to reassure you?‘. 
Faye answers ‗yeah‘ (ITV 2007). 
A second way in which Turney was powerfully written as a victim was through a focus on her 
fear. In both the interviews with the Sun and ITV, Faye Turney‘s fear while being held 
hostage was put to the fore, in particular her fear of being raped. One of the Sun‘s cover pages 
(the story was divided into two parts) had ‗I feared being raped by Iranians‘ as a sub-
heading. Inside the paper, the article describes how ‗Faye desperately tried to hide the fact she 
was a woman -fearing she would be raped‘:  
Terrified of being discovered, she mouthed to Captain Air: ‗Are they 
going to rape me?‘ She said: ‗I mouthed it to him again and again. 
He didn‘t answer but he winked and smiled at me which reassured me 
everything would be OK. Looking back it was unfair of me to have 
asked him. But I wanted to know. I wanted to be prepared for 
203 
 
whatever was going to happen to me.‘ (Newton Dunn and Moult, Sun, 
09/04/2007: b)  
Other headlines and stories include ‗I was stripped and feared I‟d be raped, says Faye‘ 
(Ballinger, Daily Mail, 09/04/2007) and ‗Ms Turney said that initially she had tried to cover 
her hair and hide the fact that she was a woman, fearing that she could be raped‘ 
(Hodgson, Guardian, 09/04/2007).  
Remarkably, even in Arthur Batchelor‘s story (he was the only other hostage to sell his story 
although for a much smaller sum of money), Turney‘s fear of being raped dominates: The 
front page reads: ‗Faye: I feared they‟d rape and kill me‘ and ‗Arthur: My 3 days of hell in 
solitary‘ (Unattributed, Daily Mirror, 09/04/2007). Inside, the biggest headline reads ‗Faye 
feared they‟d rape and kill her…they called me Mr Bean‘. In the text, Batchelor is quoted 
saying ‗The blood drained from her face and Faye whispered there‟s going to be a rape 
involved in this‘ (Stansfield and Hughes, Daily Mirror, 09/04/2007). Not only does the 
representation of Turney‘s fear dominate the story, but the males‘ fear is marginalised. In fact, 
in the Daily Mirror article, Batchelor expresses his own fear of being raped: ‗I was absolutely 
exhausted by the pressure- so much I could barely move. There were times when I feared 
being raped or killed‘ (Stansfield and Hughes, Daily Mirror, 09/04/2007). He also described 
an incident where another soldier‘s hair was gently caressed and then sprayed with aftershave: 
‗We all thought he was about to be sexually abused‘ (Stansfield and Hughes, Daily Mirror, 
09/04/2007). This article is supposedly conveying Batchelor‘s story but the headlines concern 
Turney‘s fear of being raped, whereas Batchelor‘s fear is only mentioned briefly in the text. 
Turney‘s fear of rape is emphasised and Batchelor‘s fear of rape is marginalised. I argue that 
this is because Turney‘s fear resonates better with traditional assumptions about women as 
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victims. In other words, the fear of rape makes more ‗sense‘ in the story of Faye Turney than 
in the story of Batchelor. 
Women‘s alleged vulnerability for rape was emphasised again in the representations of the 
hostages return to the UK: 
The first thing I told Adam and my mum and dad was that nobody 
had touched me. I knew that would have been in their thoughts and I 
wanted to put their minds at rest. (Moult and Newton Dunn, Sun, 
10/04/2007) 
The focus on Turney‘s fear of rape only ignores that rape is used as a weapon of warfare 
against both men and women and that female soldiers, at least Western, are actually more 
likely to be raped or sexually assaulted by their fellow soldiers than by ‗the enemy‘.24 I am 
not questioning whether or not Faye Turney actually feared being raped during captivity, but 
my argument is that the focus on her fear in the media representation, and in particular her 
fear of rape, positions her in the traditional role for women as victims and undermines her 
authority and agency as a soldier.  
A third way in which Faye Turney was written as a vulnerable victim in need of protection 
was by being portrayed in passive tense. Visually, this was emphasised most clearly in the 
depiction of Turney wearing an Islamic headscarf.
25
 On 29 March 2007, the Independent, the 
Times, the Guardian, and the Daily Mail all have a photo of Turney wearing the headscarf on 
the front page. The title of the Daily Star is ‗Mum paraded on telly by Iran: She‘s forced to 
confess and wear Muslim head-dress‘ (Burchell, Daily Star, 29/03/2007). In the Daily Mirror, 
                                                             
24 See for example Williams (2006) for an honest description of a woman‘s experience as a soldier in the US 
army, including problems regarding not only sexual assault by fellow soldiers but also stigma attached to 
reporting such incidents. 
25 In this context, the headscarf symbolises submission because Turney had to wear it, but there are also 
postcolonial and orientalist discourses influencing this representation. These are beyond the scope of this 
research project but would be excellent to explore further in future projects.     
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a photo of Turney in the headscarf takes up two pages accompanied with the headline ‗A sick 
charade‘ (Hughes and Prince, Daily Mirror, 29/03/07). Similarly, in the Sun, the leading 
article focuses on Faye-the victim, seemingly terrified and despicably paraded:  
Strain and fear were etched on the face of Faye Turney as she 
‗confessed‘ to straying into Iranian waters…By picking on the 
terrified young mum, the mullahs showed how low they are ready to 
sink. Parading her before TV cameras was a despicable act of 
aggression. (Pascoe-Watson, Sun, 29/03/2007) 
The following day, the Daily Mail publishes three photos of Faye Turney on the front page. In 
addition to the mother/child photo and the soldier photo mentioned above there is an image 
from the television coverage from her capture in which Turney is veiled. The caption reads 
‗mother‘, ‗fighter‘, ‗…pawn‘ (Seamark, Daily Mail, 30/03/07).26 Faye Turney now has three 
distinctive subject positions in these discursive practices. Moreover, the ITV interview was 
titled ‗A Tonight Special: Captured, paraded and exploited: the inside story of Leading 
Seaman Faye Turney‘s ordeal‘ (ITV 2007); and an article in the Sun had ‗STRIPPED, 
WARNED and THREATENED‘ emphasised in bold caption and capital letters (Newton 
Dunn and Moult, Sun, 09/04/2007: a). The representation of Turney, visually and textually, in 
passive tense, means that Turney is no longer the subject of the story but an object being used 
by men. In this story, constructed through the discourse of Vulnerability, the subjects are all 
male whilst Turney, the lone female, is a vulnerable victim; a passive object. 
 
Louise 
                                                             
26 With all the focus on Faye Turney wearing the headscarf, the Daily Mail was also quick to point out when she 
was not wearing it: ‗the only captive woman, is shown for the first time not in an Islamic hijab‘. The caption 
says: ‗On film: Iran releases images of some hostages, apparently looking relaxed. This time, Faye Turney is not 
wearing the hijab‘ (Seamark and Chapman, Daily Mail, 04/04/2007). 
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In Female Agents, Louise is bravely refusing to give up any information during torture. 
However, despite her bravery and heroism, the torture scenes still echo the Vulnerability 
discourse because Louise is still being rescued by her brother. When Pierre is brought to the 
torture chamber, Louise is sat on a chair with her arms tied behind her back in hand-cuffs. 
Louise, wearing her under-dress only, is visibly tortured; her legs are shivering at times. 
[Heindrich:] Why have you tried to kill me twice, Louise? 
Louise says nothing, looks down, whereupon she gets hit by an officer. She falls off the chair 
and then gets pulled back upon it. Heindrich sits down in front of Pierre. At this point, the 
camera angle is from behind Pierre, depicting Louise and an officer in the background behind 
Heindrich, indicating that this story is told from Pierre‘s perspective. Pierre is the main 
character in this scene. Heindrich keeps asking Pierre the same questions, hoping that when 
he watches his sister being tortured, Pierre will finally give in and give up the information. 
Pierre, however, refuses to give in. We watch Louise‘s head being held under water. Pierre 
still does not speak. 
[Heindrich:] I thought a brother and a sister‘s love was the strongest. 
(Louise is still being held under water). I wish I had a sister like 
Louise. I would hate to have a brother like you. 
These torture scenes are overlapping with scenes in which Gaelle, who is held in a cell in the 
same building, is preparing to take her life. As such, the two different scenes communicate 
boundaries between life and death, as well as power over life. As Gaelle is taking off her 
clothes, her cell is very bright and a church choir can be heard in the background. The 
powerful music continues in the following scene when we are back in the torture chamber. 
Pierre is in a stress position with his hands tied in hand cuffs attached to the ceiling. Louise is 
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being hit in the stomach by two officers in the background. The music interlinks the two 
scenes powerfully as Gaelle is taking her own life and Pierre‘s reflecting over whether or not 
to safe his sister (who never asks him to do so).  
[Heindrich:] She can‘t take much more. You can still save her. (The 
same sacral music is still playing). 
[Pierre:] If I talk, do I have your word she will live? 
[Heindrich:] I give you my word. 
[Pierre:] I want your word as an officer. 
[Heindrich:] Stop! (the torturing). 
As he finally gives in, Pierre starts sobbing. 
[Heindrich:] I‘ll keep my promise. Your sister‘s life will be spared.  
Pierre looks at Louise, she moves her lip slightly in a covered smile of gratitude, she seems 
thankful. What is communicated in these torture scenes is that although Louise is very brave 
and strong, able to endure torture without giving in, in the end, she is still saved by her 
brother. Pierre‘s heroic act of protecting his sister has overshadowed Louise‘s heroism. This is 
how, despite Louise‘s bravery and heroism, it is Pierre, the male subject, who through the 
discourse of Vulnerability is protecting Louise, the passive victim in need of protection. The 
focus in this scene, moreover, is on the ‗dialogue‘ between Pierre and Heindrich. They are the 
subjects (male) whereas Louise (female) is a silent and passive object in the background.  
The choir-like sacral music continues in the next scene where Gaelle naked lies down on the 
floor. She tells a prayer and swallows a cyanide pill. The music intensifies and the camera 
shots from the ceiling show Gaelle as Jesus on the cross, arms out to the sides. The religious 
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references are very strong, both visually and through the music. A power over life is 
communicated in the collage of images moving from Pierre and Louise‘s situation in the 
torture chamber and Gaelle‘s in her cell. In the torture chamber, Pierre has power over 
Louise‘s life and by taking her own life, Gaelle is retaking control over her own.   
Similarly to how Faye Turney is represented, Louise is also portrayed as passive. For 
example, at two different occasions, Louise‘s life is saved by the other agents. She also misses 
her shot at Heindrich at the train station and is captured. She is tortured before she is saved by 
Pierre and then rescued by Jeanne, twice. In these scenes, Louise is acted upon rather than 
having agency in the story. She is represented as an object rather than a subject. This is how 
Louise is written as a victim through the discourse of Vulnerability. 
 
Lynndie 
As mentioned above, women‘s gendered bodies are also denied adult status by being 
associated with children. This is how Lynndie England was written as a victim, especially by 
her own defence team during the trials. A psychologist who examined England as a child was 
called to give evidence and portrayed her as a „blue baby‟ deprived of oxygen, and suffering 
from a malformation of her tongue that required it to be clipped. The psychologist also found 
her suffering ‗from an inability to process information, an ailment affecting fewer than 2 
children in 100‘ (Blumenthal, New York Times, 04/05/2005). The defence team‘s argument 
was that she in this way was a victim who could not tell right from wrong and was only doing 
as she was told: 
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‗The entire case, what this has always been about, is authority,‘ 
Captain Crisp said. ‗Pfc. England‘s blind compliance toward 
authority and her lack of authority in any context.‘ (Cloud, New 
York Times, 27/09/2005) 
Her lawyer Capt Jonathan Crisp said: Her role in this is not what it 
was initially thought to be. She was a pawn. (Unattributed, Daily 
Mirror, 30/04/2005) 
Lynndie England‘s insinuated low level of intelligence was also echoed by the judge: 
Then he [Judge Colonel Pohl] turned to Private England. ‗Maybe you 
think we forgot about you,‘ he said, trying to explain the ruling to her 
but realizing, he said, ‗I‟m not sure you‟ll understand.‘(Blumenthal, 
New York Times, 05/05/2005) 
In one of her first interviews, Lynndie England said that she was only following orders. In the 
Daily Star this story got the title ‗Lynndie told to pose‘ (Unattributed, Daily Star, 
13/05/2004). Again, the title suggests passivity rather than agency and England is written as 
an object in a story where Graner is the subject and main character: 
‗Did you think any of this was wrong?‘ the judge asked. ‗Why were 
you doing it?‘ He asked me to, she said, referring to Specialist 
Graner. (Levy, New York Times, 03/05/2005) 
Standing just over five feet tall and speaking almost inaudibly, with 
little emotion, Private England testified in court at Fort Hood that she 
went along with the demands of a fellow soldier, Specialist Charles A. 
Graner Jr., thinking ‗it was just for his personal amusement.‘ (Levy, 
New York Times, 03/05/2005) 
I argue that the focus on her height, her insinuated low level of intelligence and the alleged 
lack of authority associates Lynndie England with childhood and writes her as a passive 
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victim who is denied adulthood. This is how the discourse of Vulnerability influences the 
writing of England as an object denied of agency in political violence and this is how victim 
stories are told as inversions of motherhood. 
 
Janis 
In the independent panel‘s report (the Schlesinger report) about the Abu Ghraib scandal, 
published in the New York Times, Karpinski was portrayed as an incompetent leader in need 
of mentoring:  
We believe Lt. Gen. [Ricardo] Sanchez should have taken stronger 
action in November when he realized the extent of the leadership 
problems at Abu Ghraib. His attempt to mentor Brig. Gen. [Janis] 
Karpinski, though well-intended, was insufficient in a combat zone in 
the midst of a serious and growing insurgency. (Unattributed, New 
York Times, 25/08/2004) 
According to Karpinski, her leadership abilities were never in doubt: 
Gen. Sanchez never once - not once did he ever mention to me his 
concerns about my leadership ability. He never mentored me, he never 
suggested that I try something differently, he never criticized me, not 
once. (Karpinski, Signal City, 04/07/2004)  
The Washington Post quoted an unclassified report by an Air Force psychiatrist who studied 
‗physical abuses by US military police of Iraqi prison detainees‘: 
Nelson said Karpinski had difficulty delegating work, dismissed 
punishments of lesser officers that were recommended by her staff, 
and was ineffective in resolving problems with personnel, logistics, 
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administration and supplies, of which she was aware. Karpinski ‗felt 
herself a victim and she propagated a negativity that permeated 
throughout‘ the area of her command responsibility, Nelson wrote. 
(Smith, Washington Post, 24/05/2004)  
Furthermore, after Karpinski left the Army, she was described as an abandoned child. An 
article published in the Times was titled ‗My army life: lonely, restless and afraid‘. The 
author suggests that she is lonely and ‗now that she has lost the crutch of the Army, feels 
somewhat abandoned.‘ The article says: ‗She lives alone in South Carolina and never had 
children.‘ Karpinski is quoted saying: ‗If anybody wanted kids more than the other, George 
did. Not that I didn‘t want them. It just wasn‘t on the cards. And you have to be together 
occasionally‘ (de Bertodano, Times, 13/08/2004). Here, Karpinski is written as a victim, both 
according to her own supposed feelings and by being associated with childhood. In addition, 
her choice of not having children is turned into a punishment as she is assumed to be lonely 
when she has left/being kicked out of the ‗family‘ of the army. I argue that by representing 
Karpinski as in need of mentoring and as a victim herself, she is associated with childhood 
and a lack of authority. As a result, she is denied agency in these discursive practices. This is 
how Janis Karpinski is written as a victim through the discourse of Vulnerability and why 
victim stories denying female agency in political violence are inversions of motherhood. 
 
3.2 Performing Emotionality 
Faye 
When the ITV interview begins, Faye Turney is already tearful. As the interview continues, it 
becomes clear that the focus is on Turney as an emotional, weak and vulnerable mother, not a 
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brave soldier. We (the audience) are watching Turney as she is watching the television 
footage of herself during captivity for the first time. We see her face in profile with Trevor 
MacDonald sitting next to her in the background. As she watches the pictures of herself, 
Turney is biting her lip, seemingly trying not to cry. She gets tears in her eyes. She is 
emotional. At this point, McDonald asks: ‗How do you feel Faye, seeing that back now?‘ 
Turney answers it upsets her deeply. The next question from McDonald is ‗What were your 
emotions on being separated from the rest of your colleagues?‘ Turney replies it was horrible 
and that she had a panic attack since being put in her cell (ITV 2007). When Faye Turney 
describes the moment her Iranian captors told her that her colleagues had been sent home and 
that she was the only one left, she says: ‗It was just [Turney sighs]...what a feeling‘. She 
seems to get emotional and the camera zooms in. She swallows. McDonald asks ‗So you felt 
you were in this alone?‘ Here, the close-up on Turney‘s face emphasises her emotionality. 
Then, McDonald asks another bizarre question: ‗Did you ever cry yourself to sleep?‘ Again, 
Turney gets emotional as she answers in the affirmative. As mentioned above, of all shots, a 
close-up is ‗the most concrete, most objective through what it shows, the most abstract, most 
subjective through what it signifies‘ (Mitry 2000: 67, 68). Thus, it is Turney‘s emotionality 
that is in focus here and the reason for this, I argue, is because emotionality, due to the Myth 
of Motherhood, is the expected and ‗normal‘ response for a woman. In this sense, 
emotionality is part of ‗natural‘ femininity. At the same time, however, within the 
masculinised context of the military, emotionality is also associated with weakness.  
The moment Turney was told she was the only one left was also used by the newspapers as 
when she ‗totally lost it‘:  
All I could think of was how completely alone I was... At that moment 
I just totally lost it. All I could think of was what my family must be 
213 
 
going through. What would my husband Adam be telling Molly? Did 
they even know I was missing? I cried my eyes out. I asked the 
guards about my friends but all they did was laugh at me. (Newton 
Dunn and Moult, Sun, 09/04/2007: a) 
Even though this quote concerns her feelings about being alone, commentaries focused on her 
role as a mother:  
Faye Turney goes on to say that, once in Iranian custody, she ‗totally 
lost it‘ when she thought about what her three-year-old daughter 
Molly would be going through. ‗I cried my eyes out,‘ she told the 
Sun, ‗but all the guards did was laugh at me.‘ It is hardly surprising 
that her interrogators then began to ask her whether she wanted to see 
her daughter again. (Lawson, Independent, 10/04/2007) 
Here, the focus is on a mother‘s feelings. Crying her eyes out is linked to her role as a mother 
as she is portrayed as having lost it when thinking about her daughter when, in fact, she was 
expressing her feelings about being ‗completely alone‘. I argue that the links were made with 
reference to her motherhood because this ‗makes sense‘ according to the Myth of 
Motherhood. In other words, by emphasising Turney‘s identity as a mother, she is ‗naturally‘ 
written as emotional. Moreover, speaking of the moment when she had to reveal that she was 
female, Faye Turney‘s emotional experience is described:  
I had tears welling in my eyes because I knew this was the point they 
would discover I was female. But I was determined not to give them 
the satisfaction of seeing me cry and I pulled myself together. There 
was a look of total disbelief and they kept staring at me and repeating 
‗woman, woman‘. (Newton Dunn and Moult, Sun, 09/04/2007: b) 
Similarly, much of the media coverage of the hostages‘ reunions with friends and families 
focused on Turney‘s emotional reunion with her husband but above all with her daughter. The 
214 
 
Sun‘s headline on the front page is ‗Hello Molly!‘ In the text we learn that ‗Hostage Faye 
Turney was reunited with little daughter Molly yesterday - amid tearful scenes‘ (Newton 
Dunn and Moult, Sun, 06/04/2007). Later, in the Sun‘s second day coverage of ‗Faye 
Turney‘s ordeal‘ based on the interview with Turney, the front page reads ‗Mummy 
mummy!‘ and a photo of Turney lifting up her daughter Molly is covering the whole page. 
The caption reads ‗Tears as Faye holds her little Molly again. FREED Navy hostage Faye 
Turney lovingly kisses the little daughter she feared she might never see again. Faye, 25, told 
last night how she wept at being greeted by cries of ‗Mummy, Mummy‘ at an emotional 
reunion with Molly, three‘ (Moult and Newton Dunn, Sun, 10/04/2007: a, b). Inside the paper, 
it is mentioned that ‗throughout her time as a prisoner of the fanatical Iranian regime, the 
thought of her only child growing up without a mother had reduced her to tears‘ (Newton 
Dunn and Moult, Sun, 10/04/2007: b). Another article was titled: ‗Smiles that say Mummy is 
home: Tears and laughter in the sunshine at hostages‘ reunion‘. In the text it is mentioned that 
‗some chatted with their families, while others were overcome with the emotion and broke 
down and wept‘ (Kelly, Daily Mail, 06/04/2007). However, the story does not tell us who 
broke down and wept. Considering the attention to Turney‘s emotionality in the overall 
coverage, I speculate that if it was Turney who was ‗overcome with emotion and broke down 
and wept‘ she would have been named. Therefore, I argue that in this victim story men‘s 
emotionality is anonymous, whereas Turney‘s emotionality is identified and highly visible.  
I do not suggest that Faye Turney should not have been emotional but I argue that the 
portrayal of her is based on ‗emotionality‘ as the appropriate response for a woman with her 
experience. The interviews are set up to portray her emotionality and by doing so the 
representation of Turney follows essentialist assumptions of gender behaviour. In other 
words, by portraying Turney as emotional, she is performing ‗natural‘ femininity. Turney is 
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cast in the traditional role for women in war, that of a victim, whereas her authority and 
agency as a soldier is forgotten. If the interviewee was a male both the questions and the set 
up would have been different. Also, if Turney had been showed the footage of herself in 
captivity beforehand, the desired outcome of her emotionality might not have happened.   
 
Nasima 
Nasima is written as a victim through the discourse of Emotionality in two main ways: by 
being motivated by personal relationships and by the insertion of doubts and maternal 
insights. First, by describing her motivations as personal, Nasima is portrayed as acting out of 
desperation. In the beginning of Britz, Nasima is acting out her dissatisfaction with the 
situation for British Muslims in non-violent ways. She takes part in demonstrations and she 
voices concerns about the radicalisation of British Muslims and the resort to violence as a 
means for change. Nasima is convinced political issues should be solved through democratic 
means. At the end, however, Nasima has become radicalised and transformed into a suicide 
bomber. In particular, Nasima‘s radicalisation takes place as a response to two failed personal 
relationships: her relationship with Sabia, her best friend, and Jude, her secret boyfriend. 
Sabia, whose brother is under surveillance by counter-terrorism agencies, is being 
incarcerated for buying a larger amount of spices. In prison, she is humiliated and later tells 
Nasima she was ‗touched‘. Once released, Sabia is put under a control order and not allowed 
to see her friends or leave the house. Due to the trauma, Sabia eventually commits suicide. 
The second failed personal relationship is with Jude, one of her fellow medical students. 
Nasima is afraid her family will not accept Jude as her boyfriend because he is black and so 
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their relationship is secret. Nasima‘s father finds out, however, and sends her off to Pakistan 
to meet and plan a marriage to a local man.  
Jude finds Nasima in Pakistan, but members of Nasima‘s ‗new family‘ attack him. Nasima 
flees, assuming Jude has been killed. Nasima now finds herself in a desperate situation as she 
has run away from the family she was supposed to marry into, her father thinks she has put 
shame upon their family because she has had a (sexual) relationship with a man without being 
married, she believes her boyfriend has been killed and her best friend has committed suicide. 
Nasima had made arrangements to train as a fighter in Pakistan before leaving the UK and, 
subsequently, meets up with a woman in a cafe. Although the meeting was arranged before 
Jude showed up, the latest trauma for Nasima seems to function as another push towards 
violent resolutions and no turning back. In addition, when training is over and Nasima needs 
to make up her mind about the suicide mission, the camp organisers reveal that they have 
faked her death. Nasima is shown a photo of her family attending her funeral. In effect, 
Nasima now has no choice. She cannot go back to her old life in Britain anymore. She has got 
nothing to lose.  
Nasima‘s personal motivation for her actions is also demonstrated when the man who is 
helping her prepare for her mission says ‗You‘ll sit at God‘s right hand‘. Nasima replies: 
‗That‘s not why I‘m doing it‘. Instead, Nasima is taking revenge for her friend but she is also 
acting out of despair as she has no choice. Although Nasima‘s martyrdom statement issuing 
her political reasons is shown in the epilogue, I argue that Nasima is written as desperate, as a 
victim having no other choice than to choose the path of violence due to the failed personal 
relationships. This representation is ordered by the discourse of Emotionality because by 
representing Nasima as motivated by personal rather than political reasons, her agency is 
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denied and she is but a victim. As demonstrated above, women are associated with 
emotionality rather than rationality in traditional ideas about gender and political violence. 
Thus, it ‗makes sense‘ that a female perpetrator of violence is driven by personal motivations.  
Second, another way it is shown that killing is ‗unnatural‘ for a female subject is through the 
insertion of doubts and maternal insights. In Britz, Nasima is expressing concerns about the 
target of her attack. When she finds out about the location she asks: ‗who will be there?‘ The 
man helping her with her final preparations says it is bankers on a lunch-break with their 
families. Nasima looks up, seems troubled and says: ‗I didn‘t realise there would be children 
there‘. At this point, a simple melody which will run until Nasima reaches her target starts to 
play. Background music is usually used in order to establish a specific mood or emotion. In 
these scenes, the music is played in minor keys giving a sparse, bleak and serious impression 
which functions to enrich the emotional communication of the scenes. 
Nasima‘s hesitation about hurting children is an example of how the tension between life-
giving (Myth of Motherhood) and life-taking (agency in political violence) materialises. By 
showing her hesitation through maternal feelings, the audience is reminded that her [a 
woman‘s] proper role is to give life, not to take it. Thus, by portraying the female subject as 
having maternal insights or in doubt, essentialist ideas about gender, agency and political 
violence are reinforced and female agency in political violence is, subsequently, rendered 
‗unnatural‘. Moreover, the hesitation about the use of force in gendered terms in itself writes 
the subject as, not only emotional rather than rational, but as weak. In Britz, Nasima hesitates 
about the use of violence right until the end of the programme. For example, at a meeting with 
the camp organisers in Pakistan, Nasima says she has only agreed to training in the camp, not 
yet about ‗the other‘, meaning the suicide mission. This reminds the audience that she is still 
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hesitating about acts of violence. Moreover, shortly before Nasima leaves the house in 
London where she has been staying for her final mission, she phones her brother Sohail‘s 
mobile phone, but he does not answer it. Again, this shows that Nasima hesitates about the 
mission. In these subject positions, Nasima is not a strong masculinised subject who can ‗do-
it-as-a-man‘ and ‗naturally‘ use violence. Instead, Nasima is femininised through notions of 
care and emotionality. This is how Nasima is written as a victim through the discourse of 
Emotionality.  
 
Lynndie 
In Errol Morris‘ documentary Standard Operating Procedure (2008) England defends her 
actions at Abu Ghraib prison by saying ‗it was all because of a man‘. This was also a common 
thread in the media representation during the trials: 
I was embarrassed because I was used by Private Graner; I didn‘t 
realise it at the time... I trusted him and I loved him. (Unattributed, 
Times, 28/09/2005) 
England‘s defence countered that England was only trying to please 
her soldier boyfriend, then-Cpl. Charles Graner Jr., labelled the abuse 
ringleader by prosecutors: ‗She was a follower, she was an individual 
who was smitten with Graner,‘ Crisp said. ‗She just did whatever he 
wanted her to do‘. (Gutierrez, USA Today, 26/09/2005)  
[S]he was under the influence of Charles Graner, an enlisted man 
who was her boyfriend and who oversaw an Abu Ghraib cellblock... 
‗Those pictures don‘t show the absolute amazing trust she placed in 
him because she loved him.‘ (Cloud, New York Times, 22/09/2005)  
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[S]he is, as she says, weak and passive and the sort of woman who is 
an easy mark for a man with the gift of fibbery. This was Charles 
A. Graner Jr., her superior and boyfriend, father of her child, and stock 
character in every country-western song: He left her and the baby for 
another woman. As is very often the case in life and literature ... the 
perpetrator is often also a victim. No reading of England‘s life story 
can stand any other interpretation. She is one of life‘s losers. (Cohen, 
Washington Post, 01/10/2005) 
By emphasising England‘s emotionality, the defence team tried to put focus on England‘s 
identity as a woman and highlight that it is ‗unnatural‘ for a woman to participate in such 
activities. By associating her behaviour with emotionality, however, England is also 
associated with a lack of authority. This was probably the defence team‘s desired outcome, 
however, this was also the predominant representation of England in the media at the time of 
her trials. By being portrayed as a victim of her own emotions and lacking authority, attempts 
are made to re-write England as ‗just a woman‘ who could not help herself but was blinded by 
love. This is how Lynndie England is denied agency and written as a victim through the 
discourse of Emotionality. 
 
Janis 
As mentioned above, Janis Karpinski was considered ‗extremely emotional‘ by General 
Taguba in the investigation of the 800
th
 Military Police brigade:  
BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much of her 
testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was 
her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many 
of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or 
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exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to 
both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its 
soldiers. (Taguba 2004) 
Karpinski defended being emotional by arguing that she is a caring boss who indeed will get 
emotional when defending her soldiers. However, Karpinski also claims that she was not the 
only person involved being emotional:  
But it wasn‘t me who was overwhelmed. Every man in that room - 
and there were six of them - was in tears when my statement was 
finished. Every one of them. Including Taguba. And I think that they 
were embarrassed by that, and that‘s why he made that comment in 
the report. (Karpinski, Signal City, 04/07/2004) 
In contrast, I argue that Karpinski was described as ‗extremely emotional‘ in order to 
undermine her authority and agency and in that sense blame her for the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
By using Karpinski‘s emotionality, her identity as a woman is highlighted and her identity as 
a military officer is forgotten. In the end, Karpinski was officially punished for a false shop-
lifting charge from 2002, before she was even a General, not for the torture scandal 
(Unattributed, CBS News, 02/06/04). Still, I argue that by emphasising Karpiniski‘s 
emotionality, she was not only read as a woman, but this gendering was absolutely vital in 
order to construct her as a weak leader.  
Karpinski was portrayed as not being in control of her soldiers and as a naïve leader unable to 
understand the implications of her leadership: ‗MP Commander: ―No knowledge‖ of alleged 
abuse‘ (CNN, 04/05/2004). The same day, the Sun headlined an article ‗JAIL BOSS IN 
DENIAL‘ (Unattributed, Sun, 04/05/2004). A few days earlier, the Daily Mail published an 
article titled ‗They love it here said General Janis‘ (Unattributed, Daily Mail, 30/04/04). Not 
only does this article imply that Karpinski has no idea about what is actually happening at 
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Abu Ghraib and is, therefore, lacking control and authority, but it also refers to Karpinski by 
using her first name only. As mentioned above in relation to female suicide bombers in 
Palestine, the representation of a first name only indicates that the subject lacks authority. 
This is repeated in the text of the article where ‗colleagues‘, who are anonymous, critique 
‗Janis‘: 
Colleagues of the tough, super-fit officer last night described her as a 
woman with one mission to raise her own profile. One colleague said: 
‗Janis sees herself as making way for women to get to the top in the 
US Army. But many of her soldiers said she had been promoted 
beyond her ability because she was a woman.‘ (Churcher and Graham, 
Mail on Sunday, 02/05/2004) 
Approximately a year after the images were released and Karpinski had been framed as a 
weak leader, she received her penalty. Her rank was reduced to colonel and she was issued a 
reprimand and relieved of her command. However, she was not officially punished for what 
happened at Abu Ghraib: 
The Army said Karpinski was guilty of dereliction of duty and 
shoplifting. Investigators did not substantiate allegations that she 
made a false statement to an investigating team and failed to obey a 
lawful order. Karpinski was relieved of command of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade on April 8. President Bush had to approve the 
Pentagon‘s action against Karpinski. (Moniz, USA Today, 06/05/2005) 
‗Though Brig. Gen. Karpinski‘s performance of duty was found to be 
seriously lacking, the investigation determined that no action or lack 
of action on her part contributed specifically to the abuse of detainees 
at Abu Ghraib,‘ according to an Army news release. (White, 
Washington Post, 06/05/2005) 
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Despite having been officially cleared from the abuse at Abu Ghraib, Karpinski is commonly 
referred to as the highest ranking officer to have been punished for the scandal. She also 
remains the only General ever to have been demoted in the US army (Karpinski, Signal City, 
13/11/2005). I argue that Karpinski was framed as a bad and weak leader through the 
discourse of Emotionality. Karpinski was weak in the sense that she ‗felt like a victim‘ herself 
and by being represented as a naïve leader not in control of her soldiers. By emphasising 
Karpinski‘s female identity through the discourse of Emotionality, I argue, Karpinski was not 
only constructed as a victim denied of agency but as an ‗unnatural‘ leader. In this sense, 
Karpinski‘s female, life-giving, identity was crucial for the construction of her as a bad and 
incompetent military leader.  
  
Ulrike 
Ulrike Meinhof is written as a victim through the discourse of Emotionality in three main 
ways: by the insertion of maternal insights, by acting out of desperation, and by being the 
femininised subject defined through motherhood. First, similarly to how Nasima‘s hesitation 
about killing children is portrayed in Britz, Ulrike Meinhof‘s initial hesitations about the use 
of force is also demonstrated by the insertion of maternal insights. In her role as a journalist, 
Ulrike has arranged a meeting with Andreas Baader, who is serving time in prison, in order to 
interview him for a book. The meeting is taking place outside of prison under the surveillance 
of two armed guards. In reality, Ulrike is meeting Baader in order to help him escape. Aware 
that armed members of the RAF will arrive to free Baader, Ulrike asks a policeman:  
[Ulrike:] Are you married? Do you have children?  
[Policeman:] Yes, wife and children.  
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[Ulrike:] Oh. 
The tone in her voice seems disappointed. Ulrike is expressing doubt over the possibility of 
making a child fatherless. Aware of the risk that the officer might get injured or killed, 
Ulrike‘s hesitation about violence is communicated through maternal feelings with 
connotations to nurturing, caring, affection and attachment. I argue that Ulrike‘s maternal 
feelings are used to communicate that the use of force is ‗unnatural‘ for Ulrike but also to 
emphasise her position at the crossroads between violence and non-violence and to illuminate 
the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate femininity. By depicting Ulrike as 
showing maternal feelings, her role as a woman and a mother is emphasised which enables 
the writing of her as the feminised subject for whom participation in violence is ‗unnatural‘. 
This is how Ulrike signifies ‗natural‘ femininity and the Myth of Motherhood is 
communicated. 
Second, Ulrike‘s actions and choices are explained through her personal relationships. The 
film starts with Ulrike, her two children and husband on a beach in northern Germany, which 
immediately puts focus on Ulrike‘s role as a mother. Soon, there is a scene where Ulrike 
leaves her home with a bag and her daughters. Bleak slow music (violin chords) starts to play 
communicating seriousness and sadness. The next scene shows when Ulrike moments earlier 
had walked in on her husband having sex with another woman and the audience understands 
that this is the reason Ulrike has left her husband. Furthermore, because of this personal 
trauma, Ulrike seems to be searching for a new meaningful purpose in life. She is portrayed as 
being influenced and inspired by Gudrun Ensslin‘s actions. When Ulrike, in her role as a 
journalist, is covering Ensslin and Baader‘s trials, she listens in on an interview with Ensslin‘s 
parents: 
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[Journalist:] How has your relationship to your daughter changed with 
this act? 
[Father:] It was surprising for me to see how Gudrun, who was always 
very rational, reached a state of almost euphoric self-realization 
through this act. A holy self-realization. 
[Mother:] I sense that she has achieved something liberating, even in 
the family. Suddenly, I myself feel liberated from a constriction and 
the fear that previously dominated my life. She released me from my 
fears. 
After this scene, the music intensifies and gets more energetic. At the same time, we see 
Ulrike writing an article about resistance for a political journal. Ulrike has clearly been 
inspired by what Gudrun‘s parents were saying. She decides to arrange a meeting with 
Gudrun.  
Ulrike‘s personal motivations to join the Red Army Faction (RAF) are also highlighted when 
she decides to take an active part in the freeing of Andreas Baader, mentioned above. Gudrun 
says to Ulrike: ‗Just write about it afterwards. That‘s all you‘re good for anyway‘. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, the character Peter functions to signify Ulrike at the crossroads 
between violence and non-violence. When Peter voices concerns regarding Ulrike‘s decision 
to help Baader escape (‗This is crazy!‘), Ulrike says: ‗I have to do it‘. In other words, Ulrike 
feels she has to take part for personal reasons. Another personal relationship which seems to 
make Ulrike ‗turn to violence‘ is her relationship with Rudi Dutschke, a union leader. We see 
Ulrike attend a meeting where Rudi Dutschke is speaking. He recognises that she is there and 
gives her a smile. This suggests that Ulrike and Dutschke are close friends. Soon afterwards 
Dutschke is shot by a right-wing extremist. He survives, but is brain-damaged. When Ulrike 
hears about the shooting on the radio she starts to cry. This seems to be yet another personal 
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trauma for Ulrike. In combination, what is communicated is that Ulrike ends up as a female 
perpetrator of political violence due to personal traumas and failures.  
The third way in which Ulrike Meinhof is written as a victim through the discourse of 
Emotionality is by being portrayed as the feminine subject in contrast to Gudrun Ensslin. This 
was mentioned in Chapter 5 when I explained how Gudrun is written as a masculinised 
subject. As the feminine subject, Ulrike is signifying emotionality, passivity and non-
violence. In their first meeting, Ulrike‘s non-violent method for political change is critiqued 
by Gudrun: 
[Gudrun:] If they shoot our people like Ohnesorg and Dutschke then 
we are going to shoot back. That is the logical consequence.  
[Ulrike:] You are not serious? 
[Gudrun:] All over the world armed comrades are fighting. We must 
show our solidarity. 
[Ulrike:] But we do. 
[Gudrun:] Even if the Fascists throw you in jail? Such sacrifices have 
to be made. Or do you think that your theoretical masturbation will 
change anything? 
When Gudrun tells Ulrike that her theoretical masturbation is not working, she is critiquing 
Ulrike for passivity, not real action. This is one way in which Gudrun is written as the active 
masculinised subject, whereas Ulrike is the passive feminine subject. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the two women, one feminine and one masculine subject, are juxtaposed visually 
through clothes and make-up, but they are also portrayed very differently when they are 
arrested. When Gudrun is arrested for carrying a gun in a clothes shop she violently tries to 
resist and the music in the background is fast and energetic, similar to music in an action 
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movie. When Ulrike is arrested, however, she collapses and starts crying. She makes no 
attempt to resist while slow and sad background music starts to play. Overall, Ulrike is shown 
crying several times, whereas Gudrun is not. As the film continues, the division between the 
two women increases and results in confrontation when, in prison, Gudrun starts to write the 
group‘s statements instead of Ulrike: 
[Ulrike:] Why are you changing my texts? 
[Gudrun:] Because the stuff you write is depressing. 
[Ulrike:] I don‘t understand why you are doing this. You swoop on 
every mistake I make! I can‘t take it! Your deceit drives me up the 
wall! 
[Gudrun:] You wait! I‘m so sick of your bouts of exhaustion! I‘m so 
fed up with them! You want me to snap! 
In the following scene, the two women are yet again arguing. In the next scene, Andreas is 
reading a letter from Gudrun:  
[Gudrun:] You want to know about Ulrike? It‘s sinister. A vampire, 
trembling with bloodlust. Ulrike‘s two laughs during work were 
necrophilic, hysterical, absolutely ugly and clearly directed against 
me... Although I still say it‘s directed less against me than against you. 
When Ulrike shows the group a new statement she has written, Andreas reads it, says ‗it‘s 
crap‘ and tears it apart. Gudrun is sitting with her back turned towards Ulrike.  
[Ulrike:] You are giving me false information or Gudrun completely 
rewrites my stuff. Why do you do that? (She asks Gudrun.) To 
torment me? 
Still with her back facing Ulrike, Gudrun says:  
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[Gudrun:] To pay back your tormenting. (Gudrun turns her head, 
looks Ulrike in the eyes.) An eye for an eye. 
[Ulrike:] I don‘t get it, or I don‘t want to. But I can‘t take it anymore. 
[Gudrun:] I‟m no witch, but I‟ve learned to be brutal. 
After one of the trial sessions, Gudrun whispers to Ulrike:  
[Gudrun:] You are the knife in the RAF‘s back.  
Ulrike never goes back to the trials, she takes her own life. In this sense, the tension within the 
RAF, in particular between Gudrun and Ulrike, pushes Ulrike towards mental ill-health and 
suicide. By portraying the tension between Ulrike and Gudrun as one between femininity and 
masculinity, the film reinforces traditional ideas about gender, agency and political violence 
where masculinity is associated with power, rationality, agency, violence, strong etc. and 
femininity is associated with emotionality, passivity, weakness and non-violence. 
Moreover, in order to emphasise Ulrike as the feminine subject, her story is told through her 
motherhood, whereas Gudrun‘s motherhood is but a footnote. The following conversation 
between Ulrike and Gudrun takes place in the beginning of the film:   
[Ulrike:] What about your son? 
[Gudrun:] If you are serious, you have to be able to make such 
sacrifices. Andreas has a little girl as well. 
[Ulrike:] I could never leave my children 
This scene communicates first of all that the difference between these women is placed within 
their roles as mothers. Gudrun has sacrificed her motherhood in order to pursue her political 
aims and in order to function as a perpetrator of political violence. Ulrike, however, says she 
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could never make such a sacrifice. Here, Ulrike is acting within ‗natural‘ femininity and along 
the Myth of Motherhood. The scene also emphasises the film‘s central focus on motherhood 
rather than fatherhood. In the film, we see both Gudrun‘s son and Ulrike‘s two daughters, 
whereas Andreas‘ daughter is only mentioned once and never shown. In this sense, the two 
women‘s motherhood is visible whereas Andreas Baader‘s fatherhood is invisible.   
Furthermore, as the film progresses Ulrike‘s identity as a suitable mother is compromised. 
When some of the most prominent RAF members travel to Jordan for guerrilla training, 
Ulrike‘s children are being looked after by other members in Sicily. In Jordan, there is a 
meeting between Andreas, Gudrun, Ulrike and the camp organisers regarding Ulrike‘s 
children:  
[Gudrun:] We have a problem with Ulrike‘s kids. They are in Sicily 
now but they cannot stay there any longer. Is it possible to send them 
to Jordan to one of these camps for Palestinian orphans? 
[Man:] Generally speaking yes, but if we accept them, she will never 
see them again.  
Gudrun answers the man yes. During the discussion, Ulrike remains quiet and passively looks 
down. She seems shocked by what has been arranged, yet, she does not protest. These scenes, 
I argue, shows not only Ulrike‘s passivity towards Gudrun and Andreas but it also constructs 
her as a bad mother unable to protect her children. She seems to accept the decision for her 
children to be sent away to become resistance fighters. Ulrike, who in the beginning of the 
film had said that she could never leave her children, has now completed the transformation 
into a potential monster who is capable of abandoning their children. Crucially, however, 
here, the abandoning of the children does not write Ulrike as a monster but as a victim. In the 
book which the film is based on (Aust 2008), it is mentioned how Ulrike in 1973 stops 
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allowing her children to come and visit her in prison. She never saw her children again (Aust 
2008: 200). This information is not, however, included in the film. I argue that such exclusion 
enables Ulrike to be written as a victim rather than a monster. Rather than being a monster, 
who actively sacrifices her children, Ulrike represents failed motherhood, and the reason she 
fails is because she is the weak, passive and emotional feminine subject. Her mental ill health 
and subsequent suicide enriches this representation. 
 
Gaelle 
In the beginning of Female Agents, Gaelle is most often positioned as a strong and committed 
agent influenced by the discourse of the Vacant Womb. However, as soon as she gets 
captured, Gaelle is instead positioned as the ultimate weak female subject. Heindrich and his 
men bring Gaelle into the room where Pierre is being tortured. Gaelle is stripped off her 
clothes until she is standing in her underwear only. She is crying quietly. Heindrich asks 
Pierre: 
[Heindrich:] Where are your accomplices hiding? And the Phoenixes? 
What are they for? 
While Pierre says nothing, Gaelle wets herself. At this moment, there is an extreme close-up 
on her underwear which takes up the whole screen. As mentioned above, close-ups are used to 
emphasise the object‘s qualities: 
The object presented in close-up inevitably draws attention to its 
perceptible qualities, to everything which makes it different. It appeals 
to the emotions but these can only be felt, experienced by seeing it. 
(Mitry 2000: 67) 
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Thus, by showing her underwear in a close-up as she wets herself, an emphasis on Gaelle‘s 
fear, weakness and vulnerability is communicated. The Germans put Gaelle on a chair and 
pulls out her finger nail. Gaelle screams very loudly. There is a close-up on her face as she 
immediately gives up information regarding where the female agents were meeting up: 
[Gaelle:] The Duroc Institute for the Blind. (Gaelle is crying). We 
were to meet there to await orders for a new mission.  
The next scene focuses on Pierre‘s face as he looks down visibly disappointed. Later, when 
the two prisoners are chained to the walls of the same room, Pierre asks Gaelle about her 
cyanide pill. There is a close-up on Gaelle‘s face as she turns away and says:  
[Gaelle:] I am scared. You don‘t know what that means.  
When Heindrich enters the room, he offers Gaelle a white tissue but she refuses. The camera 
is filming from Gaelle‘s perspective. Heindrich crouches to be levelled with Gaelle and the 
camera.  
[Heindrich:] I am going to need your services again. Your friends got 
away from me. Where and when was the back-up?  
[Gaelle:] The back-up? 
[Heindrich:] Don‘t act dumb. I know the SOE methods. 
[Gaelle:] Louise knows that I betrayed them. She won‘t come to the 
rendezvous. (Gaelle defiantly looks Heindrich in the eyes).  
[Heindrich:] She is a woman who likes to take risks. 
[Gaelle:] If I talk, what is in it for me? 
[Heindrich:] Your freedom. 
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[Gaelle:] To be tried and sentenced by the SOE? 
[Heindrich:] You prefer that we torture you? (Gaelle looks down, her 
nose starts to bleed.) 
[Gaelle:] Tomorrow noon. Concorde Metro, Pont de Neilly platform. 
The agents had been told that, in the event of a capture, they must endure at least 48 hours of 
captivity, even if they are being tortured, before they can reveal any secret information in 
order for the other agents to get to safety. Gaelle, however, gives up the information almost 
immediately. Despite the earlier writing of Gaelle as a heroine (when she was mainly 
positioned against other females), in these discursive practices Gaelle is positioned against 
males and written as the ultimate female victim. Gaelle is weak, demonstrated by the fact that 
she immediately gives in and that she is bleeding from her nose, she is scared as the focus on 
her fear signifies, and she is emotional because she is crying. 
 
Suzy 
In Female Agents, Suzy is the only one of the agents who has no previous military training. 
Instead, she was chosen for the mission because she had had a relationship with Heindrich. 
When Louise and the other agents have been captured or killed, Suzy is Buckmaster‘s last 
chance to assassinate Heindrich. The plan is for Suzy to meet, seduce and subsequently kill 
him, her former lover. 
[Heindrich:] Liliane, (Suzy‘s real name)... for three years I refused to 
believe you were dead. Why did you leave? (Suzy turns around, faces 
him.)  
[Suzy:] Our love was doomed. 
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[Heindrich:] Give us another chance. Come with me. I am leaving for 
Germany tonight.  
Suzy pulls out her gun and points it at him. 
[Heindrich:] Did Buckmaster send you? You are one of his agents? 
Don‘t let them sully the beauty of what we had.  
Heindrich takes a few steps closer, Suzy hesitates. He takes her hand with which she is 
holding the gun, gently puts her down on the bed with him on top. He takes the gun from her 
hand and unloads it. He seduces her, holds her hand and they kiss. In the next scene, as Jeanne 
hears a shot from outside, music starts to play in the background in the form of a sole violin. 
The music makes a sad and serious impression. We see both Heindrich and Suzy lying on the 
bed with their eyes closed but we do not know who is dead. Then, watching from a car 
outside, Jeanne sees a body bag being carried away and Heindrich appears. At this moment, 
the music intensifies with darker lower keys associated with danger. It seems that ‗evil‘ in the 
shape of Heindrich has won this battle. Heindrich reaches for the body in order to touch Suzy 
once more but blood evaporates from the sheets. He is clearly upset about what he had to do 
and we understand that he is still in love with her. Importantly, however, Heindrich did not let 
his emotions for Suzy interfere with his role as a German officer in the war. While Suzy was 
unable to perform her task as she was too weak and emotional, Heindrich instead killed her 
when he realised her intentions. In this sense, Suzy is the emotional victim, unable to kill, 
whereas Heindrich is strong and rational and able to kill.  
 
Jeanne 
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, Jeanne is the ‗true‘ heroine in Female Agents, portrayed as a 
masculinised subject. However, in relation to other male subjects, even Jeanne is still 
portrayed as emotional and irrational. When she sees Heindrich coming out from the hotel 
where Suzy was supposed to kill him, she understands that the dead body being brought out is 
Suzy‘s. She gets upset and, foolishly, wants to kill Heindrich on the spot. She tells the driver 
of the car: 
[Jeanne:] Give me your gun!  
[Man:] What for? 
[Jeanne:] The mission is to kill him. 
[Man:] You‘re mad. Not here!  
Jeanne calms down and quietly agrees, puts her head in her hand. In this scene, despite 
Jeanne‘s desire to kill Heindrich, which would be an act of heroism, she is portrayed as acting 
irrationally and out of desperation because of her emotional experience realising that Suzy is 
dead. It is the male driver that has to calm her down and force her to act rationally. In this 
discursive context, Jeanne is positioned in relation to two other male subjects: Heindrich and 
the driver. Compared to them, Jeanne is the traditional, emotional, and irrational female. 
Hence, I argue that Jeanne is only allowed to be brave, strong and hold agency in positioning 
to other females. In a discursive context including males, as this example illustrates, Jeanne is 
written as the emotional and irrational stereotypical female subject, while the male subjects 
are written as rational subjects. Thus, through the discourse of Emotionality, even the 
strongest heroine in Female Agents is written as a victim through essentialist ideas about 
gender, agency and violence. 
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Louise 
Louise is written as a victim through the discourse of Emotionality in two main ways. First of 
all, her private relationships dominate the representation of why she is part of the resistance 
fighting. In the film‘s first scenes, Louise is a sniper amongst a group of resistance fighters. 
At one moment, Louise is supposed to give fire in order to cover one of the others. However, 
her weapon jams and as a result the man whom she was supposed to protect is shot and killed. 
Louise looks up from the rifle sight, takes a sharp breath of air, seems shocked but has to run 
off in order to save her own life. In the next scene, Louise meets up with her brother Pierre, 
who gives his condolences to Louise because the death of her husband. Thus, we understand 
that the man killed in the initial scenes that Louise failed to protect was her husband.  
Secondly, Louise is portrayed as emotional and irrational. For example, after their first 
successful mission, the female agents leave for a safe house while Pierre and two other agents 
are supposed to travel straight to Paris. However, when Pierre‘s group reaches the van they 
are surrounded by Heindrich and his men. The female agents hear the shooting that erupts and 
Louise decides to go back. From the woods she is watching Pierre being captured. Distraught, 
she irrationally attempts to fire at the Germans. However, one of the other agents who escaped 
physically stops her from firing her weapon. If Louise had succeeded she would have 
endangered the whole group‘s survival. 
As mentioned above, Louise‘s heroism is also overshadowed by the actions of her brother. 
After Heindrich has killed his former fiancé Suzy, he furiously returns to the torture chamber 
and changes the plan to let Louise go.  
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[Heindrich:] You should never have used her! You will be transferred 
to La Roquette prison. I am taking your brother to Germany with me. 
It is probably the last time you will see each other. Take him away! 
Pierre fights loose and manages to pick up a sharp object and slit his throat. Louise screams 
‗No, No, No!‘ as she watches her brother die. 
[Heindrich:] The only thing I can do for you now is to commute your 
death sentence to deportation. What do you choose? 
[Louise:] Execution!  
[Heindrich:] I will make the arrangements. Take him away. (Louise is 
looking at Pierre‘s dead body). 
In this scene, Louise defiantly opts for execution rather than prison. However, as it is 
represented, she does this because her brother just killed himself. Louise has now nothing to 
live for. Again, Louise‘s decision is influenced by her private relationships.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION: Emphasising ‗natural‘ femininity  
In this chapter, I have shown how in stories of victims, female subjects are written either as 
passive objects in need of protection or as emotional and thereby weak subjects through the 
discourses of Vulnerability and Emotionality. Here, I argue that the writing of female subjects 
as victims in this way not only deny the subject agency in political violence, but  also 
functions to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity and thereby communicate the Myth of 
Motherhood. 
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As shown above, Faye Turney‘s and Lynndie England‘s passivity is illustrated by the way in 
which they are described as captured, paraded, veiled, exploited, told to pose and so on. They 
are used by subjects rather than being subjects themselves; they are objects in need of 
protection. Furthermore, the immediate focus on Turney as a mother not only emphasises that 
she is a woman but also her alleged vulnerability as such. Being talked about as a child, 
England was associated with a lack of authority and as such written as a victim. Similarly, 
Janis Karpinski was denied adulthood and authority when she was described as in need of 
mentoring by more senior officers. In Female Agents, Louise‘s bravery and heroism is 
overshadowed by her brother‘s. It is he who is the subject while she is the object in need of 
protection. This is how the discourse of Vulnerability writes these subjects as victims denied 
of agency and communicates the Myth of Motherhood. 
Moreover, representations of female agency in political violence in which the subject is 
portrayed as ‗being emotional‘ focus on the female subject‘s own feelings, whether accurate 
or not, and functions to deny the female subject agency and authority as a soldier or military 
commander. In these representations, through interpellation, unconscious ideologies call upon 
the ideal viewer to interpret the representations according to essentialist understandings of 
gender, agency and political violence. The tension between identities of life-giving and life-
taking is made visible because of the expectations of appropriate or ‗normal‘ gender 
behaviour (being emotional). This is demonstrated by the fact that the media representation of 
Faye Turney was focused on her emotionality in general and fear of rape in particular. In 
Female Agents, all of the four main female agents (Louise, Jeanne, Suzy and Gaelle) are 
portrayed as acting out of desperation, irrational and emotional, in particular when positioned 
in relation to male subjects. Louise‘s actions are also portrayed through her personal 
relationships. Similarly, both Nasima in Britz and Ulrike in the Baader-Meinhof Complex are 
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portrayed as participating in political violence because of personal reasons and also shown 
hesitating about the use of force through maternal insights. Another way that Ulrike‘s 
emotionality is emphasised is the writing of her as the feminine subject. Thus, in comparison 
to Gudrun Ensslin, who acts as the masculine subject, Ulrike is represented as emotional, 
weak and passive which makes it ‗unnatural‘ for her to use violence. Lynndie England is 
represented as a victim of her own emotions since it was her feelings for Graner which made 
her participate in the abuse. Janis Karpinski was described as ‗extremely emotional‘ in order 
to undermine her authority and agency and in that sense blame her for the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. By using Karpinski‘s emotionality, her identity as a woman is highlighted and her 
identity as a military officer is forgotten.  
I argue that the representation of female subjects as either in need of protection or as 
emotional serves a purpose. I argue that such a portrayal echoes essentialist understandings of 
gender, agency and violence. The emotional representation ‗makes sense‘ according to the 
Myth of Motherhood since women are seen as ‗naturally‘ emotional and the association with 
children emphasises their need of protection. As victims, the female subjects are positioned in 
an appropriate ‗space‘ according to traditional ideas about gender, agency and political 
violence. Crucially, however, in this space, they are denied both authority and agency in 
political violence and, therefore, victim stories are told as inversions of motherhood. In 
addition, ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised through the discourse of Emotionality by 
demonstrating the subject‘s maternal feelings. Thus, by writing the female subject as a victim, 
its life-taking identity is ‗removed‘ and agency in political violence is denied. Consequently, 
instead, ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised and the Myth of Motherhood is communicated. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study set out to explore what representations of female agency in political violence can 
tell us about understandings about gender, agency and political violence in a Western ‗war on 
terror‘ context. In Chapter 2, I combined theoretical insights from poststructuralism, feminism 
and Roland Barthes‘ mythology framework in order to conceptualise the Myth of Motherhood 
as a theoretical meta-discourse. In Chapter 3, I discussed my methodological toolbox 
including discourse analysis, ideas about visual and textual representations, the concept of 
mass culture, as well as more specific methods and the rationale for choosing each particular 
empirical case. In Chapter 4, I discussed the existing feminist IR literature on gender, agency 
and political violence and showed that there is a gap in the literature regarding 
poststructuralist accounts of female agency in political violence in general and from a popular 
culture perspective including visual representations in particular. After having undertaken the 
empirical research, I found three different stories being told in representations of female 
agency in political violence: those of heroines, monsters and victims. Thus, in Chapters 5-7, I 
showed how representations of female agency in political violence are written as stories of 
heroines, monsters, and victims. I identified eight different discourses through which such 
stories were told: the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother, the Non-Mother, the Monstrous-
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Feminine, the Deviant Womb, the Femme Castratrice, as well as the Vulnerability and 
Emotionality discourses. Furthermore, in all three different stories, motherhood was 
instrumental to how agency in political violence was communicated. Because of the close link 
between ‗natural‘ femininity and motherhood, I argue that the three different stories were 
either told as versions, perversions or inversions of motherhood. As such, all three types of 
stories function to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity and to communicate the Myth of 
Motherhood.  
In this chapter, I draw together the strands of argument developed in the chapters above and 
reflect on the implications of these findings. I discuss methodological and theoretical 
contributions as well as limitations of the chosen approach for analysis. The chapter is 
structured around the two main original contributions to the existing feminist IR literature that 
this thesis aims to make. First, the argument that representations of female agency in political 
violence are told as stories about heroines, monsters and victims, and, then, the 
conceptualisation of the Myth of Motherhood and the argument that motherhood is 
‗everywhere‘ in representations of female agency in political violence. In the last section, I 
situate myself within the broader discipline of critical IR, I critically reflect upon strengths 
and weaknesses of my theoretical and methodological framework and I discuss avenues for 
future research.   
 
 
2. HEROINES, MONSTERS AND VICTIMS 
240 
 
Through this study, I have found that representations of female agency in political violence 
are told as three different stories: heroines, monsters and victims. While this structure is 
inspired by Sjoberg and Gentry‘s three-part framework, the research project as a whole 
elaborates and builds on their contribution to the field. As I discuss in greater detail below, 
this research project differs as it goes beyond explaining how women‘s agency in political 
violence is denied through discourses of motherhood and argues that motherhood is 
instrumental in order to also understand how female agency in political violence is enabled. 
As such, motherhood is present in all different stories rather than being one out of several 
narratives in which women‘s agency in political violence is denied.  
The Myth of Motherhood, functioning as a meta-discourse, is constituted by different 
discourses within each type of story. Thus, in heroine stories, the Myth of Motherhood is 
constituted by the discourses of the Vacant Womb, the Protective Mother and the Non-
Mother. To recap, I argue that the Vacant Womb is more suited for female heroism because 
the life-taking identity does not clash with a life-giving identity. In my empirical cases, the 
Vacant Womb predominantly influences the stories of female heroism in Female Agents as all 
women involved are childless. Some of the agents have sacrificed motherhood, some have 
sacrificed pregnancy, whereas others ‗cannot‘ have children as it is in tension with a particular 
subject position. The common denominator, and what is communicated in Female Agents, is 
that in order to be a heroine with agency in political violence, one cannot also be a mother. In 
addition, Gaelle performs the discourse of the Vacant Womb with references to religious 
moral codes and virginity. The discourse of the Protective Mother, I argue, constructs 
heroines who are performing ‗natural‘ femininity and acting out their appropriate caring and 
maternal role. This discourse influenced the representation of Faye Turney as a heroine 
because her actions were represented in a maternal relationship, not only with references to 
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her daughter but also in relation to her fellow soldiers, in particular the youngest of them. The 
representation of Janis Karpinski as a strong leader was also influenced by the Protective 
Mother when she (emotionally) defended her soldiers. The discourse of the Non-Mother 
organises stories of heroines who are not performing their life-giving role and are in one way 
or another portrayed as unable to become mothers. Thus, in order for Janis, Louise, Suzy and 
Gudrun to be written as heroines with agency in political violence, they had to sacrifice 
motherhood. Crucially, as masculine subjects, they are not ‗real‘ women, which mean that 
‗natural‘ femininity is not challenged. This is why these subjects are allowed agency in 
political violence. Moreover, the discourse of the Non-Mother also organises the writing of 
Jeanne as the masculine subject and ‗real‘ heroine of Female Agents by writing her as a 
childless prostitute already acting outside the boundary of ‗natural‘ femininity. As a 
masculine subject, it is not ‗unnatural‘ for Jeanne to be capable of killing, in fact, it is 
expected. 
In monster stories, the Myth of Motherhood is constituted by the discourses of the Monstrous-
Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme Castratrice. Here, the subject has challenged the 
idea of ‗natural‘ femininity and is, therefore, written as abject and monstrous. The discourse 
of the Monstrous-Feminine organises stories of monsters in a broad way as female subjects 
are different to the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity. This is how Faye Turney is constructed as 
monstrous for having, although temporarily, given up her role as a mother. She is monstrous 
because she had selfishly left her daughter behind, even though anonymous male soldiers who 
temporarily leave their children behind in order to serve their country are rarely constructed in 
such a way. This is one way in which motherhood is visible whereas fatherhood is rendered 
invisible. Similarly, the positioning of Gudrun and Ulrike in The Baader-Meinhof Complex 
was negotiated through motherhood where sacrificing/abandoning motherhood was linked to 
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agency in violence. Being the masculinised subject, Gudrun‘s sacrifice of motherhood is not 
problematised, whereas Ulrike‘s position as the feminised subject means that her 
transformation into someone capable of committing violent acts takes place through 
motherhood. Furthermore, when Janis Karpinski was named and pictured, and thereby 
identified as female, in the initial coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal, she was written as a 
monster because she was associated with the content of the images, which in itself was in 
tension with ‗natural‘ femininity. Moreover, the discourse of the Monstrous-Feminine 
organises stories of Lynndie England in two ways. By being written as promiscuous, England 
was made monstrous through a whore narrative which associated her with ‗unnatural‘ 
femininity. In addition, because of her pregnancy during the trials, England‘s life-giving 
identity was highlighted and added extra shock and confusion as the identities between life-
giving (Myth of Motherhood) and life-taking (agency in political violence) seemed to be 
clashing. More specifically, England was also written as a monster through the discourse of 
the Femme Castratrice. This is shown by the emphasis in the media representations on that 
she was taking part in acts of torture ‗for fun‘, most obviously demonstrated by the obsession 
with her smile in the photos. She was also written as a monster through the Femme 
Castratrice because her victims were naked, male and because one naked male was 
apparently being dragged on a leash. This all plays into the sadomasochistic connotations of 
sex, power and domination in the discourse of the Femme Castratrice. 
Having denied her ‗natural‘ ‗essence‘ by choosing not to have children, Janis Karpinski was 
constructed as monstrous and different through the discourse of the Deviant Womb by being 
referred to as ‗childless‘ and, thus, performing ‗unnatural‘ femininity. Nasima is written as a 
monster through the idea of the cyborg body performing the discourse of the Deviant Womb. 
Not only is Nasima performing the discourse of the Deviant Womb by refusing to take up her 
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role as a mother, but as a cyborg Nasima fakes motherhood in order to achieve her political 
goal. As a cyborg, the tension is overcome as Nasima is seemingly both life-giving (Myth of 
Motherhood) and life-taking (agency in political violence). However, Nasima‘s ‗real‘ identity 
is revealed as she executes her suicide mission and becomes the abject, a monster.   
Last, in victim stories, the Myth of Motherhood is constituted by the discourses of 
Vulnerability and Emotionality which function to deny the subject authority and, thus, agency 
in political violence. By ‗removing‘ the subject‘s agency in political violence in this way, the 
tension between life-giving and life-taking is hidden and ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised. 
As such, victim stories are inversions of motherhood. The discourse of Vulnerability 
influenced the writings of Faye Turney as she was described in passive tense as captured, 
paraded, veiled and used by men. Moreover, the focus on her fear of rape also signified that a 
mother/woman is an object in need of protection by her male colleagues. Lynndie England 
was written as a victim as she was being talked about with references to her childhood and as 
lacking authority. Similarly, Janis Karpinski was denied adulthood and authority when she 
was described as in need of mentoring by more senior military commanders. In Female 
Agents, Louise‘s bravery and heroism is overshadowed by her brother‘s; he is the subject and 
she is the object in need of protection. The discourse of Vulnerability influences 
representations of female agency in political violence and writes the female subjects as 
objects in need of protection denied of agency and authority. 
The discourse of Emotionality influences stories of victims in two main ways. First, 
representations of female agency in political violence in which the subject is portrayed as 
‗being emotional‘ focus on the female subject‘s own feelings, whether accurate or not, and 
functions to deny the female subject agency and authority. This is how Faye Turney was 
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constructed as a victim when her emotionality in general and fear of rape in particular was the 
focus of the representations. In Female Agents, all of the four main female agents (Louise, 
Jeanne, Suzy and Gaelle) are positioned as acting out of desperation, as irrational and 
emotional. Some, such as Jeanne, are only represented with agency in relation to other female 
subjects. When compared to male subjects, Jeanne too is associated with emotionality and 
irrationality. Louise‘s actions are also portrayed through her personal relationships with her 
brother and dead husband. Similarly, both Nasima in Britz and Ulrike in The Baader-Meinhof 
Complex are portrayed as acting out of personal motivations and both show hesitation 
through maternal insights. Another way that Ulrike‘s emotionality is emphasised is the 
writing of her as the feminine subject. In comparison to Gudrun Ensslin, who acts as the 
masculine subject, Ulrike is represented as emotional, weak and passive. Moreover, Lynndie 
England is represented as a victim of her own emotions since it was her feelings for Graner 
which allegedly made her participate in acts of abuse at Abu Ghraib. Janis Karpinski was 
described as ‗extremely emotional‘ in order to undermine her authority and agency and in 
that sense blame her for the Abu Ghraib scandal. By using Karpinski‘s emotionality, her 
identity as a woman was highlighted and her identity as a military officer was forgotten. This 
functioned to write her as an ‗unnatural‘ military leader. 
Following the theoretical and methodological framework set out in Chapters 2 and 3, I have 
also been able to demonstrate that all six empirical cases are simultaneously written as 
heroines, monsters and/or victims. In this sense, all cases include multiple narratives, which 
mean that there is no single reading of these cases. Instead, what is going on is much more 
complicated. Hence, whereas some of the existing literature, for example Sjoberg and Gentry 
(2007), perhaps could be critiqued for giving a rather static account of three different 
narratives of female agency in political violence, this study hopes to be much more nuanced 
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and to show the complexities of meaning construction and the power of discourses through 
visual, textual and cultural representations. Furthermore, it is important to point out that both 
the stories and the discourses emerge from the data, they are not applied to or imposed upon 
the empirical data. This adds to the original contribution of this thesis. Last, as I have touched 
upon in the empirical chapters, the stories of heroines, monsters and victim all emphasise 
‗natural‘ femininity and as such they all communicate the Myth of Motherhood. Hence, even 
if the monster challenges the idea of ‗natural‘ femininity in a specific discursive practice, it 
does not disrupt the Myth of Motherhood on a meta-level. In fact, the othering of the monster 
only work to emphasise ‗natural‘ femininity and underpin the Myth of Motherhood. 
 
 
3. MOTHERHOOD IS ‗EVERYWHERE‘  
By drawing upon poststructuralist theorising and its focus on language, power, discourse and 
meaning construction; feminist thought and its emphasis on gender; and myth as inspired by 
Roland Barthes‘ work, I conceptualised the Myth of Motherhood as a meta-discourse ordering 
representations of gender, agency and political violence. In Chapter 4, the literature review, I 
demonstrated that the feminist literature on motherhood and agency remains focused on, first 
of all, agency in peace and, second, material agency through political subjectivity rather than 
representations of agency through subject positions. Moreover, in the recent contributions to 
the study of female agency in political violence that have taken motherhood seriously 
motherhood is either discussed as one out of many narratives in which women‘s agency in 
political violence is gendered (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007) or as a discourse in which women‘s 
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material agency is denied as in Gentry‘s (2009) ‗twisted materialism‘. In contrast, this 
research project argues that motherhood is integral to all three different stories told in 
representations of female agency in political violence. As such, motherhood is also 
fundamental to the way in which female agency in political violence is enabled. This research 
project, thus, offers a deeper analysis of female agency in political violence by analysing how 
motherhood is linked to what is considered common sense in such representations.  
Neta Crawford (2000) has argued that emotions are ‗everywhere‘ in world politics. Here, I 
argue that motherhood is ‗everywhere‘ in representations of female agency in political 
violence, albeit not necessarily highly visible. The link between ‗natural‘ femininity and 
motherhood is interpreted as common sense and this is why it is useful to think about 
motherhood as a myth. By thinking of motherhood as myth it is possible to understand how 
such representations are gendered and, as a result, to think differently about gender, agency 
and political violence. As a myth, the Myth of Motherhood operates as a meta-discourse 
constituting different discourses in different stories. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
key characterisation of a myth is that the ideologies constructing the myth are unconscious. 
According to Barthes, ‗there are no eternal myths; for it is human history which converts 
reality into speech, and it alone rules the life and the death of mythical language‘ (Barthes 
1993: 94). Therefore, by questioning what is considered to be common sense, I make such 
unconscious ideologies conscious. I re-politicise the Myth of Motherhood as a way to think 
differently about gender, agency and political violence. 
Because of the Myth of Motherhood there is a strong link between ‗natural‘ femininity and 
motherhood. As a result, representations of female agency in political violence told as stories 
of heroines, monsters and victims are actually stories about versions, perversions and 
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inversions of motherhood. This is why motherhood is so central to the storyline in both The 
Baader-Meinhof Complex and Female Agents (whereas fatherhood is invisible). This is why 
the media representation of Faye Turney was focused on her motherhood. This is why 
Lynndie England‘s pregnancy was particularly shocking. This is why Janis Karpinski was 
often referred to as childless. This is why Nasima in Britz is faking motherhood as a cyborg 
body.  
Because of the Myth of Motherhood, a feminised subject is associated with a life-giving 
identity, which, in turn, constructs participation in political violence as ‗unnatural‘. In the 
discursive practices analysed in this research project, the ‗unnaturalness‘ of female agency in 
political violence has been communicated by assigning the feminine subject maternal 
insights, feelings and emotions of guilt. For example, both Ulrike and Nasima are shown 
hesitating about the participation in political violence, especially by hurting parents or 
children. Having become a mother, Lynndie England is portrayed as admitting her guilt 
which functions to ‗save‘ her from the role as a monster. Being held captive, Faye Turney is 
portrayed as having realised her ‗true‘ role in life: as a mother rather than a soldier. In all 
these cases and discursive practices, in heroine-, monster- and victim stories alike, the tension 
between identities of life-giving and life-taking is present, albeit in different ways, and the 
Myth of Motherhood is communicated through the division between ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ 
femininity.  
While heroism can be produced through the subject‘s maternal role, before, during or in 
absence of motherhood, as versions of motherhood emphasising subjects‘ life-giving 
identities, monstrosity is intimately linked with motherhood because the discourses of the 
Monstrous-Feminine, the Deviant Womb and the Femme Castratrice all signify a deviation 
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from the norm of ‗natural‘ femininity which is defined by its life-giving identity. As such, 
monster stories are told as perversions of motherhood and fulfil the purpose of emphasising 
‗natural‘ femininity by showing us what we are not or should not be. Similarly, the writing of 
female subjects in victim stories as either in need of protection or as emotional serves the 
purpose of emphasising ‗natural‘ femininity because the tension between identities of life-
giving and life-taking is removed when the subjects are denied agency in political violence. 
The writing of victims echoes essentialist understandings of gender, agency and violence as it 
‗makes sense‘ that women are ‗naturally‘ emotional and the association with children 
emphasises their need of protection. Because the subjects are denied both authority and 
agency in political violence in these stories, victim stories are inversions of motherhood. 
In the end, stories of heroines, monsters and victims function to discipline interpretations of 
female bodies in representations of female agency in political violence along traditionalist 
understandings of gender as the identities of life-taking and life-giving are rendered 
incompatible and ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised. That motherhood is incompatible with 
agency in political violence means that the subject is often portrayed as having to choose 
between the two different identities, or is being denied one of them. This is problematic 
because such an essentialist approach to gender proceeds from the assumption that sex/gender 
can be easily and objectively read from the body of the human subject and does therefore not 
question the power invested in making such distinctions possible in the first place. In this 
case, this has to do with how female bodies are interpreted and the limitations of agency 
imposed upon them.  
Last, in all empirical cases the Myth of Motherhood is communicated through boundaries of 
‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ femininity. In heroine stories this takes place as the subject‘s heroism is 
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communicated through motherhood/lack of motherhood. In monster stories, the Myth of 
Motherhood is communicated as ‗natural‘ femininity is defined as that which the monster is 
not. In victim stories, ‗natural‘ femininity is emphasised through emotionality and passivity 
as subjects/objects are denied agency in political violence. By using a poststructuralist 
account of gender, agency and political violence, this research project highlights how 
motherhood is fundamental to the way in which subject positions are enabled but also closed 
off by particular discourses of gender, agency and political violence. The writing of heroines, 
monsters and victims, as female bodies with or without agency in political violence, is 
negotiated, and made sense of, through motherhood. In this sense, motherhood is not only a 
discourse in which female agency in political violence is denied as argued in Sjoberg and 
Gentry (2007) and Gentry (2009), but it is also instrumental to the way in which female 
agency in political violence is enabled. Consequently, I argue that motherhood is 
‗everywhere‘ in representations of female agency in political violence. Motherhood is 
communicated as common sense and this is why it is useful to think about motherhood as a 
myth in order to think differently about gender, agency and political violence. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REFLECTION 
So far, I have discussed this study‘s main contribution to the existing feminist IR literature on 
gender, agency and political violence. However, the outcomes of this research also have wider 
implications for how to study IR; the appeal of this research project, therefore, reaches far 
beyond feminist IR theory. Here, I discuss potential avenues for future research, but I also 
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discuss strengths and weaknesses with regards to the theoretical and methodological 
framework for analysis, reflecting upon the changes I would make if I were to embark upon 
this project anew. 
From the onset of this research project, I wanted to include visual representations in my 
discourse analysis of female agency in political violence as I believe that discourse analysis 
should not be limited to the study of linguistics. However, within the literature on discourse 
analysis in IR, I struggled to find sufficient information and guidance as to how to do this in 
practice. Texts such as Hansen (2006) and Campbell (1990) were helpful because they offered 
insights into poststructuralist discourse analysis but they were still limited to state-based 
foreign policy analysis. Other contributions such as Milliken (1999) and Doty (1993), which I 
ended up using, were more useful but, again, they remained focused on textual analysis. I 
realised that I had to venture outside the boundaries of the discipline in order to explain how I 
would undertake my poststructuralist discourse analysis.
27
  I turned to cultural studies because 
of its longer history in analysing the visual realm in sub-fields such as television studies, film 
studies and so on. Consequently, the methodology of this research project is undoubtedly 
eclectic, yet, I believe it needs to be because this is an investigation of the visual, the cultural 
and the political. Hence, in order to analyse the empirical data and to make the arguments I 
make, I needed to consult literatures on popular culture, on representations, on feminism, on 
poststructuralism but also literature on media and culture. The influences from cultural studies 
are also motivated by the use of a postmodernised Barthes, whose writings transgress 
disciplinary boundaries. The contribution to knowledge would simply not be the same had 
these insights been left out. 
                                                             
27 Since I started this research project valuable contributions such as Hansen (2011) and Shepherd (2008) have 
provided insights into how to arrange a methodological framework engaging with visual representations and 
non-state security practices.  
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At the same time, however, I acknowledge that concepts such as interpellation and the abject 
might be seen as in tension with a poststructuralist research project because of their 
background in either Marxist theorising as with Althusser‘s concept of interpellation or 
structural psychoanalysis as Kristeva‘s abject. I would like to emphasise, however, that in a 
similar way to how Cynthia Weber (2005: 10) discusses ideology in her postmodernised 
reading of Barthes, I only use the concept of interpellation in the context of such an 
understanding of unconscious ideology. This means that interpellation is linked to the use of a 
postmodernised Barthes rather than as linked to ideology in a traditional Marxist and state-
centric sense. I use interpellation in order to demonstrate how the Myth of Motherhood is 
communicated as common sense in order to get at how representations of female agency in 
political violence are written as stories of heroines, monsters and victims around the boundary 
of ‗natural‘/‗unnatural‘ femininity. The difference is that I use interpellation through 
Foucauldian notions of subjectification rather than through the idea of an extended state 
apparatus as a means of perpetuating ideology.
28
 
Through the process of undertaking this research project, I have learned immensely. 
Reflecting on possible changes if I was to embark upon this research project anew, the 
following questions spring to mind: Should I have had a research question more clearly 
associated with a single theory? Should I have used more easily accessible case studies? 
Should I have just analysed ‗real‘ cases? Or should I have used cases from popular culture 
only in order to situate the thesis more clearly within the popular culture and IR literature? 
Should I have used a smaller number of cases? 
As mentioned above, one of the aims is to demonstrate that similar gendered stories are 
produced in both mass media and popular culture, hence, had I only analysed empirical cases 
                                                             
28 See Purvis and Hunt (1993) for a discussion on the compatibility of discourse and ideology. 
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from popular culture, or alternatively, if I had only analysed ‗real‘ cases from mass media, I 
would not have been able to make the argument that both ‗real‘ and fictional stories are 
representations of events. Certainly, using only fictional cases from popular culture would 
have enabled me to make a more powerful contribution to the sub-field of ‗popular culture 
and IR‘, but some highly valuable aspects of the thesis would have been left out; for example, 
I would have been unable to comment on the discursive function of the fear of rape in the case 
of Faye Turney.  
Despite the possibility that it may have compromised the depth of analysis presented in this 
dissertation, as nuances in the way in which motherhood is communicated would necessarily 
have been left out, if I were to embark upon this research project anew, I would probably 
study a smaller number of cases, perhaps only one ‗real‘ and one fictional. There are aspects 
within each case presented above that I could not elaborate on given the constraints of a 
doctoral dissertation. The theoretical and methodological framework for analysis, however, 
would not have changed, as the aims of the project would have been the same. This research 
project does not offer an application of a theoretical and methodological framework to 
empirical data in a traditional sense, but the framework for analysis developed in this research 
project is in itself an original contribution to knowledge as it opens up new avenues for 
research. In this way, I believe the elaborate theoretical and methodological framework 
contributes to the discipline of critical IR in a way that would not be possible had I gone down 
a more conventional route for my analysis. 
A couple of months after I had started this research project Sjoberg and Gentry‘s book 
Mothers, Monsters, Whores was published. Initially, I was worried that the research I had set 
out for myself to do had already been done. However, I soon realised how the different angle 
of my work could take many of their arguments on board and build on it. As I have explained 
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above, the findings of this research project move beyond theirs because of a different way in 
which motherhood is analysed, how agency is defined and how political violence is defined. 
Still, my work is indebted to theirs because it made it easier for me to situate my work within 
feminist IR. This research project is also indebted to Cynthia Weber‘s development of 
Barthes‘ mythology framework, without which the conceptualisation of a Myth of 
Motherhood would probably not have happened. 
Even though this project‘s main contribution is within feminist IR, thanks to its imaginative 
theoretical and methodological framework, it also speaks to literature engaged with popular 
culture and IR, with critical security studies and with the aesthetic turn in IR (Bleiker 2001). 
Yet, this research project is limited in the sense that it cannot engage substantially with these 
sub-fields. For example, during the process of undertaking this research project, I became 
increasingly aware of the centrality of emotions to the communicative processes of 
representations. This was most obvious in monster stories. Statements such as that the photos 
depicting England from the Abu Ghraib made people sick and expressions of revulsion 
indicate that something happens when people read such representations. However, even in 
victim stories some representations aimed to evoke emotional responses. For example, we are 
often asked to sympathise with the female subject in the victim story. In this way, we are in a 
sense expected to ‗feel‘ their pain, their desperation and their emotions in order to understand 
why they chose to become perpetrators of political violence. Although, extremely interesting 
and understudied, the theoretical and methodological framework deployed in this research 
project simply does not offer space to elaborate on such a possible contribution to knowledge. 
Instead, I see the engagement with emotions and emotionality as one possible avenue for 
future research on gender, agency and political violence. I also believe we have to study the 
everyday for a more holistic and nuanced understanding of how politics informs the cultural 
254 
 
and how the cultural informs the political. This is how I see the academic field of critical IR 
theory developing. 
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